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DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CHARACTER OF SUPRANATIONALISM: THE
EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Peter L. Lindseth*
This Article argues, from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, that
supranational institutions are best understood as administrative in charac-
ter, and then explores the implications of this argument by looking at the
European Community. The author concludes that the Community's "demo-
cratic deficit"flows primarily from an inability to establish democractically-
legitimate hierarchical supervision over supranational technocrats-a prob-
lem bound up with the historical relationship between demos, democracy
and national political institutions as cultural symbols of popular sover-
eignty. The author examines aspects of Community law designed to main-
tain forms of national control, as well as two alternative strategies-democ-
ratization through the European Parliament, and "non-hierarchical"
legitimation through transparency and participation rights in the Commu-
nity regulatory process.
Finding these strategies ultimately inadequate, in themselves, to the
needs of democratic legitimation, the author turns to judicial review, criti-
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University, Duke, and Yale, and I am very grateful for the many provocative questions and
comments raised during those visits.
Editor's Note: To guide readers through references to the various European
Community and European Union treaties, as amended, this Article uses the following
abbreviations. "EC Treaty" refers to the Treaty establishing the European Community, as
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 (expected to enter
into force on May 1, 1999) (for the consolidated version of the EG Treaty after entry into
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173). "TEU" refers to the Treaty
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. 1 (C 191), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 573 (1992)
(signed at Maastricht) (entered into force on November 1, 1993), as amended by the
Treaty of Amsterdam (for a consolidated version of the TEU after entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, see 1999 O.J. (C 340) 145). Unless otherwise specified, when citing
to the EC Treaty and the TEU, this Article refers to the renumbered treaty provisions after
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, followed in parentheses by the former
numbering. Where appropriate, this Article uses "EEG Treaty" to refer to the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, as amended by the Single European Act
(SEA), Feb. 17, 1986 (signed at Luxembourg), Feb. 28, 1986 (signed at the Hague), 1987
O.J. (L 169) 1 (entered into force on July 1, 1987) (for a consolidated version of the EEC
Treaty after the entry into force of the SEA, see Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, Treaties Establishing the European Communities 207 (1987)).
The "Treaty of Rome" refers to the original Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (signed at Rome).
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cally analyzing the deference shown by the European Court ofJustice to Com-
munity legislative decisions relative to the more democratically-legitimate
Member States. Finding this broad deference inconsistent with the Commu-
nity's administrative character, the author outlines an alternative ap-
proach-a substantive presumption against supranational legislative au-
tonomy-as well as a new procedure-a "European Conflicts Tribunal"-
to resolve conflicts over the scope of the relative legislative authority of the
Member States and the Community. The purpose of these reforms would be to
mediate between the legitimate needs of legislative harmonization at the Com-
munity leve4 on the one hand, and the persistence of the nation-state as the
historically legitimate symbol of democratic sovereignty, on the other-a ten-
sion that arguably exists in any supranational body.
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INTRODUCTION: A NEW DIMENSION TO AN OLD PROBLEM
Ensuring democratic control over delegated normative power has
been a major constitutional challenge in the twentieth-century adminis-
[Vol. 99:628
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trative state.' As the century draws to a close, however, this challenge is
taking on a whole new dimension, one intimately related to the changing
nature of the nation-state as a locus of sovereignty and governance in a
globalizing economy.2 In varying degrees, we are witnessing delegations
of normative power to institutions operating outside the confines of the
nation-state, generally under the auspices of trade agreements and the
institutional mechanisms that they create. The identifying chalacteristic
of the emerging legal order is the formal role given to non-national deci-
sionmakers in the elaboration and/or control of regulatory norms that
apply within national borders.
From the national standpoint, these decisionmakers often enjoy a
significant degree of legal autonomy, in that no particular state is guaran-
teed a formal veto over their supranational policy choices.3 In its most
rudimentary form, this autonomous "supranational normative power"
tends to be adjudicative, as under the dispute settlement mechanism of
the World Trade Organization (WTO).4 In its more advanced form, as
under the European Community,5 it can also be specifically and quite
extensively legislative in nature, relying on supranational institutions to
1. The term "delegated normative power" is used here in both a legislative and an
adjudicative sense, encompassing the authority of administrative bodies to make rules of
general application (quasi-legislative power) as well as the power to elaborate the meaning
of legislative provisions on a case-by-case basis through administrative adjudication. For a
discussion of the legal and political mechanisms that have developed to control delegated
normative power at the national level, see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 Modem L. Rev. 1
(1993) [hereinafter MacCormick, Sovereign State]; Neil MacCormick, Sovereignty,
Democracy and Subsidiarity, in Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of
Europe 95 (R. Bellamy et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter MacCormick, Sovereignty, Democracy
and Subsidiarity].
3. Whether this formal-legal autonomy results in actual autonomy for supranational
decisionmakers is extremely difficult to measure and thus subject to debate among social
scientists. See, e.g., Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the
European Community, 51 Int'l Org. 99, 110 (1997); see also infra notes 288-294 and
accompanying text.
4. The new dispute settlement procedures should play a critical role in elaborating
the content of otherwise vague treaty norms, almost certainly in ways not entirely expected
by the original signatories. Given this delegated normative power, it is perhaps not
surprising that legal scholars are beginning to examine the WTO's dispute settlement
procedures in administrative law terms. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson,
WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments,
90 Am. J. Int'l L. 193 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovemment Parties, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 295 (1996);
Kim Rubenstein & Jenny Schultz, Bringing Law and Order to International Trade:
Administrative Law Principles and the GATT/WTO, 11 St John's J. Legal Comment. 271
(1996).
5. The focus of this article is on the institutions of the European Community, not
those of the European Union. Only the institutions of the EC are truly "supranational" in
character, whereas those of the Union remain intergovernmental. The relevance of the
EC/EU distinction is explained in greater detail below. See infra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
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make rules of general application. In both instances, nation-states have
relinquished a measure of control over the content of regulatory norms
in the interest of more efficient and coherent international cooperation
and coordination.
This Article views supranational delegation as the next stage in a pro-
cess of diffusion and fragmentation of normative power that has dramati-
cally altered the balance of power at the national level over the course of
the twentieth century. Central to this process has been a shift in norma-
tive power out of the legislative realm into an increasingly complex and
variegated administrative sphere, one which now extends to the suprana-
tional level. Nationally, this shift has involved three interrelated institu-
tional elements: first, the assertion of executive predominance within the
state, deemed necessary to assure rational internal management as well as
the projection of national political and economic power on an interna-
tional level; second, the political and institutional triumph within the exec-
utive of the technocrat, for whom a "depoliticized" expertise and a re-
spect for the tenets of administrative legality (subject to some form of
judicial review) have served as the primary bases of legitimacy; and third,
the widespread use of enabling legislation, which, rather than specifying
regulatory norms directly, delegates this authority to an administrative
agency.6
These institutional elements are also manifest in the phenomenon of
supranational delegation, albeit in somewhat modified form. National
executives and bureaucracies continue to play the central role in defining
national policy interests and in defending them in supranational institu-
tions, but now the purpose is "to lift the management of the market to a
more effective systemic level." 7 Enabling legislation takes on a new
guise-a treaty or other international agreement transferring normative
power to non-national technocratic agencies-but now the aim is "to ad-
dress problems beyond the effective political control of even the largest
6. For a theoretical discussion of the changing nature of legislation in the modem
administrative state, see Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State,
89 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 380-85 (1989) (describing "transitive" versus "intransitive"
legislation).
7. Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur.
L. 27, 66 (1998) (citing Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. Common Mkt. Studies 473
(1993); Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (1992)).
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individual states."8 National legislatures play, at best, a decidedly secon-
dary role in the process of supranational policymaking.9
A. The "Democratic Deficit" - National and Supranational
As with delegation to national administrative institutions, the phe-
nomenon of supranational delegation-particularly that of legislative
power-raises important questions of democratic legitimacy that this Arti-
cle explores.1 0 There is, one might say, a basic "democratic deficit" (to
use a phrase that has gained wide currency in Europe) common to both
forms of delegation. Each involves the transfer of normative power to
agents that are not electorally responsible in any direct sense to the "peo-
ple" whose "sovereignty," or at least some portion of it, the agents are said
to exercise. 1 On the national level, administrative agencies are responsi-
ble politically, not to the people directly, but to their representative insti-
tutions (executive and legislative), which are the privileged means by
which the democratic preferences of the national community are trans-
8. Sauter, supra note 7, at 66; see also Inger-Johanne Sand, Understanding the New
Forms of Governance: Mutually Interdependent, Reflexive, Destabilised and Competing
Institutions, 4 Eur. L.J. 271, 286 & n.32 (1998). The purpose of the present article is not to
identify the causal factors driving delegation but rather to examine how delegation-
notably supranational delegation-can be reconciled with democratic principles. There is
a large literature, especially in the United States, that seeks to explain why delegation
occurs or how regulatory norms are ultimately shaped. For a detailed examination, see
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1998). For a discussion of theories of regulation as they relate to
Europe, see Michelle Egan & Dieter Wolf, Regulation and Comitology The EC
Committee System in Regulatory Perspective, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 499 (1998).
9. This phenomenon is especially pronounced in the EC/EU. See Deirdre M. Curtin,
Postnational Democracy- The European Union in Search of a Political Philosophy 48
(1997) [hereinafter Curtin, Postnational Democracy] ("[Tihe process of closer European
integration ... has had the effect of fragmenting and dispersing the legislative power of
the individual constituent nation-states. At the same time the excessive empowerment of
the executive results in a neo absolutist process of decision-making with dramatic
consequences for notions of democracy enshrined at the national level.").
10. Part I, infra, provides a general overview of the criteria of democratic legitimacy
used in this article.
11. The quotation marks signify that terms like "people" or "sovereignty" (or, for that
matter, "nation" or "democracy") are analytical constructs that can be descriptively
problematic, and they should therefore not be endowed with any inherent meaning apart
from historical and cultural context. They belong to a cultural system of interpretation
built up over time which both shapes popular perceptions of events and the changing
structures of material life-institutional, economic, and social-and controls the meaning
that individuals give to social and political action affecting the stability of the governing
regime. The cultural system of interpretation also evolves historically-that is, its
underlying notions become imbued with new meaning-in response to those same events,
structural changes, and actions. See generally Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History (1985).
From this perspective, the question of democratic legitimacy is not political-theoretical but
historical and cultural: The popular acceptance of a particular regime is rooted in its
perceived linkage to the "people," however that term is defined in a given time and place.
On the formal-institutional structures that have developed historically to establish that
linkage, see infra Part IA.
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lated into general legal terms. Institutions exercising supranational nor-
mative power, however, exist in an even more attenuated "two step" rela-
tionship with the people, or rather the "peoples" of the various
participating states. 12 Because supranational bodies lack the requisite di-
rect connection to the perceived source of sovereign power upon which
democratic legitimacy is based, this Article views them as essentially ad-
ministrative in character.
Viewed from an administrative perspective, how might the normative
output of these emergent supranational bodies be legitimized in demo-
cratic terms? There is a tendency among those who stress the benefits of
delegation and the virtues of administrative governance (whether nation-
ally or supranationally) to measure legitimacy in terms of expertise and
efficient policy outcomes, with some form of legal control-judicial re-
view-serving as perhaps the only effective means of checking the exer-
cise of administrative rulemaking.13 If this were so, then technocratic as-
sertions of efficiency and expertise, along with the observance of some
form of supranational "legality," might be adequate, in themselves, to le-
gitimize the normative output of supranational administrative bodies.' 4
National experiences with the development of the administrative state,
however, strongly suggest that this route to democratic legitimation is in-
adequate in itself. In most states, forms of participation and transparency
rights are developing in some degree as a further check on administrative
power and as a complement to legal control; indeed, these rights may
point to the emergence of new forms of "democratic" representation in
the modem administrative state.' 5 More importantly, however, even as
transparency and participation rights have taken on an increasingly im-
portant legitimating function, traditional forms of hierarchical supervi-
sion by elected representatives (both executive and legislative) have re-
mained of paramount importance, providing the essential legitimating
mechanism for the exercise of delegated normative power within the ad-
ministrative sphere.' 6
This persistent need for democratically legitimate, hierarchical-polit-
ical oversight and control over administrative decision makers points to
perhaps the most problematic aspect of supranational delegation. By def-
inition, in a supranational body there is no democratically-legitimate hier-
12. The notion of a "two-step" relationship is taken from Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1239, 1240 (1989).
13. See generally infra Part VA-; infra notes 295-299 and accompanying text.
14. One commentator has gone so far as to express the view that "[e]fficiency may
even substitute democracy as a source of legitimation or as a legitimating argument."
Markus Jachtenfuchs, Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance, 1 Eur. LJ. 115,
129 (1995).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
[Vol. 99:628
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER OF THE EC
archical superior, as we understand that notion in a national sense.17
Rather, there are at best indirect political controls exercised by national
executives over otherwise-autonomous supranational, technocratic agents
who owe their loyalty to the membership of the supranational body as a
whole rather than to any one particular state. Although the pursuit of
efficient international cooperation may demand a shift in the locus of
regulation to reasonably autonomous supranational institutions, popular
notions of legitimation and control have remained wedded to the hierar-
chical political institutions (executive and legislative) of the "sovereign"
nation-state. 18 In short, the evolving forms of supranational policymak-
ing are out-pacing our traditional, state-based conceptions of how dele-
gated normative power should be democratically controlled.
B. The Example of the European Community
This Article explores this problem of legitimation and control in su-
pranational bodies by looking at the experience of the European Com-
munity.19 The Community example is telling, I argue, because it is per-
haps the most advanced model of supranationalism that we know,
exercising not only adjudicative but also executive and legislative func-
tions as well. Although purportedly an entity possessing only enumerated
powers, the scope of the Community's normative authority has steadily
increased since its inception in the 1950s, partly due to explicit transfers
from the Member States, but more importantly due to an expansive inter-
pretation of Community competences by the Community institutions
themselves, notably the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 20 Because of
the dramatic expansion in normative power at the supranational level in
Europe over the last forty years, it was not uncommon to see the Euro-
17. Emblematic of the problem is the recent body of literature in the social sciences
that examines the problems and prospects of "Governance without Government." See
Jachtenfuchs, supra note 14, at 121 (citing, e.g., Governance without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics (James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992)); see also
Sand, supra note 8; Ange Wiener, The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission
Belt and Prism of New Governance, 4 Eur. Lj. 294 (1998). On the increasing recourse to
the notion of "governance" in the social science literature to describe the EC/EU
phenomenon, see Kenneth A. Armstrong, Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal
Dimension of European Integration, 36J. Common Mkt. Studies 153, 168 (1998).
18. Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1014, 1055 (1997)
[hereinafter Picciotto, Networks]; see also Sand, supra note 8, at 289.
19. I use the term "European Community" to encompass the three separate European
communities founded in the 1950s: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
founded in 1951; the European Community (formerly the European Economic
Community, or EEC), founded in 1957; and the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), also founded in 1957. Since the 1960s, the three communities have shared
institutions (Council, Commission, Parliament, and the Court ofJustice), and, for the sake
of simplicity, I refer to them simply as the EC. Together, the three European communities
constitute the "first pillar" of the European Union. For further institutional background
on the EC and the EU, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
20. See generally infra Part VI.B-C.
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pean Community (and now the European Union 21 ) described as some-
thing more than a mere international organization of otherwise in-
dependent sovereign states. Rather, it has often been argued that the
Community has taken on the character of a constitutional polity in its
own right-a self-legitimating, autonomous level of governance in a fed-
eral-type system-characterized by "a high degree of pooling of sover-
eignty, and important roles given to centralized institutions."22
This Article adds to an already extensive body of scholarly literature
critical of this "constitutionalist" characterization of the European Com-
munity.23 In important respects, it challenges, as others have, the "vener-
able federalist vision" of an ever-expanding, supranational, institutional
order, characterized by an autonomous legislative process that is uniform
and undifferentiated across all issue areas as in a constitutional polity.24
However, in making this argument, I also hope to develop further an
alternative perspective on the legal nature of Community institutions and
of supranationalism more generally, one drawn from principles of admin-
istrative law.25 The constitutional character of Europe's supranational in-
stitutions cannot simply be inferred from their undisputedly broad range
of delegated sovereign powers: Administrative bodies, by definition, also
exercise delegated sovereign powers, although their source is not consti-
tutional but rather simply legislative, and their legitimacy is rooted not in
direct democratic control (i.e., elections) but in other forms of political
and legal supervision. 26 Despite much of the constitutionalist vocabulary
used to describe the Community-by lawyers and judges especially27-
the EC is not unlike any other supranational body exercising delegated
normative power in that, from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, it
is fundamentally of an administrative character. The Community draws
its authority not from a constitutional enactment of some definable Euro-
21. On the institutional distinction between the EC and the EU, see infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
22. Introduction, International Regulatory Competition and Coordination:
Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States 29 (Bratton et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter International Regulatory Competition and Coordination]; see also
infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. For an overview, see J.H.H.
Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 354 (1996-1997).
24. Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaldis, Keynote Article: Federalist Ideals and
Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 36 [Annual Review] J. Common Mkt.
Studies 13, 16 (1998) (arguing that "[the teleological ideal-a 'United States of Europe'
characterized by centralized, uniform, universal and undifferentiated institutions-is no
longer an appropriate standard (if it ever was one) by which to judge further steps toward
integration").
25. For a more detailed elaboration of the analytical framework drawn from
administrative law as it specifically relates to the EC/EU, see infra Part I.C (referring also
to commentators who have advanced similar views).
26. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
27. On the advent of the constitutionalist interpretation, particularly among lawyers
and judges, see generally Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23.
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pean "demos," or people-the prerequisite of democratic legitimacy2 8-
but generally from lawful transfers of normative power from national par-
liaments as representatives of their respective national communities. 29
Like an administrative body, the key sources of legitimacy in the Commu-
nity are found in political and legal, and not directly democratic, control
mechanisms.30 From this perspective, Community institutions operate as
a multi-function agency-a category Americans know well-with execu-
tive, legislative, and adjudicative jurisdiction stretching across vast areas
of economic and social regulation, unique in that it takes its mandate
from multiple political principals, i.e., the Member States and their
electorates. 31
28. The relationship between demos and democratic legitimacy is explored in greater
detail infra Part IV, which discusses extensively the thesis advanced by Joseph Weiler, Does
Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 Eur.
LJ. 219 (1995) [hereinafter Weiler, Demos].
29. It is of course true that Community institutions have also benefitted from several
transfers of normative power directly from the "peoples" of certain Member States, via
popular referenda revising their respective constitutions (particularly following the Treaty
of European Union of 1992). For an overview, see The Ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty- Issues, Debates and Future Implications (Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker
eds., 1994). Even if such referenda took place in all Member States-and they did not-
they should not be analogized to a constitutional transfer of sovereignty that might occur
on the national level, from the "people" to national parliaments or courts. Constitutional
amendment (whether by referendum or not) was necessary as a matter of domestic law, not
because the several European "peoples" intended to create a separate entity with
independent constitutional status, but because the revised EC Treaty permitted the
exercise of an autonomous rulemaking power outside the confines of the nation-state, thus
infringing upon national sovereignty. See, e.g., the decision of the French Conseil
constitutionnel, no. 97-394 DC, 31 d~c. 1997, Cons. const., Rec. 344 (holding that France
needed to amend its constitution prior to the entry into effect of certain provisions of the
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, following the same logic that the Conseil applied to the
Maastricht Treaty in Decision no. 92-308, 9 avril 1992, Cons. const., Rec. 55).
30. See infra Part IA on political-legal versus democratic legitimation, especially notes
66-76 and accompanying text. The Community has considerably expanded the powers of
the elected European Parliament as a means of introducing democratic control, but this
effort is highly problematic for both practical and theoretical reasons. See generally infra
Part IV.
31. See infra Part II. This characterization of the Community is, in many senses, a
return to an original understanding of European integration as, fundamentally, an
executive-technocratic entity-that is, before the claim of constitutionalism invaded much
of the legal and scholarly discourse. On the original executive-technocratic character of
the Community, see William Wallace & Julie Smith, Democracy or Technocracy?
European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent, 18(3) W. Eur. Pol. 137, 143
(1995) (describing the nature of the Community envisioned in the 1950s as one of
"[e]nlightened administration on behalf of uninformed publics, in cooperation with
affected interests and subject to the approval of national governments"). From the
perspective of parliamentary control (both national and European), it could well be said
that the roots of the democratic deficit are to be found in the original executive and
technocratic power structure of the Treaty. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 Yale LJ. 2403, 2430 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Transformation]. Indeed,
not only did the Community mirror the changing balance of power in the administrative
state at the national level in the 1950s and 1960s, but it fostered this shift as well. See
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The constitutionalist interpretation of the Community-the position
of the European Court of Justice-unjustifiably imputes a kind of in-
dependent legitimacy to Community institutions that they ultimately do
not possess apart from delegations made by the Member States. In the
development of its legal doctrines over four decades, the ECJ has pro-
ceeded in ways that at times imply that this mediated relationship with
the source of the Community's sovereign power did not exist,3 2 even
though the absence of a democratic relationship with the peoples of the
various Member States is perhaps the most persistent and troubling as-
pect of European constitutionalism. The ECJ has attempted to circum-
vent the absence of democratic legitimacy in the Community through a
sort of rhetorical sleight of hand, by speaking of the EC's constitutional
character as "based on the rule of law," in which the Court itself serves as
the ultimate legitimating mechanism, rather than on democratic con-
trol.3 3 By asserting, however, that the institutional legitimacy of the Com-
munity results primarily from forms of legal rather than democratic control,
the ECJ in fact betrays the limitations of its constitutionalist analogy and
points to the administrative character of the EC.
Despite the flaws in its constitutionalist approach, it nevertheless
needs to be acknowledged that the Court has been a highly successful
agent of European integration for much of its history. In the three de-
cades following the EEC's establishment in 1957, the Member States
largely acquiesced in the Court's effort to elaborate autonomous suprana-
tional norms through the development of such fundamental doctrines as
direct effect, supremacy, and implied powers, each of which helped to lay
the legal foundation upon which subsequent political integration could
build.3 4 And yet, despite this considerable achievement, it must equally
be acknowledged that over the last decade the judicial effort to constitu-
tionalize the Community has run up against a number of problematic
political realities as the Member States have reasserted their primary role
in the integration process. As European integration shifted from ajudi-
cial to a more political mode in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Mem-
ber States introduced a number of structural and substantive legal
Curtin, Postnational Democracy, supra note 9, at 45 ("European integration has
considerably increased the power of (national) administrations while making it much
more difficult for national parliaments to exert their powers of control."); see alsoJos6 de
Areilza, Sovereignty or Management? The Dual Character of the EC's Supranationalism-
Revisited, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working Paper Series no. 2/95, at 5 <http://
www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/papers/95/9502ind.hml> (referring to "a
growing distortion on [sic] the national vertical and horizontal mechanisms of division of
powers, as well as the weakening of other internal democratic checks and balances")
(print-out of the online version on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Paul D.
Marquardt, Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and Constitutionalism in the
European Union, 4 DukeJ. Comp. & Int'l L. 265, 269-70 (1994) [hereinafter Marquardt,
Deficit Reduction].
32. See generally infra Part VI.B-C.
33. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-6102 para. 21.
34. See generally infra Parts II.A and VI.B.
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changes that are difficult to square with the constitutionalist perspective
of the ECJ. These include the insertion of the so-called "subsidiarity"
principle into the EC Treaty, the establishment of the "pillar structure" to
govern the relationship between the supranational EC and the intergov-
ernmental EU, and the move toward "variable geometry" in a number of
substantive domains through opt-outs, derogation rights, and procedures
for "closer cooperation" among certain Member States.
3 5
The constitutionalist perspective cannot adequately account for
these sorts of changes other than to see them as troubling deviations
from the constitutionalist ideal-as evidence of a "Europe of bits and
pieces."36 This Article asserts that an administrative perspective better
explains the recent evolution of the EC's institutional law, by viewing
these changes as part of a political and legal strategy by which the Mem-
ber States (the democratically-legitimate principals in the system) have
sought to limit the normative autonomy of the Community as their agent,
while not unduly impeding the progress of legislative and regulatory har-
monization.3 7 This balancing act-characterized by the desire to retain a
measure of political control while also allowing integration to proceed-
is particularly pronounced in the so-called "comitology system," or the
regulatory committee system through which much of the subordinate leg-
islation of the Community must now pass.3 8 As one observer notes, the
dominant forms of policy coordination in the Community (i.e., the "long
Community tradition of administration by committees of experts" g39 ) are
35. See infra Part III.C. As Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, supra note 24, have pointed out,
when in 1988 Margaret Thatcher called for a "multi-track" Europe, her position was
"dismissed as the height of Euroscepticism." Id. at 35. However, "[i]n the decade that
followed, the debate over Europe has been turned on its head. Today it is the more
federalist countries that demand differentiation and flexibility-now termed
'differentiated solidarity', 'avant-garde', 'federal core', or 'enhanced co-operation'." Id.
36. See, e.g., Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of
Bits and Pieces, 30 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 17 (1993) [hereinafter Curtin, A Europe of Bits
and Pieces]; see also Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, supra note 24, at 15-16 (describing
widespread dissatisfaction among European "federalists" with the Treaty of Amsterdam);Jo
Shaw, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy, 4 Eur. LJ. 63;
80-81 (1998) (describing variable geometry, on the one hand, as a "typically technocratic
solution," and, on the other, as evidence that "the 'constitution' of the EU is an evolving
rather than fixed entity").
37. Cf. Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, supra note 24, at 33 ("What governments and the
public seem to desire today-as they always have-is a European structure that solves
practical problems while undermining state sovereignty to the minimum extent possible.").
38. The Council of Ministers established the comitology system to control the
subdelegation of additional rulemaking powers to the European Commission. Rather than
simply confer such powers on the Commission outright-as permitted under Article 145
(now Article 205) of the EC Treaty-the Council issued the Comitology Decision on July
13, 1987, Council Decision 87/373/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33, which outlined three
alternative types of committee procedures for the adoption of subordinate legislation. See
generally infra Part V.C, especially notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
39. Sauter, supra note 7, at 68. For further historical background and a legal
overview, see Ellen Vos, The Rise of Committees, 3 Eur. Lj. 210 (1997).
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"difficult to fit into existing constitutional categories, and even more diffi-
cult to square with democratic legitimacy: a tough challenge to [Euro-
pean] constitutional theory."40 The administrative perspective advocated
here, it is hoped, can provide a means to overcome the disconnect be-
tween much of the prevailing-and recognizably inadequate-constitu-
tionalist discourse regarding the Community and the administrave reality
of its institutions.41
My analysis involves three basic elements. First, I examine, in admin-
istrative law terms, the absence of democratically-legitimate political con-
trol over the Community's "legislative" output. I then explore changes in
the institutional law of the Community that, I argue, the Member States
implemented in response to that absence. 42 Second, I consider two
widely-discussed alternative strategies to legitimize Community action:
democratization through an increase in the powers of the European
Parliament,43 and "non-hierarchical" legitimation through an increase in
transparency and participation rights in the Community regulatory pro-
cess. 44 I conclude, however, that both strategies are unpromising because
each ultimately depends-although for different reasons-on the estab-
lishment of legitimate political control outside the confines of the nation-
state, which is a problematic proposition at this point in Europe's history.
Third and finally, I turn to methods of Treaty interpretation as means of
promoting democratic legitimacy, focusing particularly on the extent to
which the institutions of the Community-qua supranational administra-
tive agency-are entitled to deference in their interpretation of the scope
of the Community's delegated authority relative to the more democrati-
cally-legitimate Member States.45
It is on this third point that one should discern what I regard to be
the most important legal consequence of my analysis. Because the Euro-
pean Community's legislative process should be viewed as primarily ad-
ministrative in character, it should not enjoy the deference usually ac-
corded a normal constitutional legislature, something akin to the rational
basis test in the United States, which has been the ECJ's effective practice
to date.46 This Article argues for the abandonment of the ECJ's "prefer-
40. Sauter, supra note 7, at 68. For an analogous view from within the ECJ itself, see
David A.O. Edward, What Kind of Law Does Europe Need? The Role of Law, Lawyers and
Judges in Contemporary European Integration, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1, 13 (1998-1999)
(arguing that the "structure [of governance in the EC/EU] does not fit well with
conventional theories of separation of powers or of federal structures").
41. For a similar effort to overcome this sort of disconnect, see generally Moravcsik &
Nicolaidis, supra note 24.
42. See infra Part IlI.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra Part V.
45. See infra Parts VI & VII.
46. For further discussion, see infra Part VI.C.2, especially notes 410, 417-434 and
accompanying text. The Court takes a less deferential line only where one branch
(generally the Council) argues for a "legal basis" that constrains Community competence
and maximizes Member State control. See infra notes 373-377 and accompanying text.
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ence for Europe," the method that has prevailed over nearly four de-
cades, and the application of a general interpretive presumption against
the Community's normative autonomy. In other words, where there is
ambiguity in the EC Treaty with regard to the relative balance of power
between the Community and the Member States, European courts should
favor any reasonable interpretation that maximizes Member State con-
trol, because national officials are the more legitimate decisionmakers.
47
As further support for this presumption, I look specifically to the
subsidiarity principle, which the Member States added to the EC Treaty
via the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992.48 European courts
should regard subsidiarity, at a minimum, as an interpretive principle
akin to the nondelegation doctrine in the United States.4 9 The purpose
of viewing subsidiarity in this way would not be to create insurmountable
obstacles to supranational delegation, but rather simply to avoid Treaty
constructions that amount to democratically problematic, open-ended
transfers of normative power to the Community's essentially administra-
tive institutions.
Along the same lines, because the ECJ's own adjudicative authority is
intimately bound up with the administrative character of the Community,
this Article argues that the European Court of Justice should not possess
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the extent of the Community's delegated
legislative authority-the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz-which the ECJ
has effectively claimed to date. Rather, the Community must develop a
system to resolve conflicts between the two orders of jurisdiction (na-
tional and supranational) in a manner that respects the legitimate pre-
rogatives of both spheres of governance. I thus propose the establish-
ment of a "European Conflicts Tribunal" akin to the French Tribunal des
Conflits to resolve disputes over competences. 50
47. The inspiration for this presumption is drawn from the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984). My outlook is similar to Paul Stephan's proposed legal "skepticism"
toward internationally-produced legislation. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 681, 732
(1996-1997). See infra Part VIA.
48. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994)
[hereinafter Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously]. Since the entry into force of the
TEU, EC Treaty Article 5 (ex Article 3b) has provided the following:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
49. For the American nondelegation doctrine analogue, see Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) [hereinafter Benzene]. For further
discussion of the subsiditrity/nondelegation comparison, see infra notes 459-487 and
accompanying text.
50. See infra Part VII.
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Cognizant, however, that "not all legal problems can be solved le-
gally,"51 I would build an additional, formalized political check into the
otherwise essentially judicial conflicts process that I outline in this Article.
In the event that a dissenting Member State is dissatisfied with a legal
decision of the Conflicts Tribunal, it should have the right to appeal the
matter to a political body comprised of the heads of state or government
of the Member States, the European Council.5 2 If the Member State con-
cerned cannot negotiate a satisfactory political solution within the Euro-
pean Council, then it should have the right-subject to significant proce-
dural conditions precedent-to opt out of the disputed legislation.53
This sort of opt-out right would be another manifestation of the emerg-
ing variable geometry in Community law, but more importantly it would
reinforce political responsibility at the national level for the normative
output of the Community, thus augmenting its democratic legitimacy.5 4
C. The Ameican Perspective
Much (but obviously not all) of the inspiration for the administrative
perspective brought to bear here is of American origin, which is perhaps
understandable given the nationality of the author. Looking at the EC
from an American administrative law perspective, however, is not merely
an analytical conceit: Many influential European commentators, as a
means of addressing the democratic deficit in Europe, increasingly draw
inspiration from what they perceive to be the American model of par-
ticipatory, non-hierarchical administration.5 5 The problem, however, is
51. Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 Eur. L.J. 259, 265
(1995) [hereinafter MacCormick, Sovereignty Now].
52. This body also includes each State's foreign ministers as well as the President of
the European Commission and the Commissioner for External Affairs. It is charged with
defining "the general political guidelines" of the European Union. TEU art. 4 (ex art. D).
53. See infra notes 517-521 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 517-521 and accompanying text.
55. The work of Giandomenico Majone provides the most prominent example. See,
e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Europe's "Democratic Deficit": The Question of Standards, 4
Eur. L.J. 5, 18-22 (1998) [hereinafter Majone, "Democratic Deficit"]; Giadomenico
Majone, The European Community: An "Independent Fourth Branch of Government"?,
in Verfassungen ffir ein Ziviles Europa 23 (Gert Briggemeier ed., 1994) [hereinafter
Majone, Independent Fourth Branch]; Giadomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory
State in Europe, 17 W. Eur. Pol. 77, 98 (1994) [hereinafter Majone, Regulatory State]; see
also Giadomenico Majone, Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why
Democracies Need Non-Majoritarian Institutions 6-8 (European Univ. Inst., Working
Paper RSC No. 96/57, 1996) [hereinafter Majone, Temporal Consistency] <http://
www.iue.it/RSC/WP-Texts/96_57t.hml> (print-out of the online version on file with the
Columbia Law Review). For similar views, see Michelle Everson, Administering Europe?, 36
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 195 (1998) [hereinafter Everson, Administering Europe?]; Michelle
Everson, Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?, 1 Eur. L.J. 180 (1995) [hereinafter
Everson, Independent Agencies]; see also P.P. Craig, Democracy and Rule-Making within
the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment, 3 Eur. LJ. 105 (1997); ChristianJoerges
& Jfirgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes:
The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 Eur. LJ. 273 (1997). For an American
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that several of these commentators have failed to appreciate fully the
complex relationship between legitimate political control and judicial re-
view in American administrative law, emphasizing instead judicially-en-
forced transparency and participation rights as the principal means of
legitimizing technocratic autonomy.5 6 Selectiveness with regard to the
American example in this case may risk mistaken or incomplete prescrip-
tions for Europe in its search to overcome the democratic deficit, particu-
larly given the critical absence of legitimate hierarchical control within
the Community.
It is my hope that the difficult question of legitimacy in Europe may
serve as a point of entry into a broader scholarly discussion of the appro-
priate means of controlling delegated normative power in any suprana-
tional body, a debate in which American legal scholars must participate as
well. The phenomenon of supranational delegation raises a number of
questions of political and historical complexity, and I do not claim to
advance anything approaching a complete answer to them here. Rather,
the advent of supranationalism continues to demand the insights of his-
torians, constitutional and political theorists, and social scientists, as well
as specialists in public international law, international trade, and interna-
tional relations. Nevertheless, I believe that the administrative perspec-
tive developed in this Article may provide a guide for future research, or
at least a number of working hypotheses regarding the legal nature of this
important historical phenomenon.
The European experience strongly suggests that the key obstacle to
supranational legitimacy is the difficulty in reproducing democratically-
legitimate, hierarchical control outside the confines of the nation-state.
The problem of legitimate political control is, in turn, intimately bound
up with complex questions of the relationship between demos, democ-
racy, and national political institutions as symbols of popular sover-
eignty.57 For those who insist on viewing supranational bodies in consti-
tutionalist terms, the challenge is to reconceive democracy outside the
nation-state-perhaps by redefining the very meaning of demos5 8-in or-
der to achieve, as Deirdre Curtin puts it, "postuational democracy."5 9 In
the case of the EC/EU, in my view, there remain significant cultural-his-
torical obstacles to building such a postnational democracy, even if one
cannot deny that some important strides have been made toward the for-
mulation of a specifically European demos.
60
contribution, see generally Martin Shapiro, Codification of Administrative Law: The U.S.
and the Union, 2 Eur. LJ. 26 (1996).
56. See infra notes 119-124, 313-321 and accompanying text.
57. See infra Part V.
58. Joseph Weiler has advocated a redefinition of the notion of "demos," or
peoplehood, in order to create the possibility of democratic legitimacy at the Community
level. See Weiler, Demos, supra note 28.
59. Curtin, Postnational Democracy, supra note 9.
60. See infra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
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The emergence of such a demos is admittedly a dynamic process.
Nevertheless, in Europe as elsewhere, democratic legitimacy depends on
the popular perception of the existence of a political demos as such, as
well as on the belief that governing institutions symbolize or express the
sovereignty of the demos in a constitutional sense. At the European level,
as long as political identity continues to cling to the nation-state, and thus
to its institutional structures, as expressions of popular sovereignty, the
status of the EC/EU as a self-legitimating "constitutional" level of govern-
ance will remain tenuous. 61 In the interim, the Community will continue
to be essentially of an administrative character-that is, it will continue to
be a technocratic body exercising delegated normative power-and pub-
lic law doctrines governing Community action should be reformulated to
reflect this reality.6 2
Before other regional free-trade blocs, or the global community
more generally, proceed further down the supranational path, we must
examine seriously whether we possess the means of legitimizing suprana-
tional normative power-specifically rulemaking power-in a way that
adequately accounts for the political and cultural tensions that arise when
such power is exercised by non-national decisionmakers. Where, as here,
the central concern is democratic legitimacy-that is, the nature of the
relationship between an at least perceived-to-be "sovereign" people and
the possessors of delegated normative power-I would argue that the ad-
ministrative characterization of supranationalism holds true regardless of
whether the normative power in question is adjudicative (as in the WTO)
or is also legislative (as in the EC). Administrative law, rather than
strained constitutionalist analogies, may thus provide the most promising
source of principles to mediate between the legitimate needs of increased
international regulatory cooperation on the one hand, and the persis-
61. On the persistence of national identity, see Matieu Deflem & Fred C. Pampel, The
Myth of Postnational Identity- Popular Support for European Unification, 75(1) Social
Forces 119 (1996) (empirical study arguing in favor of continued importance of national
identity); Chris Shore, Transcending the Nation-State? The European Commission and
the (Re-)discovery of Europe, 9(4) J. Historical Sociology 473 (1996) (a critical appraisal of
the concept of European identity which questions whether the efforts of the EG to
construct a post-nationalist political order in Europe is feasible or politically desirable);
Stephen Wood, Building "Europe": Culture, History and Politics, 11(3) J. Historical
Sociology 397 (1998) (arguing that nations remain the base line for conceptions of
belonging and political legitimacy in Europe).
62. Although this Article suggests that the Community lacks constitutional and
democratic legitimacy, it does not argue that the EC is, as a consequence, an illegitimate
producer of legal norms. The Community clearly possesses a kind of administrative
legitimacy, rooted in the expertise of its technocrats and their capacity, subject to forms of
indirect political and legal controls, to produce efficient norms responsive to social needs.
Moreover, the shared memory of Europe's own destructiveness in the first half of the
century continues to lend legitimacy to the integration effort and further provides popular
and cultural underpinnings to what is otherwise a highly elite, bureaucratic enterprise. See
infra note 232.
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tence of the sovereign nation-state as a cultural category on the other-a
tension that arguably exists in any supranational body.
I. SUPRANATIONAL DELEGATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITMACY.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Legitimacy in National Administrative Institutions
The practice of delegation is so common in modem administrative
states that one could probably describe it as "universal... in most if not
all complex societies."63 Despite its probable universality, however, the
power of unelected administrators to make regulatory norms-notably
the power to make general rules in a quasi-legislative sense-is inescap-
ably problematic from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy. Admit-
tedly, measuring legitimacy is a difficult task. In a sociological sense, it
may be described as "a broad, empirically determined societal acceptance
of the system." 64 However, specifically democratic legitimacy, as that term
is used in this Article, also possesses an important formal-institutional di-
mension, one relating to the degree of perceived connection between the
people and the possessors of normative power. There are two fundamen-
tal criteria that I assert are essential to establishing that connection, both
of which administrative power fails to meet. First, administrative agencies
do not derive their power directly from a constitutional delegation of legis-
lative authority from the people; rather, they derive it indirectly from the
people through an enactment by the people's elected representatives. 65
Second, agencies do not depend directly on periodic popular approval-
that is, they do not depend directly on the vote-for their continuing
legitimacy.
This is not to say, however, that legislative power delegated to admin-
istrative institutions is therefore necessarily illegitimate in a sociological
63. Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 747 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, From Expertise
to Politics].
64. See Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2469. For a succinct overview of
similar views in the social sciences, see Marquardt, Deficit Reduction, supra note 31, at
272-74.
65. My notion of constitutional delegation is similar to Bruce Ackerman's notion of
constitutional moment or, rather, of "historic moments of successful constitutional
politics." Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 23 (1991). According to
Ackerman, however, such moments need not take the form of an explicit constitutional
adoption or revision. Moments of overwhelming popular support can confer special
constitutional legitimacy on reformist political representatives and the constitutional
changes, both substantive and procedural, sought to be effected. I would argue, however,
that such moments must hold a place in the popular memory as constitutional-that is, they
must be remembered not as "routine lawmaking" but as "higher lawmaking"-in order to
hold the status of a constitutional delegation. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Law,
History and Memory: "Republican Moments" and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Review
in France, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. 49 (1996-1997) [hereinafter Lindseth, Law, History and
Memory].
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sense. It means only that the legitimacy of administrative rulemaking
cannot, formally speaking, be termed democratic. Rather, at the national
level, the institutional legitimacy of administrative bodies is generally me-
diated through the branches of government that are themselves endowed
with constitutional authority, whether democratic (i.e., executive or legis-
lative) orjudicial. 66 The formal-institutional legitimacy of administrative
power thus depends primarily on political and legal mechanisms. It is
rooted first in a lawful legislative enactment and thereafter relies on some
combination of hierarchical political control by the executive, direct leg-
islative oversight, and judicial review before courts or specialized tribu-
nals, to ensure that the rules produced in the administrative sphere fall
within the original legislative mandate and do not violate the rights of
individuals or other private interests. Instead of speaking of democratic
legitimacy in the administrative context, therefore, we often speak simply
of accountability-that is, not of legitimacy per se but of its substitute.
Of course, neither political oversight nor judicial review, standing
alone, provides a complete answer to the democratic concerns raised by
delegation to administrative bodies. Agencies often enjoy a significant
degree of independence, either in a formal legal sense or as a conse-
quence of organizational complexity, thus undermining the possibility of
hierarchical political oversight by democratically-legitimate officials. 67
Moreover, the incentives for citizens to inform themselves about the
stakes of regulatory policy may be weak, as may be the public's capacity to
monitor the activities of elected representatives who purportedly super-
vise administrative action.68 This means that the threat of popular mobil-
ization in the electoral arena over regulatory policy disagreements may,
in some respects, be simply a background constraint at best.69
Judicial review, when combined with legally mandated transparency
and participation rights of interests affected by administrative action, may
do much to mitigate these problems, but does not eliminate them.
Transparency and participation rights undoubtedly provide a check on
the diffused and fragmented exercise of normative power in the modem
state; indeed, the increasing importance of such rights may reflect a
66. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The
Place of Agencies).
67. It should be stressed that hierarchical political control need not mean highly
centralized control. More subtle, decentralized control mechanisms are possible. In the
sense used here, "hierarchical" means only that some electorally accountable body
(executive or legislative) retains the ultimate political responsibility for choices made
(which may include decentralization).
68. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is
Germany a Model?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1279, 1280 (1994) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, Is
Germany a Model?].
69. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of
Public Law in Germany and the United States 66 (1995) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman,
Controlling Environmental Policy].
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transformation of the very nature of representative government away
from a hierarchical, plebiscitarian model to one significantly more decen-
tralized and neo-corporatist. v0 A citizen's-or, maybe more importantly,
a group's-right to participate directly in the exercise of delegated
rulemaking authority (through, for example, American-style "notice and
comment" procedures) involves a kind of quasi-democratic discipline, as-
suming that the agency is under a legal obligation to take that participa-
tion seriously and respond in a meaningful way to germane comments by
outsiders, perhaps even by modifying the proposed subordinate legisla-
tion as a consequence. 71 The legal enforcement of such rights in the
courts can, however, compound the shortcomings of administrative ac-
countability if equally unaccountable judges devise means to substitute
their judgement for that of the agency under the guise of promoting "rea-
soned decisionmaking," or if they use judicial review to impose excessive
procedural requirements that impede lawful rulemaking.72
Given these limitations, political and legal controls can only be said
to promote administrative accountability if they operate in combina-
tion.73 From a democratic standpoint, however, the more important of
these two control mechanisms is clearly hierarchical oversight by demo-
cratically-legitimate political officials. The reason is simple: Whether in a
presidential or parliamentary system, the executive and the legislature are
at least perceived to be ultimately responsible to the people in some rea-
sonably direct sense, whereas judges are not.74 Hierarchical control by
elected officials provides the administrative sphere with the necessary per-
ceived linkage to the people as a whole, a linkage that judicial enforce-
ment of the transparency and participation rights of particular interests,
standing alone, simply cannot. 75 This sort of linkage is especially neces-
sary when the regulatory question entails a dispute over values or the allo-
70. See generally Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3
Eur. LJ. 313 (1997); see also Janne Haaland Matlf.ry, New Forms of Governance in
Europe? The Decline of the State as the Source of Political Legitimation, 30 Cooperation
& Conflict 99, 114 (1995).
71. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 63, at 759-60.
72. Pierce, supra note 12, at 1266.
73. On the need for a balance between hierarchical and judicial control, see Peter L.
Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States: Susan Rose-Ackerman and the Limits of
Public Law in Germany and the United States, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 589, 617-18 (1996)
[hereinafter Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States] (review essay).
74. Of course, one might argue that in a parliamentary system the cabinet is not
directly responsible to the people in the same sense as the chief executive is in a
presidential system. However, even in a parliamentary system, citizens cast their votes in
particular constituencies generally with the aim of putting a particular party or governing
coalition either into power, or, perhaps more importantly, out of power. The political
decisions of the executive in a parliamentary system are thus clearly subject to direct voter
approbation, even if citizens technically vote only for particular legislators.
75. Cf. Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (noting that "[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make [administrative] policy choices," rather than the courts).
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cation of scarce resources; that is, where the question is essentially polit-
ical rather than technical. It is hierarchical political control, first and
foremost, that gives policymaking in the administrative sphere a demo-
cratic veneer, if not full democratic legitimacy. Judges must therefore
take cognizance of the presence or absence of democratically-legitimate
political control in determining the appropriate scope of judicial review
of administrative action.76
B. Legitimacy in Supranational Institutions
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the legitimation of supranational normative
power is significantly more complicated than what one finds at the na-
tional level, taking us out of the realm of formal-institutional legitimating
mechanisms into the more complex realm of understanding the sociolog-
ical legitimation of administrative governance. Supranational delegation,
even in pursuit of the valid goal of international cooperation and coordi-
nation, is sociologically problematic, I argue, because it undermines an
essential but little-acknowledged cultural underpinning of the modem
administrative state. Administrative agents on the national level, despite
their lack of an electoral relationship with the people, and despite a sig-
nificant degree of formal or legal independence from political oversight,
nevertheless enjoy a degree of implicit popular confidence owing to their
membership in the same national political community-the same de-
mos-with a shared history, a shared legal and political tradition, and,
presumably, a shared commitment to the ultimate national well-being.77
When normative power is exercised outside the confines of the nation-
state, this cultural and historical foundation of administrative power is
absent.
This absence arguably accentuates the need for legitimate political
control over supranational decisionmaking. However, although a partic-
ular country's nationals may in fact ultimately hold their domestic repre-
sentatives responsible for decisions made at the supranational level, the
actual control over such decisions may well be diffused throughout supra-
national institutions and policy-making networks in which no single par-
ticipating state or its representatives have a decisive voice, in either a legal
or practical sense.78 Similarly, the objects of regulation will no longer be
strictly national but supranational, often rooted in a commitment to ab-
stract economic values-free trade, efficient markets-that many people
either poorly understand or fear and disparage as alien and techno-
cratic. 79 Regardless of the apparent efficiency of the new regulatory ar-
rangements at the supranational level measured in wealth-maximization
terms, the threat of social or political "backlash" against a purportedly
76. See Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 618.
77. For further discussion of the concept of the demos, see infra Part IV, discussing
extensively the thesis advanced in Weiler, Demos, supra note 28.
78. This is, in fact, the essential characteristic of autonomous supranationalism.
79. Cf. Sand, supra note 8, at 286.
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alien decisionmaking process is always latent in a supranational system 80
More importantly, the threat of backlash may become an active concern
as the independence of the supranational decisionmaking process be-
comes more popularly apparent.
The European experience since the mid-1980s is instructive. It sug-
gests that when supranational institutions gain a significant degree of
legal and practical autonomy from national control, the political and cul-
tural repercussions may be profound, even if the economic benefits are,
in theory, generally positive. Even in the most ardently "pro-European"
of countries, such as France and Germany, significant minorities cutting
across traditional ideological lines have emerged with very serious doubts
about the value of-indeed with strong hostility toward-the further
transfer of rulemaking power beyond the confines of the nation-state.8 '
Should some precipitating event, such as a major economic downturn,
place Europe's supranational institutions under significant strain, these
legitimacy concerns could turn into a legitimation crisis in which the very
idea of supranational normative power may be brought into serious
question.8 2
80. On the need to incorporate the threat of backlash into efficiency analysis, see
generally MarkJ. Roe, Backlash, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1998).
81. Insofar as the broader phenomenon of supranational delegation (e.g., to the
WTO) is concerned, this cross-ideological phenomenon is not confined to Europe. In the
United States, Pat Buchanan on the right finds himself in agreement with unlikely allies on
the left, such as Ralph Nader and the AFL-CIO, who are united in their opposition to free
trade and the transfer of normative power to supranational bodies that it entails. See, e.g.,
PatrickJ. Buchanan, The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and SocialJustice Are
Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy (1998). For attacks from the left, see,
e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
Ralph Nader et al., The Case Against Free Trade: GATT, NAFTA and the Globalization of
Corporate Power (1993); The Case Against the Global Economy: And For A Turn Toward
the Local (Jerry Mander et al. eds., 1996).
82. The European Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the single
currency-the euro-on January 1, 1999, if anything, intensify these risks. The
institutional cornerstone of the EMU is the European Central Bank (ECB), a
quintessentially technocratic and nontransparent body with "no clear accountability to any
other arm of national or European government." Europe's New Currency: Gambling on
the Euro, The Economist, Jan. 2, 1999, at 20. The ECB's mandate under the Treaty is
.price stability," EC Treaty art. 105, although it is left to the Bank itself to decide what that
term means. Thus, viewed solely from an institutional perspective, the ECB can only
exacerbate the democratic deficit, given its broad discretion in the politically delicate
domain of monetary policy. But when viewed in light of other aspects of monetary union,
notably the so-called Stability and Growth Pact among the eleven participating Member
States, the political and economic risks of the euro become even greater. The economic
risks flow from the danger of an asymmetrical recession affecting one Member State more
than others. The political risks, in turn, flow from the inability of the more-severely
affected Member State to take fiscal measures to counteract the recession, since resort to
such measures is severely constrained by the Stability Pact. As a major European
newsmagazine recently put it: "The danger that this raises is that in the event of a sharp
recession in one or more countries, there will then be a political reaction against the EU
itself. The Union as a whole, and other euro members, will be blamed for the victim's
inability to moderate its recession." Leaders: Europe's Adventure Begins, The Economist,
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Undoubtedly, as an empirical matter the increasing importance of
supranational normative power has strained the idea that the nation-state
is the presumptive locus of sovereignty.8 3 To some observers, in fact, the
diffusion and fragmentation of normative power that characterizes mod-
em governance-not just to the supranational level but to the subna-
tional level as well-now means that the idea of the "sovereign" nation-
state is an anachronism.8 4 By extension, one might argue, the corre-
sponding notion of supranational delegation is of equally limited analyti-
cal utility because it implicitly takes the sovereign nation-state as the nor-
mative baseline.8 5 There is, however, a basic flaw in this argument.
Although terms like national sovereignty and delegation may be descrip-
tively anachronistic, they retain validity in a cultural sense.8 6 By this, I
mean that they retain their power to order thinking-to shape popular
understandings of, and therefore social and political responses to, the
changing political structures associated with globalization.8 7 As a conse-
Jan. 2, 1999, at 16. One possible political consequence would be that in many European
countries political voices presently considered to be on the anti-European extreme could
receive a more sympathetic hearing among supporters of the "mainstream" parties. See,
e.g., Marlise Simons, On Far Right, A Soft Voice Undermines French Center, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 14, 1998, at A6.
83. See MacCormick, Sovereign State, supra note 2; MacCormick, Sovereignty,
Democracy and Subsidiarity, supra note 2; Stephan, supra note 47; see also Matfiry, supra
note 70, at 110 (speaking of the state as a formal-legal reality that is in decline empirically).
84. See, e.g., MacCormick, Sovereign State, supra note 2, at 16 ("it seems obvious that
no state in Western Europe any longer is a sovereign state"); MacCormick, Sovereignty,
Democracy and Subsidiarity, supra note 2, at 95 ("Sovereignty and sovereign states, and
definitions of law in terms of sovereignty and the state, have been but the passing
phenomena of a few centuries. Their passing is by no means regrettable."); see also
Armstrong, supra note 17, at 169; Sand, supra note 8, at 285; Areilza, supra note 31, at 20.
85. Cf. Armstrong, supra note 17, at 168 ("[T]he language of delegation is deployed
in order to maintain the centrality of the nation-state as the defining variable of EU
integration."); Wiener, supra note 17, at 298 (generally describing interpretations of the
EC/EU rooted in administrative law as state-centric "[c]onceptual remnants" that are "all
too often misleading when applied as tools in the debates over politics and policy-making
in polities other than modem nation-states").
86. They belong to a cultural system of interpretation in the sense described supra
note 11.
87. Professor MacCormick, perhaps inadvertently, offers a concrete example of this
phenomenon. See MacCormick, Sovereign State, supra note 2, at 16, in which he refers to
a leading article that appeared in the Daily Telegraph which praised the then-Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, "for his absolute adherence to the principle of 'fiscal
sovereignty' while exhibiting sensible flexibility about some process of harmonisation of
taxes" in the Community. MacCormick's aim was to show that, while "no state in Western
Europe is any longer a sovereign state," id., opinion leaders still cling (mistakenly) to the
notion. MacCormick's point is well taken but he misses the full implications of his
example. Popular conceptions of state sovereignty, like those found in the Daily Telegraph's
editorial, are an empirical reality in their own right that must be accounted for in any
serious discussion of the democratic legitimacy of Community institutions. Another
observer, Ange Wiener, also effectively alludes to the cultural importance of state-based
notions like sovereignty when asserting that the discursive shift in the social sciences away
from the notion of traditional "govermnent" to the purportedly more modem notion of
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quence, particularly when viewed from the perspective of democratic le-
gitimacy, notions like national sovereignty and delegation cannot be ig-
nored or theorized away as descriptively unhelpful or empirically
inaccurate.88 Despite the pressures for increased international economic
integration that drive supranational delegation, "the primary political
unit-at least in a cultural sense-"remans the 'sovereign' nation-
state."8 9
The problem with supranational institutions, and especially those of
the European Community, is not simply that they are "non-
majoritarian"-i.e., non-democratic-like other administrative agencies
that lack a direct electoral relationship with the people.90 Rather, it is
that they are both non-democratic and, more importantly, non-national.
As a consequence, they lack the degree of implicit popular confidence
that makes administrative autonomy on the national level possible, or at
least tolerable. Indeed, upon closer examination, one finds that this is-
sue-which lies at the intersection of politics, law, and national identity-
is also at the center of Europe's struggle with the so-called democratic
deficit.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER OF SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNIY
A. Institutional Background: The European Community and the European
Union Distinguished
Most American legal scholars have at least a passing familiarity with
European integration and its leading institutions, the European Union
"governance" will remain superficial unless accompanied by a conceptual shift that breaks
with "'rigid adherence to traditional notions of the national polity.'" Wiener, supra note
17, at 298-99 (quoting Everson, Administering Europe?, supra note 55, at 209). The real
question, however, is not whether academic elites can make the necessary conceptual shift
(this, perhaps, is easily accomplished), but whether the broader population can make the
same shift. Only then will "governance without government" be viewed as fully legitimate.
88. See infra notes 224-233 and accompanying text (discussing Weiler, Demos, supra
note 28). For an analysis sensitive to sovereignty concerns, see Croley and Jackson, supra
note 4, at 212.
89. Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1055.
90. For an analysis that regards the legitimacy problem in the Community in these
terms, see Majone, Independent Fourth Branch, supra note 55, at 24:
The problem of the "democratic deficit" of the Community is by no means
unique, although this is the impression given by many disquisitions on the
subject. In reality, it is a problem common to all non-majoritarian institutions-
independent regulatory agencies but also courts and central banks. If the
problem is more visible at the Community level, this is because regulation is
relatively more important there than at the national level.
It should also be noted that Majone's inclusion of courts in the same category as
independent regulatory agencies and central banks is questionable. In most states, the
normative power of thejudiciary is generally the consequence of a constitutional delegation,
conferring on them a degree of institutional legitimacy that agencies or central banks
cannot claim, given that they are creatures of legislation.
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and the European Community. However, for most observers outside
Europe the structural intricacies and procedural complexities of these
bodies remain, if not a mystery, then a source of some confusion. The
first bit of confusion usually concerns the basic legal distinction between
the EU and the EC itself. The EC is merely a component part of the
EU-the first of its three "pillars," as Europeans put it. The second pillar
encompasses a common foreign and security policy, while the third ex-
tends to cooperation injustice and home affairs, a term that encompasses
law enforcement and immigration, among other things.91 However, only
the first pillar-the European Community-can make a claim to being a
truly supranational body with a reasonably autonomous institutional
existence of its own.92 In so far as the second and third pillars are con-
cerned, the EU has historically been essentially an intergovernmental
body, requiring the consent of each Member State before common ac-
tion can be taken. This requirement preserves, at least in principle, the
prerogatives of national sovereignty and control.93
The competences of the European Community are confined largely
to economic and social regulation; that is, to the enforcement of competi-
tion rules and the harmonization of national legislation necessary to
achieve an integrated internal market among the EU's fifteen Member
States.94  The Community possesses a collective "executive" (the
European Commission) sitting atop its own bureaucracy; a sort of "two-
house legislature" (the Council of Ministers and the European Parlia-
ment); and a 'judiciary" (the European Court ofJustice and the Court of
First Instance). The Commission is appointed for a five-year term by
common consent of the Member States, subject to approval by the Euro-
pean Parliament, which is elected for the same five-year term, generally
by proportional representation from national lists. 95 The Commission is
headed by the President, nominated by "common accord" of the Member
91. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community gains significant competences in
many third pillar areas. For a discussion, see infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
92. The EU's "first pillar" in fact encompasses the three separate European
communities founded in the 1950s: the ECSC, the EC (formerly the European Economic
Community, or EEC), and Euratom. See supra note 19. For simplicity, I refer to the entire
"first pillar" as the European Community.
93. At the EU level the key institutions are the European Council, a body that meets
every six months and includes the heads of state or government, as well as the foreign
ministers of each Member State, along with the President of the European Commission
and the Commissioner for External Affairs; and the so-called Intergovernmental
Conferences (IGCs), where Treaty amendments are negotiated. The EU was established in
1992 by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), often called the Maastricht Treaty.
94. There has, however, been significant spill-over into other domains. See infra
notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
95. The United Kingdom has historically used single-member districts, although it has
shifted to proportional representation for the June 1999 elections to the European
Parliament. EC Treaty art. 190 (3) (ex art. 138 (3)). However, EC Treaty Article 190 (4) (ex
art. 138(4)), as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, obligates the European Parliament
to "draw up a proposal for elections... with a uniform procedure in all Member States."
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States, and, after the Treaty of Amsterdam, subject to approval by the
European Parliament. 9 6 Each Commissioner receives a portfolio cover-
ing one or more of the Community's directorates-general (in effect, min-
istries). The Council of Ministers is a variable body, composed of Mem-
ber State ministers whose domestic portfolios relate to the matter at hand
(e.g., on agricultural questions, agricultural ministers, and so on).97 The
Council and the Parliament vote on legislative proposals submitted by the
Commission, although it is clearly the Council and the Commission that
historically have played the decisive legislative roles.9 8 Finally, the legal
acts of the Community, as well as those of the Member States touching on
Community law, are subject to review by the Community judiciary.99
96. EC Treaty Art. 214(2) (ex art. 152(2)).
97. A "Committee of Permanent Representatives" (COREPER) assists the Council of
Ministers and provides it a permanent presence in Brussels to counterbalance the
bureaucratic predominance of the Commission. EC Treaty art. 296 (ex art. 151).
98. The legislative process in the Community is extremely variegated and complex.
See, e.g., infra note 131. Nevertheless, it follows one basic model: The Commission
proposes and the Council disposes. The Council of Ministers thus votes on proposals
submitted by the Commission, either by unanimity or qualified majority, depending on the
subject matter. However, as discussed infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text, the
European Parliament has over the last decade assumed an increasingly important
legislative role, gaining a true veto in certain domains-under the "co-decision procedure"
of Article 251 (ex art. 189b) of the EC Treaty-and a suspensive veto in others-under the
"cooperation procedure" of Article 252 (ex art. 189c)). The Treaty of Amsterdam has
vastly increased the areas subject to the co-decision procedure, leading to the "virtual
disappearance of the cooperation procedure." See Michel Petite, The Treaty of
Amsterdam, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working Paper series, no. 2/98, <http://
vv.lav.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-2-Ol.html>, at section IV,
page 2 (print-out of the online version of file with the Columbia Law Review).
Community legislation comes in two broad forms: regulations and directives. Under
Article 249 (ex art. 189) of the EC Treaty, regulations are directly applicable without
Member State legislation. By contrast, directives, the more common form of legislation,
require Member State implementing legislation in order to be "transposed" into national
law. Directives are in theory binding only as to the result to be achieved, leaving the
specific form and content of implementation to the discretion of national legislatures.
However, the ECJ has long held that a directive can have direct effect in a Member State if
the deadline for implementation has passed and the directive is unambiguous in its legal
terms. See, e.g., Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
99. Member States, individual plaintiffs, and Community institutions can bring action
in the ECJ challenging the legality of acts of the Community that are intended to produce
legal effects, although the standing requirements and the nature of challengeable acts vary
among the possible plaintiffi. See EC Treaty art. 230 (ex art. 173). The ECJ also has
jurisdiction to consider the legality of Community acts if a national court refers the
question to the ECJ in the context of national litigation. See EC Treaty art. 234(b) (ex art.
177(b)). However, the more important function of the preliminary reference procedure
under Article 234 (ex art. 177) is to enable the ECJ to consider the legality of Member
State norms under Community law. See infra note 349. The Commission can also initiate
a direct action against a Member State under Article 226 (ex art. 169) for failure to comply
with an obligation under Community law.
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B. The Limitations of the Existing Descriptive Categories: The Community as
International Organization and as Constitutional Polity
The legal character of the Community remains elusive even to the
most knowledgeable observers. The question is persistently asked: Is the
EC simply a new kind of international organization or has it evolved into
something approaching a federal "constitutional polity" in its own right?
No one, of course, opts for either characterization without qualification.
Rather, the broadly accepted view is that the Community is sui generis: It
"remains something well short of a federal state [but] has become some-
thing far more than an international organization of independent sover-
eigns."10 0 Yet despite its sui generis character-despite the fact that the
Community "is still a novelty in want of a convincing label"'l0 '-these two
poles (constitutional polity, international organization) have largely pro-
vided the analytical categories that have shaped much of the scholarly
and political debate over the history of the Community.
From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, both perspectives pro-
vide a poor guide to the legal nature of the Community's supranational
institutions. Lawyers, judges, and legal academics have traditionally
tended toward the constitutionalist pole in the debate. 10 2 According to
this view, the EC has transformed itself from a legal arrangement among
sovereign states governed by international law into a vertically-integrated
"new legal order"-that is, a kind of constitutional order-as the Euro-
pean Court of Justice so boldly announced in 1963 in Van Gend &
Loos.103 The key element in this transformation was the judicial recogni-
tion-via doctrines of the supremacy and direct effect of Community law,
100. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory
of Legal Integration, 47 Int'l Org. 41, 41 (1993).
101. Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The
German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. 229,
229 (1997). Grimm is ajudge on Germany's Federal Constitutional Court.
102. For an overview, see Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 41-42; Weiler &
Trachtman, supra note 23. For examples, see F.G. Jacobs, Is the Court of Justice of the
European Communities a Constitutional Court?, in Constitutional Adjudication in
European Community and National Law 25 (Deirdre Curtin & David O'Keeffe eds., 1992);
Trevor C. Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: The Emerging Constitution of
the European Community, 34 Am.J. Comp. L. 229 (1986); Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts
about the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 93
[hereinafter Lenaerts, Interaction]; Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces
of Federalism, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 205 (1990); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a
Constitution for Europe, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 595 (1989); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges,
and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1981); see also
Sauter, supra note 7, at 30-45.
103. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transp. & Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend &
Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
This is perhaps the most famous decision in European law, in which the ECJ held that
Article 12 of the EEC Treaty had a direct effect which an individual could raise against a
Member State, stating memorably that "the Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law." Id. at 12, 2 C.M.L.R. at 129. For further discussion, see infra notes
343-349 and accompanying text.
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implied powers, and more recently fundamental rights' 04-that Commu-
nity law creates legal obligations that individuals can enforce against the
Member States. It is this process that purportedly distinguishes the "con-
stitutional" EC from other international legal regimes, which create obli-
gations enforceable solely among the participating states themselves. In-
deed, it is now common for the ECJ explicitly to assert the constitutional
character of the Community, calling the EC Treaty the "constitutional
charter of a Community based on the rule of law."10 5
This claim of a constitutional status for the institutions of the
Community contains a number of weaknesses. The most fundamental is
that there is not yet any European "people"-no demos-in whom sover-
eignty can be said to have originally resided, which was then constitution-
ally delegated to the Community without going through the intermedia-
tion of the Member States.106 Moreover, even if a fully-formed demos
were not a prerequisite, there is another basic problem: There has never
been any explicit constitutional decision on the part of the peoples of the
various Member States to create a self-legitimating, federal constitutional
entity at the European level. Several scholars have asserted the need,
therefore, for a full-fledged "constitutional convention," or in any case
some kind of "constitutional moment" in Europe, in order "to generate
(or self-constitute) a democratic European polity."10 7
Apart from these theoretical criticisms, recent scholarship in a
number of social science fields (political science, international relations,
political economy, sociology) have also revealed several empirical short-
comings in the constitutionalist perspective.' 08 One strand of the recent
social-science literature points to the considerable evidence of the Com-
munity's continuing intergovernmental nature, notably at the levels of
Treaty amendment and of major harmonization legislation. 10 9 In these
104. For a discussion of these doctrines, see infra notes 342-368 and accompanying
text.
105. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-6102 para. 21; see also Case C-2/88 Imm.,
Zwartveld et al., 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365, 1-3373, para. 16; Case 294/83, Parti cologiste 'Les
Verts' v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365 par. 23.
106. See infra Part IV.
107. Sauter, supra note 7, at 36 (citing, e.g., Curtin, A Europe of Bits and Pieces,
supra note 36); see also Philip Allott, The Crisis of European Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, 34 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 439, 490 (1997)
(advocating convening of a "Congress of Europe," where "we, the people of Europe, would
consider how far we can actualize the unique potentiality of Europe"). This, of course,
leaves aside the question of the existence of a European "people" (or demos) capable of
making the requisite constitutional delegation. See inf-a Part IV. The better view is that
both a demos and an explicit constitutional decision would be required to confer full
democratic sovereignty on European institutions, thus addressing the legitimacy concerns
raised supra Parts HA. & II.B.
108. For a summary, including an extensive bibliography, see Weiler & Trachtman,
supra note 23.
109. See id. at 364 (referring particularly to the work of Andrew Moravcsik, whose
"intergovernmental lamp post has, admirably, become a veritable searchlight."); Andrew
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domains the executives and the bureaucracies of the Member States-if
not necessarily their parliaments-still play a critical role. The EC thus
remains an intergovernmental entity, but one in which the prerogatives
of national sovereignty have been diminished by the construction of a
rule-based system of supranational power. This perspective is much more
consistent with a traditional international organization and is therefore a
useful empirical corrective to the constitutionalist interpretation.
There are, however, certain empirical drawbacks to the intergovern-
mentalist perspective as well, which relate primarily to a failure to ac-
count adequately for the degree of normative autonomy that Community
institutions in fact enjoy. A counter-perspective has recently emerged,
also rooted in the social sciences, that is explicitly focused on explaining
policymaking autonomy at the Community level. This newer "institution-
alist" approach emphasizes the EC as an example of multi-level, differen-
tiated "governance" outside the strict confines of the nation-state, as op-
posed to traditional hierarchical "government" at the national level. 110
From this perspective, the Community is seen as an aggregation of simul-
taneously competing and interdependent institutions-both national and
supranational-in which the predominant form of policy coordination is
through networks of technocratic experts operating in relative freedom
from hierarchical control.
This line of "heterarchical" thinking, as one European legal com-
mentator has called it,"' undoubtedly reflects better the diffusion and
fragmentation of normative power in an era of administrative govern-
ance. This newer interpretation, however, "makes no claim to be a nor-
mative model."112 Rather, the approach "confines itself to noting those
trends within the European administrative process which supports its gen-
eral theory that hierarchical thinking within the normative confines of
the nation-state is a thing of the past."" 3 In some sense, this explanatory
and theoretical orientation is a common feature of the social-science
literature on the Community generally. The principal concern of this
literature tends to be either identification of the causal variables driving
supranationalism, or explanation of the intricacies of institutional coop-
eration and coordination among the bureaucracies of disparate states.11 4
In the search for a robust explanatory theory, however, social scientists
tend to ignore or discount the problem of democratic legitimacy, particu-
larly in its supranational, cultural complexity. 115
Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 473 (1993).
110. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 17; Sand, supra note 8; Wiener, supra note 17.
111. Everson, Administering Europe?, supra note 55, at 211.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. For an overview, see, e.g., Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Contending Models of
Governance in the European Union, in Europe's Ambiguous Unity: Conflicts and
Tensions in the Post-Maastricht Era (Alan W. Cafruny & Carl Lankowski eds., 1997).
115. See generally supra Part I.B.
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In my view, the explanatory and theoretical focus of the social-sci-
ence literature risks complacency toward-and, at worst, inadvertent le-
gitimation of-the supranational status quo, regardless of whether it is
understood as the strategic use of intergovernmental negotiation by na-
tional executives or as informal consensus-building by subgovernmental
technocratic networks. In either case, the manner in which suprana-
tional policymaking avoids the constraints of traditional political and
legal control mechanisms on the national level remains largely unex-
plored, at least in normative terms.
C. An Alternative Analytical Framework: The Community as Supranational
Administrative Agency
This article asserts that, from the standpoint of democratic legiti-
macy, principles of administrative law provide a superior analytical frame-
work, both descriptively and normatively, to the various approaches just
described. By administrative law, however, I do not mean simply basic
procedural matters or the defense of individual rights in the administra-
tive context, important though these dimensions of administrative law
may be. I mean, rather, the broader question of how those branches of
government that are in fact endowed with constitutional authority-legis-
lative, executive, or judicial-can best control and supervise the norma-
tive power delegated to the administrative sphere in a manner most con-
sistent with democratic values." 6
Analyzing the Community in administrative terms is not new." 7 In a
narrow sense, there has been an ongoing effort in the Community to
build a genuinely "European administrative law."118 More broadly, one
European commentator, Giandomenico Majone, has gone so far as to
characterize the Community as something akin to an "independent
fourth branch of government"-the regulatory branch-of the Member
States."19 Professor Majone argues that the problem of the democratic
deficit in the Community is, for the most part, a problem of institutional
design and "incentive structures" to ensure accountability in the produc-
tion of supranational norms.' 20 The primary route to legitimacy in this
scheme is through transparency and participation rights in the techno-
cratic rulemaking process, thus largely avoiding the need for hierarchical
oversight, while also demonstrating a decided preference for suprana-
tional autonomy from forms of political control.'
2
'
116. See supra Part L.AL
117. See the articles of Everson and Majone, supra note 55.
118. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 281; see also Jiirgen Schwarze, European
Administrative Law (1992); Shapiro, supra note 55, at 42.
119. Majone, Independent Fourth Branch, supra note 55. For a more detailed
analysis of Professor Majone's writings, see infra notes 252-280 and accompanying text.
120. Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 25.
121. See infta notes 296-299 and accompanying text.
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Professor Majone regards the Community as a kind of independent
regulatory agency on the American model.122 For him, American in-
dependent agencies demonstrate that hierarchical political control is not
essential to the legitimation of administrative rulemaking as long as cer-
tain other conditions-for example, "clear statutory objectives" or "over-
sight by specialised legislative committees"' 23-are satisfied. However,
one could fairly criticize this approach for failing to explore more fully
the extent to which these features of the American system, much more
than being simply manifestations of "efficient institutional design," in fact
ultimately reflect the role of Congress as the legitimating political princi-
pal in our administrative state on which even independent agencies ulti-
mately depend. Additionally, one might further query whether Professor
Majone overstates the importance of independent agencies in the Ameri-
can system. Much of the science-intensive regulation that he admires in
the United States takes place, in fact, in executive agencies such as the
EPA, operating under the hierarchical authority of the President. Need-
less to say, this office, like Congress, derives its legitimacy from its demo-
cratic relationship with the American people.
In contrast to Professor Majone, I would suggest that the main advan-
tage of comparing European institutions to the American administrative
model is not that it focuses our attention on the undoubted need for
greater transparency and participation rights in the Community's
rulemaking process. Rather, its main benefit is that it focuses our atten-
tion on the absence of democratically-legitimate, hierarchical political
control over the Community's essentially administrative institutions. The
character of the Community as a kind of independent regulatory agency
cannot be denied; nevertheless, unlike its American counterparts, there is
no ultimate political body in the Community-not the Commission, not
the Parliament, and not the Member State executives acting in concert
through the Council of Ministers or in intergovernmental conferences-
capable of providing the hierarchical legitimation of the Community's
normative output in the manner of a national legislature or executive.
In my view, the lack of a legitimate political principal at the
Community level itself suggests that the EC as a whole-including its pur-
portedly "political branches" as well as its judiciary-should be under-
stood as a supranational administrative agency of the Member States sever-
ally, which remain the political principals in the system and the loci of
democratic legitimacy. The administrative perspective further suggests
that the legitimation of the Community's normative output must con-
tinue to be channeled through the constitutional structures of the Mem-
122. On Professor Majone's attraction to the American model of independent and
participatory administration, see generally infra Part V and, more specifically, notes 252 &
296 and accompanying text.
123. Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 27.
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ber States, like the output of any other administrative body.124 The Com-
munity's institutional legitimacy emphatically does not flow from an en
masse political mobilization, globally transferring sovereignty in a consti-
tutional sense from some hypothetical European demos, however de-
fined. The EC phenomenon, one observer has rightly noted, "is too com-
plex and too amorphous to be presented as emerging from a new abstract
constituent power."125 Rather,
[t]he EC is a pragmatic institutional construction of loose
boundaries and a diffused political identity, in which different
bureaucracies and social agents handle different economic and
social problems around the core project of achieving market
and economic integration. This resulting perception of EC gov-
ernance ... highlights problems typical of any modern polity of
political control and administrative discretion. 126
This overall characterization of the EC as a kind of administrative
agency of the several Member States best accounts, I believe, both for the
Community's undoubted participation in the exercise of sovereign power
like national administrative bodies, and its lack of direct and independ-
ent legitimacy apart from lawful delegations from the Member States.' 27
The administrative characterization is also more consistent with the pre-
dominant role played by national executives in the intergovernmental
conferences and in the Council of Ministers, as well as national and su-
pranational technocrats in the comitology system and in the Commission,
in the production of Community legal norms. In this sense, the Commu-
nity is best understood as an extension of the executive-technocratic gov-
ernance that has characterized the development of the modern adminis-
trative state at the national level over the course of the twentieth
century.128
124. Indeed, the foundations of Community law reflect the critical role played by the
Member States as mediators of Community's democratic legitimacy. Politically, the
Community draws its legitimacy from, variously, the intergovernmental conferences
charged with Treaty amendment, national (generally parliamentary) ratification of the
Treaty and its amendments, and the presence of the Member States' ministerial
representatives in the Council. On this last element, see MacCormick, Sovereignty Now,
supra note 51, at 264 ("[T]he effective legislature for the Community is the Council of
Ministers, whose members are identifiable only by reference to the place they hold
according to state-systems of law; so Community powers of legal change and criteria of
validity presuppose the validity of competences conferred by state-systems, but not
themselves validated by EC law."); see also Edward, supra note 40, at 13 (noting the role of
the Member States as both inside and outside the Community legal and political system).
125. Areilza, supra note 31, at 10.
126. Id. at 2.
127. The Community has admittedly attempted to create this sort of independent and
direct legitimacy through an increase in the powers of the elected European Parliament.
However, for the reasons set out in Part IV, infra, this "parliamentary democratization
strategy" is inadequate to the task of legitimation.
128. On the historically executive-technocratic character of the EC, see supra note 31.
Professor Weiler and others have themselves observed that, in the EC, below the
intergovernmental level of treaty negotiation and the supranational level of Community
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From an administrative perspective, the EC Treaty should be under-
stood, not as a constitutional charter, but as a kind of enabling legislation
adopted and revised by the unanimous consent of the Member States.
Rather than think in constitutionalist terms of separation of powers at the
Community level, one should think in terms of the EC's delegated legisla-
tive, executive, and adjudicative functions. Although the Treaty contains
a number of directly effective provisions conferring rights on private par-
ties-which is not uncommon in enabling legislation on the national
level129-the more important provisions of the Treaty delegate normative
authority to EC institutions to formulate the rules needed to achieve the
Community's mandate-most notably, the completion of the internal
market.'8 0 Paralleling the procedural variation that one finds among
American agencies, the rulemaking procedures in the Community-that
is, both its primary and secondary legislative procedures-also vary con-
siderably among substantive domains. In part this is a consequence of
original Treaty design,' 3 ' and in part it is due to the Council's imposition
of additional requirements-the comitology system-when it further sub-
delegates normative power to the Commission.' 3 2
The Community's severely limited budget favors rulemaking rather
than more costly forms of direct intervention.133 Indeed, the vast bulk of
the Community's functions as an agency of the Member States is purely
normative, in both a legislative and an adjudicative sense.13 4 Implemen-
tation remains primarily the responsibility of the Member States, subject
legislation, there exists an "infranational" level, one "mostly about regulatory governance
and management" which is therefore ripe, presumably, for the application of
administrative law principles. J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and Its Critique,
18(3) W. Eur. Pol. 4, 26 (1995). My objection to this three-level breakdown-
international, supranational, and infranational-is that it implies that only the last
category of governance is administrative in character. When the EC is viewed, as this
Article attempts to do, from the perspective of democratic legitimacy-that is, the
perceived connection between the "people" and the possessors of normative power-all
three arenas of governance in the Community share the same essentially administrative
character.
129. On the doctrine of direct effect, see supra notes 343-349 and accompanying
text.
130. See, e.g., EC Treaty art. 94-95 (ex arts. 100-100a).
131. By one count prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, there
were no fewer than twenty-one different procedures available for the adoption of
legislation, including four different procedures in the field of environmental policy,
excluding the possibility of resort to the legislative procedure for harmonization in
completion of the internal Market under Article 95 (ex art. 100a). See Renaud Dehousse,
Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives to the
Majoritarian Avenue?, 18(3) W. Eur. Pol. 118, 123-24 (1995) (citing Jean-Claude Piris,
After Maastricht, are the Community Institutions More Efficacious, More Democratic and
More Transparent, 19 Eur. L. Rev. 449 (1994)).
132. On the comitology system, see supra note 38. For further discussion, see
generally infra Part V.C, especially notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
133. See Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 87.
134. The purely normative nature of Community power, as well as the distribution of
implementation responsibility, is more reminiscent of the administrative system which
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to supervision by the Commission and an array of justiciable rights of
private interests. Consequently, issues of Member State compliance and
enforcement continually arise, rendering the effectiveness of Community
law a perennial concern.'3 5 Subordinate legislation in the Community is
further subject to a whole range of additional procedures, centered
around the comitology system, that create varying opportunities for ad-
ministrative negotiation among Member States.' 3 6
Since the early 1960s, despite the evident technocratic orientation of
the Community's institutions, much of the legal discourse concerning the
EC has been couched not in principles of administrative law, but in the
conceptual vocabulary of constitutional federalism: supremacy, direct ef-
fect, implied powers, preemption, and now subsidiarity and fundamental
rights.'3 7 In part this is due to the special role that the European Court
of Justice has played in furthering European integration, particularly
through its claimed power to review Member State laws under Article 234
(ex Article 177) of the EC Treaty.' 3 8 However, if one looks at the provi-
sions for legal control of Community institutions (Article 230 (ex Article
173)), it is clear that the legal regime proceeds from an understanding of
the Community as an essentially administrative institution. The four
specified bases for annulment of a Community act under this article are
drawn directly from French administrative law, notably the recours pour
excds de pouvoir lack of competence, infringement of an essential proce-
dural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relat-
ing to its application, and misuse of powers.' 3 9 Tellingly, in the proce-
dures for legal control, the drafters of the original Treaty of Rome made
no distinction between the Council and the Commission, on the basis
that the former was legislative and the latter administrative or executive
in character, as one might expect to find in a constitutional system.
prevails in Germany. See Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note
69, at 8 (outlining the German administrative system).
135. For a comprehensive survey, see Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European
Community Law. Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 19
(1993).
136. See generally id. These procedures might be analogized to certain German
procedures which give both members of the Bundestag and state government ministers
(via the Bundesrat) a say in the drafting of important regulations. See Rose-Ackerman,
Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 69, at 146 n.10.
137. For a summary, see Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23.
138. Article 234 (ex art. 177) allows national courts, in the context of national
litigation, to refer questions of Community law to the ECJ, thus providing the European
Court an important tool to review Member State laws for their conformity with Community
law. Much of the resulting case law-articulating such doctrines as supremacy and direct
effect-has an understandably "federalist" feel. See generally Burley & Mattli, supra note
100. For a summary of the judicial review provisions of the EC Treaty, see supra note 99.
139. The four ouvertures, or legal bases, for a recours pour excds de pouvoir in French law
are incompetence, vice deforme, violation de la loi, and dtournement de pouvoir. See 2 Vedel &
Delvolv6, Droit Adminlstratif 299 (12th ed. 1992). Other aspects of the ECJ's jurisdiction
have their roots in French administrative law as well. Compare Article 230 (ex art. 173) of
the EC Treaty, with Article R 102 of the Code des tribunaux administratifs.
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Neither institution was exempt from the same range of essentially admin-
istrative claims. 140
III. SUPRANATIONAL LEGISLATION AND LEGrrIMATE POLITICAL CONTROL
A- Legislative Blockage in the Community and Integration by Adjudication
The rule of unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers during the
first three decades of the Community's existence (1957-1986) meant that
the executive of each Member State possessed an effective veto power
over the Community's legislative output.141 Thus, at the supranational
level, unanimity served as the functional equivalent of strict governmental
control over administrative norm-production, precisely as one often finds
in parliamentary systems at the national level. As Americans well under-
stand, however, stringent procedural requirements-and certainly una-
nimity qualifies as such-can also lead to an "ossification of rulemaking"
in an administrative regime, and Europeans used a similar term-
Eurosclerosis-to describe the difficulties of political coordination in
their formal legislative processes under the unanimity rule.
As a consequence of the legislative blockage in the 1960s and 1970s,
the EC did what American administrative agencies have often done in the
face of difficult procedural hurdles: It proceeded by adjudication. That
is, the EC relied on its adjudicative authority to give content, on a case-by-
140. For more on the French influence, see Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the
European Court of Justice, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 656, 658 (1997) ("[T]he framing of
administrative remedies in the Treaties reflects both the form and grounds for such
remedies in French law." (citing Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange, Case 3/54,
Associazone Industrie Siderurgiche Italiane v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community, [1954-1956] E.C.R. 63, 75)); see also La Communaut6 Europ~enne du
charbon et de l'acier, Rapport de la d lgation franaise sur le Tralt6 et la Convention
signfs a. Paris le 18 Avril 1951 (Ministre des affaires 6trang~res, Oct. 1951).
141. The original Treaty of Rome actually provided for a three-phase, tvelve-year
transitional period from 1958 through 1969. It was only during the first two phases (from
the beginning of 1958 to the end of 1965) that the Treaty provided that most Council
decisions would be taken on the basis of a unanimous vote. At the beginning of the third
stage on January 1, 1966, the Treaty broadly expanded the areas subject to majority voting
in the Council. In mid-1965, however, France, led by Charles de Gaulle, precipitated a
crisis by announcing its refusal to accept the impending shift to majority voting, boycotting
all meetings of the Council, in a policy known as the chaise vide, or "empty chair." The
crisis was not resolved until January 1966, in what came to be called the Luxembourg
Compromise, whereby one Member State could demand a Council decision by unanimity
when it believed that "a very important national interest" was at stake. Bulletin of the
European Communities 8-10 (March 1966). Although the Luxembourg Compromise was
in principal non-binding, a "Veto Culture" emerged, characterized by a "working
assumption... that since any country could invoke the Compromise at any time, there was
little point in pressing a proposal whenever strong objections were raised by one of the
Member States." Anthony L. Teasdae, The Life and Death of the Luxembourg
Compromise, 31 J. Common Mkt. Studies 567, 570 (1993).
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case basis, to the common market norms set forth in the Treaty. 14 2 Inte-
gration by way of adjudication was less a strategic choice on the part of
political actors than a move by the ECJ to fill the policy breach.
"[I]mportant political outcomes [were] debated and decided in the lan-
guage and logic of law,"' 43 particularly in the context of preliminary ref-
erences under then-Article 177 (now Article 234). National courts made
such references in the context of litigation, seeking interpretative state-
ments on the scope of Community law and its impact on national norms.
Despite the fact that national courts retained ultimate decisional power in
a formal sense, often ECJ interpretations under the preliminary reference
procedure effectively mandated a particular decision significantly con-
straining the effect of the Member State law in question. Through pre-
liminary references the ECJ forged links with an array of "subnational
actors-private litigants, their lawyers, and lower national courts"' 44 -
creating a body of law as well as a professional community (including
professors of European law) invested in the success of the Community
project.
The ECJ's method of treaty and legislative interpretation throughout
this period was quite open-ended, intended to extend aggressively the
reach of Community competence. That extension was in large measure
accomplished through recourse to the so-called "teleological method of
interpretation" common in the civil law tradition, which gave the judges
of the ECJ wide latitude "to justify its decisions in light of the common
interests of the members as enshrined in both specific and general objec-
tives of the original Rome treaty."' 45 Teleological interpretation permit-
ted the Court "to rationalize everything from direct effect to the preemp-
tion of member state negotiating power in external affairs in every case in
which the treaty grants internal competence to community authori-
ties."146 The Court justified these doctrines "not on the basis of specific
provisions in the treaty or community secondary legislation but on the
accomplishment of the most elementary goals set forth in the Preamble
of the treaty."'14 7 The ECJ gave itself maximum leeway in the pursuit of
these ends through the doctrine of supremacy, whereby the Court estab-
142. See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. of Eur. L. 267, 271 (1981). This article argues for a distinction
between "normative" and "decisional" supranationalism.
143. Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 44; see also Karen Alter, The European
Court's Political Power, 19 W. Eur. Pol. 458 (1996) (discussing the emergence of the
European Court as the most powerful political institution in the European Union).
144. Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 58.
145. Id. at 68; see also Fennelly, supra note 140, at 664-79. For further discussion, see
infra Part VI.B.
146. Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 68 (citing Case 22/70, Commission v.
Council, 1971 E.C.R. 363). For an early view by ajudge on the ECJ, see Pierre Pescatore,
The Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations,
Based on the Experience of the European Communities 41-44, 86-90 (1974).
147. Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 68.
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lished itself as the ultimate judge of the extent of Community
competences. 148
Integration by adjudication was effective in part because it appealed
to rule of law sentiments among Member State officials, even where they
were otherwise hostile to specific decisions.' 49 It gave integration a dis-
tinctly incremental feel, not necessarily a bad thing while the new regula-
tory regime was trying to legitimate itself.' 50 Incrementalism still had a
profound effect on the content of national law, however. In the area of
free movement of goods guaranteed by Article 28 (ex Article 30), for
example, the European Court took a maximalist approach, holding that a
showing of potential and indirect hindrance to interstate trade was suffi-
cient to strike down a Member State requirement. 5 1 A whole range of
national product safety and consumer protection rules, indistinctly appli-
cable to goods on the market but with potential impact on trade, came
under challenge. In response, the ECJ developed the principle of "mu-
tual recognition," whereby a Member State could not generally prohibit
148. As Joseph Weiler has noted, see Transformation, supra note 31, at 2414-15 &
n.26, the ECJ has never addressed its exclusive jurisdiction squarely, but implicit in its
decisions is the understanding that the Court has, as a matter of Community law, the
ultimate say on the reach of Community competence. See, e.g., Case 314/85, Foto Frost v.
Hauptzollamt Lfibeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.L 4199 (case in which the Court reserved to itself the
sole prerogative of declaring Community law invalid); Case 66/80, SPA Int'l Chemical
Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1981 E.C.R. 1191 (same). For further
discussion of the ECJ's so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz, see infra Part VII.
149. See Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 68 (citing Hjalte Rasmussen, On the Law
and Policy of the European Court ofJustice 275-81 (1986)) ("[Ejven governments overtly
hostile to the Court's authority [did] not seek to ask the Court to overturn a previous
ruling but rather accept[ed] that ruling as a statement of law and use[d] it as a point of
departure for making arguments in subsequent cases."). Weiler explains Member State
deference to ECJ rulings in terms of "the deep-seated legitimacy that derives from the
mythical neutrality and religious-like authority with which we invest our supreme courts."
Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2428.
150. A comparison with the history of American federal regulatory institutions may be
helpful. Recall that when the Supreme Court finally abandoned its narrow reading of
federal power to regulate interstate commerce in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937), it was in connection with an agency that is as "judicial" as they come.
The NLRB, until relatively recently, almost never made rules. Rather, it used a common-
law method of precedent more reminiscent of nineteenth-century practice, which perhaps
made the transition to a federal regulatory state less threatening. (I am grateful to Peter
Strauss for this insight.) Indeed, it was not until nearly three decades later that there was
the explosion in rulemaking we associate with the modern American regulatory state. See
Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 63, at 755-56 nn.33-34 and accompanying
text (referring to the "tremendous expansion ... in the prominence, use and development
of rulemaking" in the United States in the 1960s). Ironically, approximately the same
thirty-year interval elapsed in Europe before the explosion in rulemaking at the
supranational level, from the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the adoption of
the Single European Act in 1986. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
151. See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852.
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the circulation of goods lawfully introduced into commerce in another
Member State. 15 2
B. The Advent of Autonomous Lawmaking at the Community Level
In the 1970s, Community legislation also quietly extended, with ECJ
approval, the reach of Community competences, effectively breaking
down the limits on delegated powers set forth in the Treaty. The ECJ
broadly interpreted, for example, the Council's legislative competence in
the area of free movement of workers under the old Article 48 (now arti-
cle 39) to reach qualifications for educational grants, even though at the
time educational policy was clearly outside Community jurisdiction. 153
The Commission and the Council also stretched the limits of the Com-
munity's purportedly "limited powers" in another fashion: through re-
course to the Community's "necessary and proper" clause, then-Article
235 (now Article 308).154 Through the use of Article 235, the original
limits on the Community's delegated powers were rendered effectively
meaningless, and the EC adopted rules in such areas as environmental
policy and consumer protection long before these areas were explicitly
added to Community jurisdiction. 15 5 The only thing holding the
Community back, at least prior to 1986, was unanimous voting in the
Council. The Member States could tolerate "functional spill-over" into
the national domain because their executives maintained effective con-
trol over the legislative output- 56
152. See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 649-50 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon] (holding that Germany
could not prohibit the sale of beverages from another Member State containing a lower
alcohol content than required by German law).
153. See Case 9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshaupstadt Mfinchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773,
777-78. For a discussion, see Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2438-41.
154. Article 308 (ex art. 235) of the EG Treaty provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
155. One might say that the way in which Article 235 was interpreted had the distinct
feel of the enabling legislation of Gary Lawson's hypothetical "Goodness and Niceness
Commission," empowered "to promulgate rules for the promotion of goodness and
niceness in all areas within the power of Congress under the Constitution." Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1239 (1994). In
Lawson's view, "[the United States Code is filled with statutes that create little Goodness
and Niceness Commissions," although, in contrast to Europe, they have limited substantive
domains (e.g., "securities, broadcast licenses, or ([Lawson's] personal favorite) imported
tea"). Id. at 1240. In view of the ECJ's interpretation of Article 235, the EC may have
become a super"Goodness and Niceness Commission," cutting across particular
substantive domains.
156. Functional spill-over describes the phenomenon whereby "any integrative action
in one sector creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking
actions in related sectors, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more
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This Article 235 legislation in part reflected the enthusiasm for social
regulation that also prevailed in the United States in the 1970s, but one
might offer a public-choice explanation as well: Such rules could be
adopted at little political cost, given that the delegated legislation af-
fected diffuse interests, whereas changes in technical rules relating to spe-
cific products might offend organized constituencies whose opposition
could be politically troublesome. Formally speaking, therefore, the vast
majority of technical non-tariff barriers remained on the Member States'
books. In addition, one might argue that the difficult policy questions
were increasingly delegated to the European level because this would al-
low the executives of the Member States to escape blame for decisions
"made in Brussels."157 Moreover, because the Member States maintained
exclusive control over implementation, it was possible for them to sup-
port the adoption of legislation at the European level that they had no
intention of applying at the national level with any great rigor, if at all. 158
In 1986, however, tired of "Eurosclerosis" and embarrassed about the
lack of progress toward the internal market, the Member States sum-
moned the will to adopt the Single European Act (SEA) along with the
so-called "1992 Program" outlined in the Commission's White Paper Com-
pleting the Internal Market.159 Rather than force costly harmonization of
standards in order to achieve the single market by 1992, the Community
followed the ECJ's lead and adopted a "new approach to technical har-
monization" based on the mutual recognition principle and minimal har-
monization. 160 Additionally, and most importantly for our purposes, the
SEA instituted a qualified-majority voting procedure in the Council for
harmonization measures meant to eliminate non-tariff barriers to
trade.' 61 It was viewed as a "low-key technical necessity in realizing the
'noncontroversial' objectives of the White Paper.' 62
action, and so forth." Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 55 (citing Leon Lindberg, The
Political Dynamics of the European Economic Integration 384 (1963)).
157. Dehousse, supra note 131, at 120.
158. See Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 86 (criticizing this argument).
159. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM(85)310 final at 9-16.
160. Article 100b(1) of the EEC Treaty, as amended by the Single European Act of
1986, read:
During 1992, the Commission shall, together with each Member State, draw up
an inventory of national laws, regulations and administrative provisions which fall
under Article 100a and which have not been harmonized pursuant to that article.
The Council, acting in accordance with the provisions of Article 100a, may decide
that the provisions in force in a Member State must be recognized as being
equivalent to those applied by another Member State.
161. See EC Treaty art. 95 (ex art. 100a).
162. Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2458. The vote-weighting system, set
out in Article 205 (ex Article 148) of the EC Treaty, is complex, but the bottom line is that
to defeat a measure it now takes an alliance of at least three of the large states (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, or the UK), or eight of the smallest states, or a range of possible
coalitions in between.
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Qualified-majority voting, however, raised the very real prospect that
the Community could adopt a piece of legislation, such as a directive,
over the objections of any one Member State. Yet this was a risk that the
Member States were willing to take in order to restore some semblance of
political control to the integration process. Minimal harmonization,
when combined with qualified-majority voting,
was better than the alternative of letting the judicial process con-
tinue to make the necessary policy choices incrementally ....
In other words, Member States were led to prefer political legis-
lation, even at the risk of being pushed into the minority on a
vote concluding Council deliberations among the Member
States, to a kind of "creeping legislation" through the judicial
process, to which they were completely external. 163
The Treaty on European Union of 1992 extended the reach of qualified-
majority voting. It also instituted the parliamentary co-decision proce-
dure requiring consent of the European Parliament to legislate in those
domains where the procedure applied, further diluting the capacity of
Member State governments to control the legislative outcome.' 64
Qualified-majority voting greatly enhanced the autonomy of
Community organs-particularly the Commission-and therefore the
Community's permanent bureaucracy in Brussels. In principal-agent
terms, the post-1986 environment significantly increased the risk of what
economists call "agency losses"; that is, the freedom of the agent to pur-
sue its own policy preferences rather than those of the principal. 165 In
many respects, the advent of qualified majority voting in the Council
marked the beginning of true supranationalism in the Community 166; its
exercise of legislative power-that is, its rulemaking, broadly defined-
was freed from the requirement of formal approbation by the democrati-
cally-accountable executives in each Member State, as supranational adju-
dicative power had long been.
However, there was a corresponding, and quite obvious, imbalance
in democratic legitimacy, because the Community standing alone was un-
able to make a serious claim to anything except a legitimacy of the most
embryonic sort, generally via the European Parliament. 167 By contrast,
the executives of the Member States, whatever the flaws of the parliamen-
tary systems that produced them, could still claim legitimacy via responsi-
bility before the national electorate in some reasonably direct sense.
163. Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 110-11.
164. The Treaty of Amsterdam will extend qualified-majority voting and
parliamentary co-decision even further. For a summary, see Philippe Manin, The Treaty of
Amsterdam, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1 (1998); Petite, supra note 98.
165. See Pollack, supra note 3, at 108 (citing Roderick D. Kiewiet & Matthew D.
McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation
Process 5 (1991)).
166. See Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2461-64.
167. On the problematic nature of the legitimacy derived from the European
Parliament, see infra Part IV.
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Decisionmaking based on a rough consensus among the Member State
executives in the Council, which qualified-majority voting now enabled,
would henceforth provide at best an indirect source of political legitimacy
for the Community's normative output.168
C. Defining the Sphere of Continuing National Control
After 1986, two forms of sovereignty were thus brought into potential
conflict on a legislative level: on the one hand, the relatively autono-
mous, "pooled" sovereignty of the Community qua agency exercising del-
egated authority; and on the other, the democratically-legitimate sover-
eignty expressed through the political and legal institutions of the
Member States. As the Member States negotiated "ever closer union" in
the early 1990s-resulting in the Treaty on European Union of 1992-
they began to recognize the necessity of developing legal means to regu-
late more effectively the boundary between these two forms of sover-
eignty.169 Two aspects of the TEU specifically addressed this issue: the
subsidiarity principle and the pillar structure. More recently, the Treaty
of Amsterdam of 1997 introduced a third innovation: the variable geom-
etry in Community law, reflected particularly in the provisions permitting
"closer cooperation" among certain Member States.
1. Subsidiarity. - The insertion of the subsidiarity principle into the
EC Treaty in 1992 should be viewed as an indirect effort to preserve the
scope of national political control over legislative norm production. Arti-
cle 5 (ex Article 3b) provides that any action falling within the concur-
rent competence of the Community and the Member States' 7 0 should
only be taken by the EC "if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community."171
By its terms, Article 5 (ex Article 3b) invites a functionalist approach
to the question of subsidiarity, rather than one rooted in democratic le-
168. See Sauter, supra note 7, at 34 n.22 (citing Joseph H.H. Weiler, Problems of
Legitimacy in Post 1992 Europe, 46 Aussenwirtschaft 411, 421 (1991)).
169. Excluded from the discussion at this point is "comitology," or the system of
committees used to maintain continuing national control over technocratic rulemaking in
the Commission. Although clearly relevant to the question of national control, this paper
treats it, infra Part V, as part of the discussion of participation and transparency rights at
the technocratic level.
170. Such is the case, for example, in consumer product safety or the environment, as
opposed to agriculture, where the Community has exclusive competence.
171. EC Treaty art. 5 (ex art. 3b). The introduction of the concept of subsidiarity in a
general way into the EC Treaty in 1992 generated a considerable amount of scholarly
commentary. See generally Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, for a
survey of the literature. In light of the abundant scholarly output on the subject, Joseph
Weiler has written of "that growth industry, Academic Subsidiarity commentary." J.H.H.
Weiler, Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the
European Court ofJustice in the Arena of Political Integration, 31 J. Common Mkt. Stud.
417, 437 (1993).
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gitimacy concerns. 172 However, as George Bermann has noted, although
"[s]ubsidiarity expresses a preference for governance at the most local
level,"173 the aim of subsidiarity is not localism per se but the pursuit of
more fundamental values to which localism is linked. These include, no-
tably, "self-determination and accountability"174 and "preservation of
identities,"175 two key ingredients to democratic legitimacy, which receive
their institutional expression in national political hierarchies. A func-
tionalist approach, in my view, is clearly inadequate to understanding the
full import of the subsidiarity principle.' 76 The subsidiarity principle has,
in fact, proven to be an imperfect means of enhancing legitimacy pre-
cisely because of its mechanistic, functionalist application by Community
institutions since its insertion into the Treaty in 1992.177
2. The Pillar Structure. - The second aspect of the TEU that sought
to regulate the boundary between Community and Member State compe-
tence is the so-called "pillar structure" of the European Union. Under
the institutional umbrella of the newly-established EU, the functions of
economic and social regulation continued to fall within the competence
of the macro-institutions of the EC (the "first pillar"). Expressly ex-
cluded, however, from Community competence, and therefore from
Community legislative procedures as well as judicial review by the ECJ,
was Member State cooperation in a common foreign and security policy
(the "second pillar") as well as justice and home affairs (the "third pil-
lar"), both of which remained subject to essentially intergovernmental
control.178 This pillar structure was an implicit recognition that only the
172. See infra notes 440-448 and accompanying text. For a critique of the
functionalist orientation of the subsidiarity principle, see Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity
and Sovereignty in the European Union; 18 Fordham Int'l LJ. 616 (1994) [hereinafter
Marquardt, Subsidiarity].
173. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 389.
174. Id. at 340. According to Bermann,
Individuals are generally thought to have greater opportunity to shape the rules
governing their personal and business affairs when those rules are made at levels
of government at which they are more effectively represented. The opportunity
to participate increases the likelihood that the law and policy that result will
reflect the interests of the population concerned .... [S]elf-determination
advances essentially democratic values.
Id.
175. Id. at 341. For example,
One result of organizing power in ways that promote self-determination and
responsiveness is that local populations can better preserve their sense of social
and cultural identity. The law is of course not the only or even the main
determinant of identity, but it can be an important instrument in strengthening
or diluting the specificity of a community's distinctive combination of forms and
values.
Id.
176. I take up this argument in greater detail in connection with the discussion of
Treaty interpretation and democratic legitimacy in Part VI.
177. See infra Part VI.C.2-3, especially infra notes 440-458 and accompanying text.
178. See TEU art. 46 (ex art. L).
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Member States may legitimately exercise the most important attribute of
sovereignty-physical coercion-whether externally or internally.
Admittedly, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 transfers to the
Community extensive competence over matters previously falling under
the third pillar, such as border control, asylum, and immigration. 179 Dur-
ing a transition period of five years, however, the Member States share
the right to initiate legislation in this area with the Commission, and the
Council may only adopt such legislation on the basis of unanimity. After
the transition period lapses, though, the power of legislative initiative de-
volves to the Commission and, upon a unanimous vote in the Council,
voting in the Council will henceforth be by qualified majority, subject to
the parliamentary co-decision procedure of Article 251 (ex Article 189b)
of the EC Treaty. In short, the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a mecha-
nism for the ultimate transfer of legislative power on most third pillar
questions to the relatively autonomous supranational institutions of the
EC.
3. "Variable Geometry" and "Closer Cooperation." - As one observer
notes, however, this transfer of third pillar competences "in such broad
and sensitive areas [would be] virtually impossible to achieve without per-
mitting opposing states to derogate" from new Community legislation.'80
Both the United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, secured derogation
rights from legislation relating to border controls. 181 These sorts of
rights-the clearest manifestation of the emergent variable geometry in
Community law-are modeled on similar opt-out rights granted in 1992
both to the UK (on the so-called "Protocol and Agreement on Social Pol-
icy"' 8 2 as well as European Monetary Union (EMU))1 83 and to Denmark
(also on the EMU).184 This breakdown in the traditional principle that
179. See EC Treaty arts. 61-68 (ex arts. 73i-73p). The date of the Treaty of
Amsterdam's entry into force is May 1, 1999.
180. Manin, supra note 164, at 5, 19.
181. Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a
of the Treaty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to
Ireland, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 97. For those countries that did not secure derogation rights,
the implications for national sovereignty are significant. The French Constitutional
Council held that the passage in these areas of legislation by Commission initiative,
qualified-majority voting, and the co-decision procedure would constrain the exercise of
national sovereignty by France and that there was no prior delegation of sovereign power
to the Community (notably in connection with the TEU in 1992) justifying this exercise of
supranational legislative power. Cons. const. no. 97-394 DC, 31 d6c. 1997, Rec. 344.
Consequently, without a revision to the French constitution authorizing a transfer of
additional sovereign powers in this domain, the challenged provisions of the Treaty of
Amsterdam could not be put into effect in France.
182. 1992 OJ. (C 224) 126, 127.
183. TEU, Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 123.
184. TEU, Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 125.
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Community law should be applied uniformly' 8 5 suggests the inadequacy
of the constitutionalist vision of the EC as a unitary, self-legitimating pol-
ity.186 While Member States may pragmatically choose to transfer certain
competences to the Community, the right to opt out demonstrates that
national political structures remain the presumptive expression of demo-
cratically-legitimate sovereignty.
Other provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, contemplating closer
cooperation among subgroups of Member States, will further reshape
Community law according to the new variable geometry.18 7 The closer
cooperation provisions envision that some but not all Member States-at
least a majority-may at some point desire to use Community institutions
to go "further" and "faster" in matters of integration. 18 8 The interested
Member States must first receive the authorization of the Council before
proceeding to closer cooperation, acting on a proposal of the
Commission and in consultation with the European Parliament.189 The
Treaty does not specify the legislative domains that are amenable to
closer cooperation, but does lay down certain substantive criteria: closer
cooperation must be aimed at furthering the objectives of the Commu-
nity; may only be used as a last resort; and may not result in discrimina-
tion or affect Community policies, actions, or programs. 190 The Treaty
also creates a major procedural safeguard: Each Member State retains
the effective right to veto requests for any such authorization.19 1
185. See Manin, supra note 164, at 18. The only exception previously was the
granting of derogation rights to new Member States during periods of transition following
their accession.
186. Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, supra note 24, at 16.
187. For an historical overview and legal analysis of the closer cooperation provisions,
see Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-Operation: The New
Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 4 Eur. L.J. 246 (1998); see also Giorgio Gaja, How
Flexible is Flexibility under the Amsterdam Treaty?, 35 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 855 (1998);
Helmut Kortenberg, Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 35 Common Mkt. L.
Rev. 833 (1998); Shaw, supra note 36, at 69-81.
188. See TEU art. 40 (ex. art. K12), arts. 43-45 (ex arts. K.15-K.17), and EC Treaty
art. 11 (ex. art. 5a), added by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
189. If the cooperation falls under the third pillar, the proposal must come from the
Member States, with the Commission given a right to give an opinion. In third pillar
matters, the Parliament is given no role. TEU art. 40(2) (ex art. K.12(2)); see also Manin,
supra note 164, at 21.
190. TEU art. 43(1) (b)-(a) (ex art. K. 15(1) (b)-(g)); see also Ehlermann, supra note
187, at 253-54.
191. Any Member State may oppose authorization for "important and stated reasons
of national policy." TEU art. 40(2) (ex art. K.12(2)); EC Treaty art. 11(2) (ex art.
5(a) (2)). In such circumstances, the matter may be referred to the heads of state or
government of the Member States, which may authorize closer cooperation only by a
unanimous vote.
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D. The Likelihood of Intensified Disputes over the Relative Legislative
Competences of the Community and the Member States
It is unclear how precisely the closer cooperation provisions are sup-
posed to mesh-both legally and practically-with qualified-majority vot-
ing in the Council. Can a qualified majority of Member States impose its
will on the minority if the majority in the end retains the option to go it
alone? Although that right may exist legally,192 politically such a course
would clearly call into question the legitimacy of the resulting norms in
dissenting states. Viewed in the most positive light, the provisions for
closer cooperation simply mean that integration will no longer proceed
at a pace determined by the most reluctant Member States. Viewed more
negatively, the cooperation provisions allow Member States to pick and
choose the domains in which they are willing to accept the most ad-
vanced elements of Community legislation. In other words, they create a
kind of general right to opt out.193
The right to derogate from a particular legislative program inevitably
casts doubt on the relative scope of the Community's general legislative
competence-from which a Member State may not, in theory, opt out-
compared to its more specific competence under the closer cooperation
provisions-from which certain Member States have, by definition, cho-
sen not to participate. The evolving variable geometry in Community law
may simply lay the groundwork for further highly contentious legal dis-
putes over perhaps the most sensitive issue in Community law: the line
between national and supranational competence. 94
IV. SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION VERsus DEMOCRATIC LEGrrIMACY
A. Overcoming the "Democratic Deficit": The Parliamentary Democratization
Strategy
Since 1986, when the Single European Act eliminated unanimous
voting in the Council for many of the most important legislative do-
mains,195 the Community has needed alternative means to legitimize its
192. Closer cooperation presumes that the normal legislative procedures of the
Community have been tried first. TEU art. 43(1)(c) (ex art. Y-15(1)(c)).
193. The impact that this right will have on Community legitimacy is an open
question. See Shaw, supra note 36, at 85 (arguing that the closer cooperation provisions
"as currently conceived are little related to the core issues of legitimacy in the EC/EU
context," and viewing them instead as "the product of a balancing exercise between
centrifugal and centripetal political tendencies operating through the various Member
States and EC/EU institutions"). Shaw's analysis arguably ignores a key aspect of the closer
cooperation provisions. It is precisely because they augment the bargaining position of
reluctant Member States in the legislative process of the Community that they reflect, if not
the actual reality, at least the desire to recreate a semblance of legitimate hierarchical
control, while also allowing the core project of legal integration to proceed. In this sense,
they are best understood from the administrative perspective.
194. See generally infra Part VI.D (discussing Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v.
Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755, 3 C.M.L.R. 671 (1996) [hereinafter Working Time Directive]).
195. EEC Treaty art. 100a.
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normative output apart from the hierarchical control of each Member
State executive. Subsidiarity, the pillar structure, and variable geometry
each offer indirect solutions to the question of democratic legitimacy by
attempting to define the scope of Community competence in a way that
both acknowledges the legitimate prerogatives of national sovereignty but
nevertheless allows integration to proceed.
196
None of these legal innovations, however, addresses how the
Community should resolve the infamous democratic deficit-that is, how
it can best legitimize the rulemaking that clearly falls within the
Community's legislative competence. The official strategy here has cen-
tered on a further increase in the role of the Community's elected body,
the European Parliament-in effect, to make it the legitimate, hierarchi-
cal political superior in the Community system. According to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the growing importance of the Parliament is an
expression of "the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples
should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a
representative assembly."
19 7
The powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament have in-
deed grown markedly over the course of the Community's history. Com-
posed originally of representatives of national legislatures, the
Parliament's political and legislative powers under the original Treaty of
Rome were feeble.1 98 In 1977, however, the Parliament gained ajunior
role in approving the Community budget. In 1979, the first direct popu-
lar elections of members took place. In 1986, the Single European Act
broadened the Parliament's legislative powers by establishing the "coop-
eration procedure," which constitutes a sort of suspensive veto. 199 In
1992, the Treaty on European Union added the "co-decision proce-
dure"-a true veto, in effect-generally for legislation in completion of
the internal market.200 The TEU also explicitly recognized the standing
of the Parliament to maintain an action against other Community institu-
196. The same could be said of the so-called comitology system, which governs the
Commission's exercise of normative power delegated by the Council. See infra notes
281-284 and accompanying text.
197. Case 138/79, SA Roquette Fr~res v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360 para. 33.
198. The original Article 137 referred vaguely to "advisory and supervisory powers
which are conferred upon [the Parliament] by this Treaty." A closer look at the Treaty,
however, revealed at best the right to be "consulted" in certain legislative fields, as well as
the right of censure against the Commission as a whole.
199. Codified as EC Treaty art. 252 (ex art. 189c). Under this procedure, if the
European Parliament rejects proposed legislation voted by the Council (acting by qualified
majority), the Council may still pass the legislation, but only by a unanimous vote.
200. Codified as EC Treaty art. 251 (ex art. 189b). Under this procedure, the
rejection of proposed legislation approved by the Council leads to the formation of an ad
hoc "conciliation commission." If the Parliament rejects the revised "conciliated"
legislation, the bill is definitively rejected. The Treaty of Amsterdam would significantly
extend the application of the co-decision procedure. See Petite, supra note 98, at section
TV, pt. 1.
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tions to defend its institutional role in the legislative process.20' Finally,
the TEU increased Parliament's political powers-previously limited to
the right of censure-by giving Parliament the right to approve the Com-
mission as a body at the beginning of its term.20 2 The Treaty of Amster-
dam further extends the powers of the Parliament by giving it the specific
right to approve the nomination of the Commission President.20 3 The
TEU also gave Parliament the right to force, by majority vote, the submis-
sion of a legislative proposal to the Council. 204
Taken together, these prerogatives smack of a nascent parliamentar-
ism: direct election, a budgetary role, a kind of "governmental" responsi-
bility, the right of legislative initiative and approval. The Parliament still
suffers, however, from a number of oft-noted problems: effective exclu-
sion from the real process of decision making, dominated by the Council
and the Commission; an unwieldy size; disproportionate representation
of smaller Member States; internal language barriers; and popular and
media disinterest.205
201. EC Treaty art. 230 (ex art. 173). The TEU's revision of Article 173 codified an
earlier decision of the ECJ explicitly recognizing the right in the Parliament. See Case C-
70/88, Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041, 1 C.M.L.R. 91 (1990) (the "Chernobyl"
decision), overruling Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5615 (the
"Comitology" decision). For a general description, see G. Federico Mancini & David T.
Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 Mod. L. Rev. 175, 180-81
(1994) (describing the ECJ's judgment in the "Chernobyl" decision, Case C-70/88,
Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041, which recognized the standing of the European
Parliament to maintain an Article 173 action to defend its institutional prerogatives against
the Council, as a step toward "strengthening (the Community's] democratic legitimacy").
202. See EC Treaty art. 214 (ex art. 158).
203. Id.
204. See EC Treaty art. 192 (ex art. 138b).
205. See Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 233-34. A breakthrough of sorts may have
come, however, in the censure controversy of January 1999 (prompted by the alleged
corruption of certain members of the Commission), and the collective resignation of the
Commission in March 1999, following the issuance of the report of the Committee of
Independent Experts. See Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations
regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, March 15,
1999, <http://wwv.europarl.eu.int/experts/en/default.htm> (on file with the Columbia
Law Rview) [hereinafter Independent Experts Report]. As one French commentator
noted soon after the resignation of the Commission, for the first time the Commission
found itself politically responsible for the internal fumctioning of the Community
bureaucracy under conditions approaching those of governmental responsibility in a
classical parliamentary democracy. See Yves M~ny, La Commission est morte . . .Vive
l'Europe, Le Monde, Friday, March 19, 1999, <http://ivwv.lemonde.fr/actu/
intemational/europe/combrux/990319/meny.html>. This observer further noted that
European institutions were, also for the first time, simultaneously the focus of the major
print and electronic media of each Member State, leading to a common public debate over
European institutional politics unprecedented in the history of the EC/EU. Finally,
because the resignation of the Commission took place just three months before the
election of a new European Parliament in June 1999, this created the possibility of an
election that would focus primarily on European questions, and not on parochial concerns
in the fifteen Member States, as was usually the case in all previous European elections.
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These are difficult obstacles to overcome in themselves, but the aim
of this section is not to address them per se, but rather to look at a more
fundamental issue. Assume, for the moment, that this array of obstacles
could indeed be overcome. Assume, more importantly, that the Parlia-
ment could in fact become the true locus of legislative power in the Com-
munity, with extensive powers of oversight over the regulatory process.
Could Community institutions in those circumstances become, in a sense,
"self-legitimating" through their responsibility to a European Parliament
with a reasonably direct relationship with the European electorate?
B. The European Parliament and the "No Demos Thesis"
Certainly a positive answer to this question would be a logical exten-
sion of the ECJ's constitutionalist vision of the Community. The question
of parliamentary prerogatives, however, forces us to examine the relation-
ship between formal democratization, democratic legitimacy, and, ulti-
mately, national sovereignty. From the standpoint of national sover-
eignty, true democratization of European institutions is problematic
because it breaks a link between democracy and the nation-state. In its
strongest form, the nationalist critique doubts seriously whether democ-
racy can exist at the European level at all, given the purported impossibil-
ity of a genuine European people in a national sense-a demos-in
whom sovereignty can be said to have originally resided, which was then
constitutionally delegated to European institutions. Joseph Weiler has
called this the "No Demos Thesis."
20 6
The relationship between the demos and democratic legitimacy is
especially critical for our purposes: If the European Parliament lacks dem-
ocratic legitimacy, in the sense that it is not exercising powers delegated to
it directly by a sovereign people, a court is simply not justified in regard-
ing it as a normal legislature. That is, the court would not be justified in
giving broad deference to its findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
same way and to the same extent as those of a national legislature.20 7 In
the absence of a European demos, the Community legislative process
might still be legitimate, but only in an administrative sense, in that it is
exercising authority within its sphere of competence lawfully delegated by
the Member States. The legislative process would be subject to judicial
review, not solely for conformity with the broad requirements of the
Treaty or for violation of fundamental rights as one might expect in the
case of a legislature, but also for basic procedural fairness and, more im-
portantly, substantive rationality in the same manner as any other admin-
istrative entity.
In a fundamental sense, therefore, the legal character of the
European Community turns on the existence of a European demos, thus
206. See Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 224-31.
207. The ECJ does in fact accord the Council and Parliament such deference. See
infra notes 410, 417-434 and accompanying text.
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requiring us to examine the implications of the No Demos Thesis more
closely. The basic premise of the thesis is not inherently nationalistic;
indeed, it rests on an essential principle that few would dispute:
Democracy does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the
existence of a polity with members-the demos-by whom and
for whom democratic discourse with its many variants takes
place. The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a
minority exists only within political boundaries defined by a
demos.2 08
The tough question is who properly may be said to be a member. In
modem European history, to date at least, there has been a broadly per-
ceived link between membership in an identifiable, cohesive national
community and the existence of a demos, a linkage that has often given
particular legitimacy to the nation-state as a democratic and sovereign
unit.20 9
The relationship between demos and nation is, however, delicate
and susceptible to differing interpretations-some very unpleasant, in-
deed reprehensible. What recently raised Joseph Weiler's ire, and in-
spired him to bring his formidable critical and analytical powers to bear
on the question, was the notion of demos implicit in the decision of the
German Federal Constitutional Court in what is known as the Maastricht
Decision.210 This ruling cleared the way for German ratification of the
Treaty on European Union of 1992, but its reasoning required that the
Court reserve for itself, as defender of the democratic rights of the
German people, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz, or ultimate jurisdic-
tion to determine the extent of Community competences relative to
Germany.
This is not an objectionable position in itself.21 Professor Weiler
asserts, however, that the ruling was based on a conception of an ethni-
cally homogeneous, "organic" German demos, the democratic rights of
208. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 222.
209. To demonstrate the relationship, consider a hypothetical, advanced by Professor
Weiler, of an Anschluss between Germany and Denmark. Under terms of the Anschluss,
Danes would be guaranteed full representation in the Bundestag. Professor Weiler argues,
I think correctly, that formal democratic rights would be of little comfort to the Danes if
they were condemned to permanent minority status in the legislature, a demos without a
country or institutions of its own. See id. at 228. Robert Dahi has elsewhere made much
the same point, using a similar example:
The criteria of the democratic process presupposes the rightfulness of the unit
itself. If the unit itself is not a proper or rightful unit, then it cannot be made
rightful simply by democratic procedures. If the United States were to compel
Costa Rica to become the fifty-first state, would not Costa Ricans rightly feel-and
we too-that a grave injustice had been done?
Robert A. Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in Liberal Democracy 95, 103-04
Q. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983).
210. BVerfGE 89, 155, translated in English at 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (1994).
211. See MacCormick, Sovereignty Now, supra note 51, at 264-65. For greater detail,
see infra Part VII.
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which it was the Constitutional Court's obligation to defend. This or-
ganic notion traces its intellectual roots, he argues, to Carl Schmitt, per-
haps the most influential conservative constitutional theorist in Germany
at the end of the Weimar Republic and subsequently the leading legal
theorist in the early years of the National Socialist regime.2 12 In a theo-
retical refinement of the Nazi ideal of a racially-pure Volksgemeinschaft,
Schmitt identified social homogeneity as the prime criterion of modem
democracy, thus requiring, if necessary, "'the excision or destruction of
the heterogeneous.' 2 13 Professor Weiler thus understandably laments:
"[O]f all the rich currents in the German national debate on polity and
membership [the German Constitutional Court] had to pick up this
one."
2 14
C. The "Hard" and "Soft" Versions
No one, and certainly not Joseph Weiler, argues that Schmitt's ex-
treme racist views or his polarizing friend-enemy conception of politics
were imported wholesale into the Maastricht Decision.2 15 Rather, in
Professor Weiler's view it is a question of inspiration, couched in "the
universal values of democracy."2 1 6 The Schmittian intellectual lineage is
reflected in the "hard" version of the No Demos Thesis, which holds that
democracy is impossible without an ethnically homogeneous, "organic"
demos-in other words, a Volk-the absence of which renders true de-
mocracy unattainable at the European level. In this version, the demos
has "an almost natural connotation. You are born German the way you
are born male or female .... The implication of this is that one's nation-
ality as a form of identity is almost primordial .... taking precedence
over other forms of consciousness and membership."
2 1 7
There is, of course, also a "soft" version of the No Demos Thesis.
This "not yet" version does not adhere to the notion of nationality as an
organic, natural condition, and thus is open to the idea that, "[a]Ithough
there is no [European] demos now the possibility for the future is not
212. See generallyJoseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (1983);
George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of
Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936 (2d ed. 1989).
213. Schwab, supra note 212, at 62-63 (quoting Carl Schmitt, Die
geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus 14 (1926)).
214. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 224.
215. Professor Weiler discusses extensively the Schmittian influences on the writings
of the Juge-Rapporteur of the Maastricht Decision, Paul Kirchhof, but does not say that
Kirchhof's views are identical to those of Schmitt. Professor Weiler further acknowledges
that in "[c] omparing the writings of Kirchhof and the ultimate decision of the Court one
gets the impression of a Court which was not altogether happy with the full-blooded views
of its Rapporteur.... The compromise seems a watered-down version of Kirchhof," which
permits alternative readings. Id. at 225. Professor Weiler hoped that his critique could
provide the incentive to reject the strongly Kirchhofian interpretation.
216. Id. at 222.
217. Id. at 227.
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precluded."218 Professor Weiler, however, assimilates the two versions,
soft and hard, arguing without much elaboration that they share "the
same understanding of peoplehood, its characteristics and manifesta-
tions."m2 9 Neither version in his view permits the possibility of democrati-
zation at the European level, or, in the case of the soft version, at least not
any time soon. Most importantly, Professor Weiler asserts, a European
Parliament without a European demos is, from the standpoint of either
position, "practically despotic," with a writ possessing "only slightly more
legitimacy than the writ of an emperor."220
Is this a fair characterization? As noted previously, it is not necessary
to recognize the existence of a true demos at the European level to still
regard the Parliament as legitimate, at least in an administrative sense, as
an elected adjunct in an essentially administrative system. The Parlia-
ment could be analogized to the municipal or departmental councils of
France which, although elected, are recognized elements of France's
otherwise (still) highly centralized administration.22' These councils ex-
ercise authority guaranteed both constitutionally and legislatively, subject
to legal controls by the French administrative court system.222 The fact
that they do not represent a demos in a national sense hardly reduces
their legal and popular legitimacy, as long as they remain within the con-
fines of their delegated legal authority. Indeed, the fact that they are
elected probably augments their legitimacy in the administrative system.
Because Professor Weiler does not examine this alternative basis for
legitimacy, he is forced to make-in order to protect Community
rulemaking from accusations of "despotism"-a highly abstract claim for
the existence of a European demos based on civic values and what he
calls "critical citizenship."223 He speaks of a demos rooted not in "trans-
European cultural affinities or shared histories" but in an abstract "com-
mitment to the shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent
documents." 224 By that he apparently means a commitment "to the du-
ties and rights of civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a com-
mitment to membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposites
of nationalism-those human features which transcend the differences of
organic ethno-culturalism." 225 Professor Weiler argues for the possibility
(indeed the necessity) of overlapping national and supranational
"demoi,"226 resulting from a decoupling of nationality and citizenship,
218. Id. at 229.
219. Id. at 230.
220. Id. at 231.
221. See generally 2 Georges Vedel & Pierre Delvolv6, Droit administratif 474-575
(11th ed. 1990) (in particular, Part IV, ch. II, "Les collectivit s locales").
222. See id. at 567-89.
223. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 256.
224. Id. at 252.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 253.
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which might then serve to legitimize Community institutions while also
disciplining the excesses of nationalism.
The idea of decoupling has a definite normative appeal, but, as
Professor Weiler implicitly acknowledges, he is calling for nothing less
than a profound cultural change in peoples' identities: "[E]ven this con-
struct of the European demos, like the Volkish construct, depends on a
shift of consciousness. Individuals must think of themselves in this way
before such a demos could have full legitimate democratic authority."227
This sounds remarkably similar, in its essentials, to the soft version of the
No Demos Thesis. In contrast to the Schmittian version, the soft version
regards national consciousness as an open system, path dependent to be
sure, but nevertheless socially and historically malleable. In this sense, it
shares much with a perfectly respectable line of sociologists, anthropolo-
gists and historians, such as, for example, Max Weber. According to the
scheme set out in Economy and Society, a "political community" (Weber's
term most closely approximating a demos) requires a "particular pathos"
and "enduring emotional foundations" derived from a history of "com-
mon political struggle." 228 Such a history of common struggle gives rise
to a "'community of memories' which.., constitutes the ultimately deci-
sive element of 'national consciousness."' 229 Weber, in sharp contrast to
Schmitt, is describing a political community as an historical and social
construct rather than an organic-ethnic-racial reality, one purportedly
pre-dating history, society, the state, or whatever. Weber even leaves
open the possibility of a multi-national political community, as long as
there also exists the necessary "community of memories" based on a heri-
tage of "common political struggle."23 °
Max Weber's message is hopeful but cautious. Europe must be built
on more than instrumental exchange or abstract values disconnected
227. Id. at 254. I use the term "cultural" in a different sense fromJoseph Weiler. I see
culture as a dynamic historical construct, a continually evolving system of interpretation, see
supra note 11, whereas for Professor Weiler the term connotes the "organic" conception of
peoplehood. See Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 229 (referring to "these organic
cultural-national criteria" of the hard version of the No Demos Thesis). Consequently, in
my view, we should avoid endowing an analytical abstraction like "culture" with causative
properties. Rather, culture evolves out of the experience of historical change by individuals.
See E.P. Thompson, History and Anthropology, Lecture Given at the Indian History
Congress (Dec. 30, 1976), in Making History 200, 222 (1994) [hereinafter Thompson,
History and Anthropology] ("[H]istorical change eventuates . . . because changes in
productive relationships are experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men's ideas
and their values, and argued through their actions, their choices and their beliefs.").
228. In Weber's view, this emotional state is ultimately grounded, sadly, on the
expectation that the individual member might die in the group interest. See 2 Max Weber,
Economy and Society 902-03 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., & Ephraim Fischof et
al. trans., 1978).
229. Id. at 903.
230. Id.
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from historical context.2 31 Yet, despite the formidable social and histori-
cal obstacles to forging a European political community in a suprana-
tional sense, these obstacles are not insurmountable in a nationally-
even regionally-heterogeneous continent like Europe. The experience
of the last fifty years bears this out in important respects. A genuine
European consciousness may not yet have developed to the same extent
or on the same terms as those of a nation-state, but a foundation has been
laid for a shared European political community with a strong cohesive
quality. Liberal values and a commitment to human rights, which form
the bases of Professor Weiler's "critical citizenship," have a much greater
and more widespread legitimacy in today's Europe than in, say, late-nine-
teenth or early-twentieth century Germany, precisely because there is a
shared memory of struggle in this century to overcome Europe's own self-
destructiveness.2 32 Professor Weiler implicitly agrees: Indeed, one of his
principal motivations for attacking the No Demos Thesis with such feroc-
ity is to counteract the negative propensities of nationalism which "are a
living part of the history of the European Nation-State ... so well known
as to obviate discussion."2 3 3
D. The Continued Pull of the Nation-State
Despite this shared memory, however, there still exists an "existential
craving for meaning and purpose" that for many is apparently only satis-
fied by "nation and state, with their organizing myths of fate and
destiny."23 4 Professor Weiler acknowledges the comparatively stronger
"psycho-sociological" power of national identity over supranational iden-
tity but asserts that national identity must be "properly managed and con-
tained" via his notion of critical citizenship.2 35 Management and contain-
ment is possible, in his estimation, because national identity has, "at
certain critical moments of transition, a far larger degree of artificiality,
of social constructionism and even social engineering" than is usually sup-
231. A political community can only be said to exist "if, and in so far as, [it)
constitutes more than an 'economic group'; or, in other words, in so far as it possesses
value systems ordering matters other than the directly economic disposition of goods and
services." Id. at 902.
232. The postwar generation of European leaders believed strongly that intensified
supranational cooperation was the only viable alternative to the reckless destruction of the
first half of the twentieth century; indeed, this understanding provided much of the initial
emotional underpinnings for the European project. Even if not exactly a "shared" history
of struggle in the sense that Weber probably meant-given that the conflicts often pitted
European against European-the common memory of destruction and deprivation at each
other's hands certainly had, and continues to have, a positive impact on the popular
legitimacy of what is otherwise a highly bureaucratic and legalistic enterprise.
233. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 248.
234. Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23, at 371.
235. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 247.
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posed.236 This has undoubtedly been true in certain contexts. 23 7 But his-
tory also cautions us not to overestimate the capacity of elites to manipu-
late national feeling or casually disregard culturally-embedded modes of
thought.238
For the time being, national and supranational identities in Europe
exist in a cultural tension, with national identity still holding the decisive
advantage,23 9 although subnational, "regional" identity is increasingly
strong.240 It strikes me as dangerous, in view of the continued strength of
national and even regional identity, to conceive of a European demos as
one not based on "trans-European cultural affinities or shared histo-
ries." 241 It is only through a shared history that the normative, civilizing
and liberal values that Professor Weiler seeks to promote are given a du-
rable social existence. Professor Weiler is clearly aware of the potential
236. Id. at 239. Again, I think this reflects the fundamental similarity between
Professor Weiler's concept of demos and the "soft" version.
237. In late-nineteenth century France, for example, when leaders of the Third
Republic were seeking to legitimate the new regime in the eyes of the French people,
history and memory were consciously merged in an official effort-via public education,
monuments, and rituals-to foster respect for "Republican" values and to forge national
feeling. Pierre Nora and a number of colleagues have sought to identify these lieux de
mbnoire, or "places of memory," that came to be seen as embodying or celebrating the
Republican or national past. See Les lieux de m~moire (P. Nora ed., 1984) (2 volumes);
see also Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France
1870-1914 ch. 18 (1976).
238. The case of late-nineteenth-century Germany is the prime example, in which the
old elites pursued several manipulative strategies to promote national feeling to undergird
the new imperial regime. Rather than successful manipulation by the old elites, however,
historians have noted a deteriorating relationship in the 1890s between elite and popular
nationalism as the social strains of rapid industrialization and urbanization became more
evident. The result was a radicalized German lower-midde class set against the prevailing
imperial regime. See David Blackbourn, The Mittelstand in German Society and Politics,
1871-1914, 4 Soc. Hist. 409 (1977); Geoff Eley, Defining Social Imperialism: Use and
Abuse of an Idea, 3 Soc. Hist. 265, 282 (1976). Professor Weiler is well aware of this history
and indeed has noted parallels to the situation today, in which European institutions
particularly have come to symbolize "the bureaucratization of life," "the depersonalization
of the market," and the "competitive structures of mobility; rapid urbanization and
centralization of power." Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23, at 369.
239. See generally Deflem & Pampel, supra note 61; Shore, supra note 61; Wood,
supra note 61.
240. The Community has benefited from the (re)emergence of regional identities, to
the extent that this development has weakened the representative claims of national
governments vis-A-vis the supranational level. However, the Member States also benefit
insofar as they can strategically exploit a broader European identity to pacify certain
regional claims (e.g. the Basques') against the national level. The Treaty on European
Union attempted to institutionalize regionalism and harness its benefits through the
creation of the "Committee of the Regions." EC Treaty arts. 263-265 (ex arts. 198a-198c).
The Treaty requires the Committee to be consulted on matters relating to trans-European
networks, public health, education, youth, culture, and economic and social cohesion. But
the Committee can also take the initiative and give its opinion on other policy matters that
affect cities and regions, such as agriculture and environmental protection. The
Committee is part of a broader effort to bring the Community "closer to the citizen."
241. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 252.
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gulf that can exist between the normative articulation of values and their
social and political observance. 242 He is equally aware, moreover, of the
problems of social and political identity engendered by the process of
European integration.2 43 And yet, one might fairly question whether Pro-
fessor Weiler's constructs of multiple demoi and critical citizenship re-
main-at least for the moment-too normatively abstract to serve as use-
ful responses to the social and political problem of identity in today's
Europe.
I have concerns about the "the politically fractured self' that Profes-
sor Weiler is prepared to celebrate, 244 particularly given its fragile cul-
tural underpinnings in an age of significant economic dislocation result-
ing from globalization.24 5 The notion of multiple membership in
overlapping demoi may in fact be an accurate reflection of the un-
doubted fragmentation of power and sovereignty in the modem state, of
which the EC is both an agent and a consequence. 24 6 Yet, attention must
be paid to how this fragmentation is being experienced by various, particu-
larly disadvantaged, social groups.247 In this sense, the notion of multiple
political demoi may ask too much from the still largely nation-centered
peoples of Europe, which may be unprepared to proceed down this cul-
tural path, as well as from European law and institutions, which may lack
the capacity to lead them. The result could be both deeper resentment
and more cynicism toward "Europe" than apparently already exists.
Proponents of the soft version rightly emphasize, therefore, that for
the time being evolution toward a fully-fledged European "political com-
munity" in a Weberian sense (that is, the development of a European
242. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of European Union, 4
Colum. J. Eur. L. 223, 231-33 (1998) [hereinafter Weiler, Bread and Circus].
243. See id. at 229-30.
244. Weiler, Demos, supra note 27, at 256.
245. Ernest Gellner's discussion of the intensification of perceived social divisions
caused by industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is suggestive of the
sorts of cultural problems that may follow similarly painful dislocations resulting from the
ongoing process of globalization. According to Gellner, such periods of dramatic
economic transition engendered
very sharp and painful and conspicuous inequality, all the more painfil because
accompanied by great disturbance, and because those less advantageously placed,
in that period, end to be not only relatively, but also absolutely miserable. In that
situation ... latent political tension is acute, and becomes actual if it can seize on
good symbols, good diacritical marks to separate ruler and ruled, privileged and
underprivileged.
Characteristically, it may seize on language, on genetically transmitted traits
("racism"), or on culture alone.
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 73-74 (1983).
246. See MacCormick, Sovereign State, supra note 2 (discussing theoretical
implications of the European Community's challenge to traditional modes of sovereignty).
247. See Thompson, History and Anthropology, supra note 227, at 222 (outlining an
analytical approach that suggests that the manner in which this fragmentation is
experienced in social and cultural life will be critical to the future direction of historical
change).
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demos) is still in its formative stages.248 In my view, recognizing this fact
simply highlights the administrative character of the EC-that is, its atten-
uated relationship with the sovereign and democratic "peoples" of the
Member States, mediated through national constitutional structures-
and thus counsels against an excessive reliance on formal democratiza-
tion at the European level as the sole means of addressing the democratic
deficit. Europe is left in a position that does not preclude further formal
democratization of its supranational institutions via increased powers of
the European Parliament, but recognizes that it must follow a pragmatic
rather than an idealist approach. In other words, in the absence of a
demos, we should not confuse formal democratization of European insti-
tutions with democratic legitimacy.249 The Community remains, in es-
sence, a supranational administrative body, the legitimacy of which de-
rives from its ability to solve practical problems reasonably efficiently, as a
regulatory agency of the Member States representing their particular na-
tional communities. 250
V. PARTICIPATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE IDEAL OF A DELIBERATIVE
SUPRANATIONAL TECHNOCRACY
A. Technocracy and the "Pathologies" of Democratic Politics
The absence of a demos is not the sole basis for criticism of a parlia-
mentary democratization strategy, but it is the most fundamental. One
might also question parliamentary democratization from an instrumental
perspective, in at least the two following respects. First, expanding the
role of the Parliament risks reproducing at the European level the per-
ceived pathologies of party politics and the concomitant interest-group
248. Professor Weiler effectively points this out as well. See Weiler, Demos, supra
note 28, at 239 & n.51 ("For most Europeans any sense of European identity defined in
organic-culture or national terms would be extremely weak."); see alsoJachtenfuchs, supra
note 14, at 128 ("Up until the present all attempts to find or even to promote a common
European political identity have been rather unsuccessful, and such consciousness would
only transpire after a very long period of time.").
249. See generally Marquardt, Deficit Reduction, supra note 31. This sort of
confusion has characterized much of the ECJ's case law regarding the powers of the
European Parliament. See, e.g., the seminaljudgment in Case 138/79, SA Roquette Frres
v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360 para. 33 (calling the Parliamentary consultation
requirement an expression of "the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples
should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative
assembly"); see also Mancini & Keeling, supra note 201, at 180-81.
250. It is perhaps because the Community's legitimacy is essentially administrative in
character that the Community has been able to survive for so long without obvious
democratic legitimacy of its own. Rather than demonstrating a breach between the
Community's low normative legitimacy as a democratic body and its high social
acceptance, see Weiler, Bread and Circus, supra note 242, at 233, 235, the Community's
durability owes to a popular appreciation that its legitimacy flows from oversight by
national political institutions, like other administrative and technocratic bodies. The
problem of the democratic deficit only became pronounced in the Community when, after
1986, the autonomy of its legislative process from national control became more apparent.
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manipulation, blockages, and policy failures that one finds in parliamen-
tary systems at the national level. Second, parliamentary democratization
largely misses the point, because the democratic deficit is really an ac-
countability deficit at the subordinate technocratic level due to the lack
of transparency and legally-enforceable participation rights in the regula-
tory process.
These two critiques are related but somewhat contradictory. Both
reflect the view that the essence of modem governance is technocratic
rather than political. The first critique implicitly assumes the superiority
of technocratic decisionmaking over legislative politics on both proce-
dural ("rational deliberation") and substantive ("sound policy") grounds.
The second, by contrast, reflects a distrust of unbridled technocracy and
demands significant outside participation and transparency as a means of
legitimation. In some sense, the aim of the second critique is, as Susan
Rose-Ackerman has put it in another context, to make "democratic values
operational" in an age where technocratic governance is unavoidable.251
Perhaps the most articulate European exponent of this position is
Giandomenico Majone. The development of the Community as an ad-
ministrative entity reflects, in Professor Majone's view, a broader trend
that he sees throughout the industrialized world-especially in Europe-
toward a purported American model of "administrative regulation."252
Professor Majone defines administrative regulation as "economic and so-
cial regulation by means of agencies operating outside the line of hierar-
chical control or oversight by the central administration. '25 3 For him,
the "perceptions of mismatch between existing institutional capacities
and the growing complexity of policy problems" is driving the trend.25 4
Complexity demands delegation to independent agencies, and especially
to the supranational institutions of the EC. Traditional intergovernmen-
tal approaches are inadequate because of the collective-action problems
that inevitably arise in policy coordination and compliance among for-
mally sovereign states, as well as the danger that policy outcomes will
overemphasize purely national interests. The complex nature of the
problems facing Europe further mandates that supranational institutions
possess "a high level of technical and administrative discretion."255
251. Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 69, at 1.
252. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 83-84. Over the last several decades,
France and Britain, for example, have increasingly abandoned centralized administrative
control as the principal means of market regulation, opting instead for autoritis
administratives indpendantes and decentralized regulatory offices. See id. at 83.
253. Id. at 83.
254. Id. at 85. Among these problems he lists "policing financial markets in an
increasingly interdependent world economy; controlling the risks of new products and new
technologies; protecting the health and economic interests of consumers without
impeding the free flow of goods, services and people across national boundaries; reducing
environmental pollution." Id.
255. Id. at 89.
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Perhaps most importantly, delegation is necessary to defeat the
"short-termism" of electoral politics, which undermines the credibility of
regulation in the eyes of regulated interests.256 From Professor Majone's
perspective, "politics" threatens "policy," because the segmentation of the
democratic process "into relatively short intervals produce [s] negative ef-
fects when the problems faced by society require long-term solutions.
Under the expectation of alternation [i.e., being voted out of office], pol-
iticians have few incentives to develop policies whose success, if at all, will
come after the next election."257 The "pathologies of politics," 258 how-
ever, go even deeper. Politicians seeking re-election are averse to the re-
flective deliberation that sound policy--indeed, genuine democracy-re-
quires. "[L]egislators engage in advertising and position taking rather
than in serious policy making, or they design laws with numerous oppor-
tunities to aid particular constituencies. Thus, re-election pressures have
negative consequences for the quality of legislation."259 According to
Professor Majone, the problem with a parliamentary democratization
strategy in Europe is that it will "compromise the effectiveness of the su-
pranational institutions. The comparative advantage of EU regulation
lies mainly in the relative insulation of Community regulators from the
short-run political considerations and pressures which tend to dominate
national policy-making."260
In sharp contrast, Professor Majone depicts the legislative processes
of the Community in a distinctly better-perhaps idealized-light. The
linchpin is the Commission, which has the exclusive right to propose leg-
islation to the Council while also possessing significant subdelegated reg-
ulatory powers under the comitology system. 261 In Professor Majone's
view, the Commission forms "the central node in a vast 'issue network'
256. Majone, Temporal Consistency, supra note 55, at 1; see also Majone,
"Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 17.
257. Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 17; see also Majone, Temporal
Consistency, supra note 55, at 1. In reaching this conclusion, Majone relies significantly on
the findings of Terry Moe in the American context. See Terry Moe, Political Institutions:
The Neglected Side of the Story, 6J.L. Econ. & Org. 213 (1990) (Special Issue).
258. This is the phrase Susan Rose-Ackerman uses to make a similar argument in
connection with legislative politics in Germany and the United States. See Rose-Ackerman,
Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 69, at 18-36. In analyzing the dangers of
parliamentary democratization in Europe, Majone cites generally Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State (1992),
which makes much the same argument. See Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 53, at 94
n.36 and accompanying text.
259. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 94. Professor Majone's perspective
on legislative politics reflects the influence of social choice theory, which "demonstrates
the fundamental difficulties of making consistent policy choices under democratic
conditions. It teaches that democracy may produce illogical and inconsistent results.
Rational choice models of politics counsel careful monitoring of the representative system
because of the weak incentives for citizens to become informed about political choices."
Rose-Ackerman, Is Germany a Model?, supra note 68, at 1280.
260. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 94.
261. On comitology, see infra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
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that includes not only experts from the national administrations, but in-
dependent experts (also from non-EU countries), academics, public-in-
terest advocates like environmentalists and leaders of consumer move-
ments, representatives of economic and professional organisations, and
of regional bodies."262 Most admirable from the standpoint of rational
deliberation and openness, Professor Majone asserts that "Commission
officials listen to everybody," operating "less as technical experts along-
side other technical experts, than as policy entrepreneurs."263 Policy en-
trepreneurship distinctly favors "innovative regulatory solutions," which
follow "substantive rather than national lines. A good deal of copinage
technocratique264 develops between Commission officials and national ex-
perts interested in discovering pragmatic solutions rather than defending
political positions."265
The basic premise of Professor Majone's depiction of the
Community's legislative and regulatory processes is that most difficult
policy questions in Europe are now of a "technical" rather than "political"
nature and that the distribution of normative power at the Community
level reflects this reality. Indeed, he argues that "[b]y the time a Commis-
sion proposal reaches the political level, first in COREPER (the commit-
tee of permanent representatives of the member states) and then in the
Council of Ministers, all the technical details have been worked out and
modifications usually leave the essentials untouched."266 However, Pro-
fessor Majone often simply assumes a clear distinction between technical
questions and politics. One might fairly ask: Has technical expertise re-
ally overtaken politics in the way that Professor Majone claims?
B. "Depoliticization" and the Cultural Foundations of Technocratic Autonomy
On one level, I would have to agree that it has. I am speaking not of
objective fact but of prevailing cultural interpretations of the modem ad-
ministrative state.267 Among elites, the administrative state is usually justi-
fied by an
epistemological distinction between the proper realm of politics
belonging to representative institutions, and that of purportedly
"non-political" expertise (scientific, economic, financial, or or-
ganizational) belonging to a separate, administrative sphere.
The perceived distinction between politics and expertise is im-
262. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 90. One observer has placed the
number of consultative bodies of the Commission at around 1300. See Areilza, supra note
31, at 6.
263. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 90 (citing John W. Kingdon,
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 188 (1984)).
264. This roughly translates as "technocratic comraderie."
265. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 91-92.
266. Id. at 92. Professor Majone notes further that the advent of qualified-majority
voting, as well as the parliamentary "co-operation procedure," undermine the power of the
Member States to bring political considerations to bear in the legislative process. Id.
267. See Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 590-91.
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plicit in any delegation of lawmaking authority away from repre-
sentative political institutions to administrative or "expert" bod-
ies [whether national or supranational].
The effort to create structures of government reflecting a
redefined boundary between law, politics and administration
was essential to the institutionalization of administrative power
in the decades after the Second World War.
2 68
But in another, more objective sense, I believe one cannot accept a
distinction between politics and expertise. Although the aim of techno-
cratic governance was (and still is) to "depoliticize" policymaking,269 I
would nevertheless argue that the result has been "much less a transfor-
mation of political questions into technical ones than their 'displace-
ment' into the administrative realm without altering their true nature."
270
"The difficult questions of balancing competing interests, allocating
scarce resources, and choosing among potentially contradictory values
[have] continued to present themselves,"271 only now in administrative
rather than political fora. Science rarely provides a complete answer to
these essentially political questions, even where administrative policymak-
ers are tempted to claim otherwise.272
The cultural underpinnings of the modern administrative state have
thus permitted "experts"-or politicians citing "experts"-to advance es-
268. Id. During this period, often following the perceived example of the United
States, European technocrats and their political allies sought to create an institutional
space within which the purported lessons of science and expertise could be applied in
relative freedom from parliamentary and party interference. For a concrete legal
outcome, see Fr. Const. (1958) Tit. 5, arts. 34, 37 (defining the spheres of legislation and
regulation). Ajudicial variation on this distinction-between "law" and "policy," or as the
French would put it, between /a lgalt and ropportunit--further reflected the quest for
autonomy of the administrative sphere: In theory, courts were to refrain from interfering
with bureaucratic policymaking unless a clear question of legality was presented. See 1
Georges Vedel & Pierre Delvolv6, Droit administrative 529 (12th ed., 1992).
269. See Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 591. Michel
Debr6, de Gaulle's first Prime Minister and a principal architect of the French Constitution
of 1958, explicitly described such "depoliticization" as a "major imperative" during his
speech presenting the first government of the Fifth Republic to the National Assembly in
January 1959. La d~politisation: mythe ou ralitE? 51 (Georges Vedel ed., 1962) (quotes
translated from French); cf. John F. Kennedy, Remarks to Members of the White House
Conference on National Economic Issues (May 21, 1962), reprinted in Public Papers of the
Presidents of The United States: John F. Kennedy, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1962, 420-22 (1963):
The fact of the matter is that most of the problems, or at least many of them, that
we now face are technical problems, are administrative problems. They are very
sophisticated judgments which do not lend themselves to the great sort of
'passionate movements' which have stirred this country so often in the past.
270. Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 591. The term
"displacement" is taken from Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of
Politics (1993).
271. Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 591.
272. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (1995).
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sentially political positions by recasting them as technical matters outside
of politics. 273 It has also permitted politicians to avoid taking difficult
stands by delegating many of the most important policy questions to ad-
ministrative bodies.274 One observer has thus rightly concluded that the
techniques of "depoliticization" are "neither neutral in themselves nor in
the processes of their development and application. Rather, it is their
very appearance of objectivity, rationality, and universality that underpins
their power and utility."275
In the international context, a corollary to depoliticization has been
the significant increase in the autonomy of administrative actors from
hierarchical control, characterized especially by the "growth of interna-
tional networks at [the] sub-state level" involving "direct contacts between
national regulators with specific responsibilities."276 Officials otherwise
subject to control and supervision within their national administrative hi-
erarchies have exploited the opportunity to develop "horizontal cross-
border contacts with their counterparts in other states, by-passing the co-
ordination of national levels of government and the mediation of diplo-
matic channels and Foreign Offices." 2 77 These contacts are usually infor-
mal or semi-formal in nature, avoiding conventional legal instruments
like treaties in favor of purportedly sub-political "administrative
arrangements."278
In some sense, the Community bureaucracy, with the Commission at
the summit, constitutes a highly developed form-perhaps even the most
273. For example, Sol Picciotto recounts how, during the Bretton Woods
negotiations, the experts involved "were highly political individuals like Harry White, who
conducted a clandestine foreign policy," and that key matters were almost always
calculated on the basis of political acceptability but "put forward as objective and scientific
in order to facilitate acceptance." Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1037 (citing
Raymond F. Mikesell, The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir 21-22 (Essays in
International Finance No. 192, 1994)).
274. See Pierce, supra note 12, at 1245-46.
275. Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1037.
276. Id. at 1038; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign
Aff., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183, 189-92 (on the "regulatory web").
277. Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1038.
278. A good example is the so-called Agreement between the Commission of the
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding
the application of their competition laws of September 1991. The Commission sought to
conclude this agreement on its own authority under the EEC Treaty. In a legal challenge
by France and other Member States, however, the ECJ held that the agreement could not
be concluded without the approval of the Council. See Case C-327/91, France v.
Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3666, 5 C.M.L.R 517 (1994). In reaching the conclusion that
the Commission had overstepped its powers by entering into the agreement on its own
authority, the Court specifically rejected the argument that the agreement involved purely
administrative cooperation between U.S. and EC authorities, rather than cooperation in
substantive policymaking, and was thus a mere administrative arrangement. Id. at
3673-74. For a discussion, see George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation Between the
European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 Admin. LJ. Am. U. 933,
958-60 (1996).
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highly developed form-of this kind of complex international policy net-
work."279 However, as the Community experience also demonstrates, the
emergence of this sort of autonomous policy network raises a significant
problem of democratic legitimacy, given the distance of much of the deci-
sionmaking from national institutions, which, for better or worse, remain
the principal vehicle for popular legitimation.2 8 0
C. Supranational Technocratic Autonomy and National Control: The
Imperfections of the Comitology System
The comitology system, which governs the Commission's exercise of
subordinate legislative power, reflects quite explicitly the desire for some
measure of continued Member State control over the Community's nor-
mative output. The Comitology Decision of July 1987 established three
alternative types of committees-the "regulatory committee," the "man-
agement committee," and the "advisory committee"-each charged with
overseeing the formulation of subordinate legislation at the Community
level.2 8 ' All are chaired by a non-voting Commission official but staffed
by members of national administrations. Of these three types, the regula-
tory committee involves the highest degree of Member State control,
prohibiting a measure from coming into effect until it has been approved
by the committee voting by qualified majority. However, the manage-
ment committee is the more common form of oversight. Under this set
up, if the committee rejects the Commission's proposal, again by quali-
fied majority, it is referred to the Council. If the Council rejects the pro-
posal within one month, it is definitively rejected; otherwise, failing
Council action, the measure is adopted.
28 2
The establishment of the comitology system must be viewed together
with the increased use of qualified-majority voting in the Council follow-
ing the Single European Act of 1986, as well as with the "new approach to
technical harmonization" that came in its wake.28 3 Qualified-majority vot-
ing, and the dramatic push to complete the internal market by 1992 via
minimal harmonization, necessarily augmented the strategic position of
the Commission vis-a-vis the Member States: The first gave the
Commission greater freedom in the process of legislative formulation,
while the second required extensive delegation of subordinate rulemak-
ing power to the Commission in order to quickly fill out the necessary
details. The political message of the Comitology Decision was therefore
279. Recall Professor Majone's characterization of the Commission as the "central
node in a vast 'issue network'." See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
280. See Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1055-56.
281. Council Decision 87/373/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33.
282. As its name implies, the advisory committee exercises purely consultative
functions and thus involves the most minimal level of Member State control. For a
succinct discussion of the three types of committee procedures, see Vos, supra note 39, at
217.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 159-164.
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understandable: Despite the increased autonomy and normative power
of the Commission, the Member States were "not willing to loosen their
intergovernmental grip on the implementation process in favour of su-
pranational institutions."28 4
From the standpoint of preserving Member State control, however,
comitology has proven to be a highly imperfect system involving signifi-
cant risk of agency losses. One problem has been a sort of "Community
capture"-that is, a subtle shift in loyalties on the part of the national
regulators serving on the various committees at the Community level,
who "slowly move from representatives of the national interest to repre-
sentatives of a Europeanised interadministrative discourse .... -285 An-
other problem is the sheer organizational density and complexity of the
comitology system, which greatly diminishes the capacity of national ad-
ministrations to control their agents at the Community level.28 6 There
are, according to one estimate, over 250 implementation committees,
each of which follows different procedures according to the area
regulated.287
From another perspective, however, comitology does offer an effec-
tive, if subtle form of Member State control, because as a general matter
"agents may rationally anticipate the reactions of principals to certain
types of behavior."288 Thus, "agency behavior that at first glance seems
autonomous may in fact be subtly influenced by the preference of princi-
pals, making genuine agency autonomy exceedingly difficult to mea-
sure."289 One political scientist has thus theorized that the Commission,
rather than run the risk of a referral of one of its regulatory proposals to
the Council, will be highly responsive to Member State preferences. The
low rate of committee references to the Council-estimated at less than
one percent of all Commission proposals under the comitology system-
arguably reflects the Commission's adroit anticipation and avoidance of
Member State opposition. 290
The problem with this theory is that it ignores one fact that could
greatly reinforce Commission autonomy: Committee voting is by quali-
fied majority, according to the same weighting which prevails in the
Council, thus meaning that the Commission can ignore significant mi-
nority positions without threat of referral. 291 The same concerns over
284. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 276; see also Vos, supra note 39, at 223-24
(describing comitology both as "a reflection of the Member States' concern that the
integrity of their own powers be maintained," and as "a concrete expression of the
principle of subsidiarity").
285. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 291.
286. For a sense of that complexity, see Snyder, supra note 135; see also Areilza, supra
note 31.
287. See Areilza, supra note 31, at 7.
288. Pollack, supra note 3, at 110.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 114-15.
291. On the vote-weighting under the qualified-majority system, see supra note 162.
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autonomy that arise at the Council level thus reproduce themselves at the
committee level. Indeed, a recent study of comitology concluded that the
Commission's "room for manoeuvre is by no means substantially con-
strained by the shadow of majority voting," even where the Commission
seeks to promote consensus rather than conflict.292 Importantly, the
Commission official chairing the committee generally controls both the
agenda and the flow of scientific advice, allowing a selective appeal "to
the authority and impartiality of science-based findings" where necessary
to overcome potential political opposition. 293 Thus, "[flrom a suprana-
tional perspective, it is not the Member States' interests which dominate
European politics but rather European institutions which have the capac-
ity to channel and influence Member State interaction in a way that is
compatible with European interests."
2 94
D. 'Deliberative Supranationalism"
Commentators like Giandomenico Majone, who welcome this kind
of supranational regulatory autonomy, nevertheless recognize the signifi-
cant legitimacy problems raised by the current state of affairs. Professor
Majone characterizes the comitology system as "ad hoc" and "the very
negation of the idea of transparency." 295 He thus calls on the Commu-
nity to adopt something like the United States Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), both to increase transparency and to rationalize the system of
participation and thus to "do more to make public accountability possible
than the wholesale transfer of traditional party politics to Brussels."
296
Christian Jeorges and Jfirgen Neyer have also written approvingly of the
development of European administrative procedures at least in part in-
spired by the American model297 as a means of facilitating what they call
"deliberative supranationalism."2 98 This concept comprises, among other
things,
the establishment of fora where the views of all concerned
[groups] can be included; legal principles and rules civilising
the decision-making process and providing an institutional con-
text for practical reasoning; [management of] tensions between
output rationality (high standards), procedural transparency
292. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 279.
293. Id. at 281.
294. Id. at 289 (citing Bach, Vom Zweckverband zum technokratischen Regime:
Politische Legitimation und institutionelle Verselbstfindigung in der Europfiischen
Gemeinschaft, in Nationalismus-Nationalititen-Surpanationalitit (H.-A. Winkler & H.
Kaelble eds., 1993)). Jeorges and Neyer still stress that the Commission emphasizes
consensus over conflict-indeed, is dependent on ongoing cooperation-and thus must
be seen as acting as an honest broker. See id. at 288-89. In my view, this mitigates only
slightly the threat of agency losses from the Member State standpoint.
295. Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 95.
296. Id.
297. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 283-85.
298. See generally id. at 290-97.
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and fairness; . . . [and] the generation and dissemination of
knowledge.299
For the moment, however, such proposals remain vague, leaving a good
deal of room for speculation about what a European procedural code will
in fact entail and how it will be integrated into existing intergovernmen-
tal processes. 300
At least on the scientific/technical consultation side of the equa-
tion-as opposed to the public participation side-there is already some
basis in both ECJ decisions and in the EC Treaty for certain procedural
requirements along these lines.30' In a decision concerning standards
governing cosmetics, for example, the ECJ held that it was unlawful for
the Commission and the relevant comitology committee to adopt rules
without first consulting the so-called Scientific Committee on Cosmetol-
ogy.30 2 Such consultation was mandatory, the Court stated, because the
rules in question needed to be "founded on scientific and technical as-
sessments which must themselves be based on the results of the latest
international research."303 Indeed, the Court went so far as to say that
technical and scientific consultation was required by "the nature of things
and apart from any provision laid down to that effect. '3 04
In addition, Article 253 (ex Article 190) of the EC Treaty sets forth a
procedural requirement that also seems designed to promote rational de-
liberation. This article provides that all acts of the Community which are
intended to produce legal effects (regulations, directives, and decisions)
"shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any
proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to
this Treaty. °30 5 However, the actual language of Article 253 (ex Article
190), as well as ECJ case law, limits the utility of this provision in two
important respects. First, on its face it requires no public consultation or
299. Id. at 299. For similar views among other European commentators, see
Armstrong, supra note 17, at 171; Everson, Administering Europe?, supra note 55, at
213-14; Sand, supra note 8, at 292-98.
300. For a view from the American side that attempts to fill the speculative void, see
Francesca Bignami, The Administrative State in a Constitutional System of Checks and
Balances: Lessons for EC Comitology from American Rulemaking, Harvard Jean Monnet
Chair Working Paper Series No. 5/99, <www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/
papers/99/990501/html> (printout of the online version on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
301. Shapiro, supra note 55, at 44-45.
302. Case 212/91, Angelopharm GmbH v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1993
E.C.R. 1-171.
303. Id. at 1-210.
304. Id. at 1-211.
305. See EC Treaty art. 253 (ex art. 190). Article 253 obviously brings to mind the
APA's requirement that newly-adopted rules include "'a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose,'" which has given American courts a basis to promote reasoned
administrative decisionmaking by ensuring that agencies have taken a "hard look" at all the
relevant materials in the record. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 63, at
756-57 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994)).
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response to public comments but simply that the enacting body "refer" to
"any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant
to this Treaty," i.e., from publicly-constituted bodies like the Commu-
nity's Economic and Social Committee.30 6 Second, unlike the Commis-
sion, whose discretion the Court controls more closely, the Court does
not apply the requirements of this provision to the Council with any great
rigor. The ECJ "tends to treat the Council as a normal legislature, en-
joying a very wide margin of discretion."307 This deference is clearly con-
trary to the administrative character of the Council, the net effect of
which is to preclude an effective examination of the rational underpin-
nings of much of the Community's primary legislative output.308 The
limitations of Article 253 (ex Article 190), both facially and as applied,
indicate that more stringent requirements are needed in the Treaty to
ensure transparency and participation rights at the European level.
E. The Normative Yearning for Legitimate Political Control: Lessons from the
American Experience
Leaving aside the dearth of details in many of the current proposals
regarding a European procedural code, however, their basic thrust is
clear: Such a code should follow the perceived model of the APA and
other American administrative procedure statutes with broadly based, le-
gally enforceable rights of participation and transparency. Such rights
should produce, to paraphrase one sympathetic American observer
speaking in another context, "a publicly accountable, technocratic policy
choice" through rules requiring "administrators to be open to the range
of scientific and technical opinion and to develop a sensitivity to the in-
terests of various groups."3 0 9
Before the Community proceeds too quickly down this road, how-
ever, Americans might offer a word of warning to Europeans not to be
too selective in their regard for the American experience. At a minimum,
Europeans should understand that the necessary corollary to administra-
tive proceduralization is more searching judicial review, particularly in
the absence of adequate hierarchical controls. The potential conse-
quence is a form of "adversarial legalism" that private interests and judges
306. Generally such references are just that: perfunctory statements, usually in the
preamble (e.g., "having regard to the report of the... "), without any obligation to
respond to germane concerns raised.
307. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 55, at 286 (citing, e.g., Case C-331/88, The Queen v.
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte:
Fedesa and Others, 1990 E.C.R. 14023, 1-4063).
308. The fifll implications of this deference will be examined in greater detail infra
Part VI, in connection with the ECJ's subsidiarity case law. See infra notes 417-434 and
accompanying text.
309. Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 69, at 84
(comparing the German licensing processes favorably with "the more secret, consensual
processes characteristic of policy-making in other areas of German law").
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can clearly abuse. Therefore, Europeans should be on guard against
what Americans call "ossification of rulemaking" in all its aspects.31 0
Perhaps more importantly, however, Europeans should also not ig-
nore the strong and increasingly important hierarchical dimension of the
American experience, particularly over the last two decades.3 1 ' By "hier-
archical dimension" I do not mean simply the efforts of recent U.S. Presi-
dents-from Carter through Clinton-to take on a central role in coordi-
nating regulatory policy among various agencies on the basis of cost-
benefit principles.3 12 Europeans may mistakenly view these sorts of polit-
ical controls solely from the standpoint of sound policy or efficient insti-
tutional design, which might somehow be replicated at the Community
level through existing institutions or new mechanisms of regulatory
coordination.3 13
Presidential efforts to assert control over the regulatory process,
rather, are part of a larger story of "normative yearning," if you will, for
democratic legitimacy within the American administrative state. In some
European academic commentary, one detects a sometimes dismissive
tone toward those who stress the need for similar forms of centralized,
legitimate political oversight at the Community level, seeing it as evidence
of "limited" political theory and a misunderstanding of "how regulation
may be tangibly reduced to a technical task, devoid of redistributive pol-
icy implications."3 1 4 If anything, American scholars have come to pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion, that regulatory issues-or at least the ma-
jor questions of social regulation (which often have a very significant
economic impact)-are inherently political, thus requiring explicitly
political control.3 1 5 In some sense, the current disquiet in both Europe
310. For a succinct overview, see Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 63, at
756-66.
311. For a summary, see id. at 761-63. Joerges & Neyer, supra note 50, at 285, are
appropriately cautious regarding the American model when they write that " [a] dvocates of
a European act on administrative procedures... may underestimate the dependence of
administrative law models on the organisational structure and the social conditions of
nation states or federations."
312. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988) (revoked by Executive Order No. 12,866 (1994)); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
313. See Majone, Independent Fourth Branch, supra note 55, at 42-43; Majone,
"Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 25-27; Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at
95-97; Majone, Temporal Consistency, supra note 55, at 7.
314. Everson, Independent Agencies, supra note 55, at 197; see also Majone,
"Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 26 (discussing "how the present understanding of
the logic of delegation casts doubt on the validity of the received view concerning the
delegation of powers by community institutions to ad hoc bodies not envisaged by the
founding Treaties").
315. See generally Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 63. Professor
Majone acknowledges that "redistributive policies can be legitimated only by majoritarian
means and thus cannot be delegated to institutions independent of the political process."
Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 28. He distinguishes redistributive policies
from "efficiency-oriented policies" that "are basically legitimated by results, and hence may
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and the United States over administrative institutions reflects strong pop-
ular reservations about-if not outright rejection of-the epistemological
distinction between politics and expertise that has in the past provided
the cultural underpinnings of modem administrative autonomy.
3 16
A misreading of the apparent success of the American model-with
(as one European admiringly describes it) its "imaginative, novel and
above all flexible means to ensure institutional and public accountabil-
ity"3 17 -has in my view given some European academic observers a false
hope: that the average European will eventually come to accept, as Amer-
icans purportedly have, a decentralized, non-hierarchical administrative
system which no one actually "controls" directly, but which is nevertheless
"under control."3 1 8 This statement glosses over the fact that most Ameri-
can citizens likely do not consciously share this sanguine view. I strongly
suspect most people-including Europeans-want to believe that admin-
istrative bodies are in fact, or at least should be, "under the control" of
some ultimately accountable elected official or officials.3 19
be delegated to such institutions, provided an adequate system of accountability is in
place." Id. Although he understands that "efficiency-enhancing policies, like all public
policies, will normally have redistributive impacts," Professor Majone asserts that "[t]his is
not a serious problem if the efficiency gains are large enough to compensate the losers,
and if it is politically feasible to do so." Id. This begs a number of critical questions
concerning efficiency gains and political feasibility that Americans have come to recognize
are intimately bound up with administrative policymaking, requiring democratically-
legitimate political control. For Professor Majone, however, although this may be true on
the national level, one of the main advantages of supranationalism is that it somehow
separates problem-solving and bargaining over the distribution of gains. He does not
specify how this is so, stating only that "Member States that are negatively affected by a
collective decision, at least in the short run, are generally compensated in some way." Id.
Professor Majone leaves unexplained, however, what that "some way" is.
316. See supra notes 264-265 and accompanying text.
317. Everson, Independent Agencies, supra note 55, at 189. Everson is referring to
OMB coordination combined with congressional oversight, administrative procedure, and
judicial review. See id. at 190-93.
318. Everson, Independent Agencies, supra note 55, at 190 (citing Terry Moe,
Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory. The Politics of the NLRB, 2 Studies in
American Development 236 (1987)); see also Majone, Independent Fourth Branch, supra
note 55, at 29 (citing the same article by Moe). Everson, Independent Agencies, supra
note 55, at 202-03, is admittedly cautious regarding the possibility of establishing
independent agencies at the European level, although her arguments would seem to apply
to the Community as a whole and not just to the subordinate independent agencies she
envisions. She acknowledges the need for greater instruments of direct accountability
between the Member States and European agencies, apart from Member State
representation in the Council of Ministers, implicitly accepting the linkage between
democratic legitimacy at the national level and hierarchical political control. She also
worries about the dramatic increase in litigation that would likely follow her proposed
broad delegation of regulatory authority to European independent agencies. Finally, she
acknowledges the criticisms of those who argue that there does not yet exist a European
'public" to which European agencies could be made directly accountable through a
European code of administrative procedure. Id.
319. Even though the European Commission is not an elected body, this desire for
political control, I believe, explains the very strong tone contained in the recent report of
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Of course, the idea that the system is "in control," and yet no politi-
cally responsible entity actually controls it, begs the question of demo-
cratic legitimacy. Even if the system is somehow vaguely "in control," it
must be so in the service of some interest which may or may not be in line
with the views of the current political majority-indeed, per Professor
Majone, this is one of the main virtues of administrative indepen-
dence.320 Whatever the advantages of such independence on "sound pol-
icy" grounds, it is truly a contortion of prevailing understandings of dem-
ocratic legitimacy to disparage or ignore the need for hierarchical
political control, either executive or legislative, in such a forthright way.
To the contrary, the widespread popular realization that elected repre-
sentatives are not, somehow, in control of administrative action is, I
would argue, responsible for much of the political anxiety about the mod-
em administrative state. The perception of a supranational technocracy
beyond democratic control is, in fact, at the core of popular concerns
about the democratic deficit in Europe, contrary to the views of those
who celebrate the virtues of administrative autonomy at the Community
level. These concerns will thus not be easily dissipated simply by estab-
lishing a "subtle, complex and detailed catalogue of mechanisms" in-
spired by the purportedly "non-hierarchical" American example.3 21
In the United States, decisions of the Supreme Court in such cases as
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 2 2 and Lujan
the Committee of Independent Experts that led to the resignation of the Commission on
March 16, 1999. See generally Independent Experts Report, supra note 205. The report
treated the Commission as having the same hierarchical political responsibilities over the
administrative functions of the Community as cabinet ministers have in a national
parliamentary system. The final paragraph of the report states:
The responsibility of individual Commissioners, or of the Commission as a body,
cannot be a vague idea .... The studies carried out by the Committee [of
Independent Experts] have too often revealed a growing reluctance among the
members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their responsibility. It is becoming
difficult to find anyone who has even the slightest sense of responsibility.
However, that sense of responsibility is essential. It must be demonstrated, first
and foremost, by the Commissioners individually and the Commission as a body.
The temptation to deprive the concept of responsibility of all substance is a
dangerous one. That concept is the ultimate manifestation of democracy.
Id. at 144, para. 9.4.25.
320. Terry Moe, whom both Everson and Majone cite, see Everson, Independent
Agencies, supra note 55, at 190 (citing Terry Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive
Theory: The Politics of the NLRB, 2 Studies in American Development 236 (1987)); see
also Majone, Independent Fourth Branch, supra note 55, at 29 (citing the same article by
Moe), has pointed this out in the American context. See Terry Moe, The Politics of
Bureaucratic Structure, in Can the Government Govern? 275 (Chubb & Peterson eds.,
1989) (arguing that interest groups generally favor "structural designs [they] would never
favor on technical grounds alone: designs that place detailed formal restrictions on
bureaucratic discretion, impose complex procedures for agency decisionmaking, minimize
opportunities for oversight, and otherwise insulate the agency from politics. The group has to
protect itself and its agency from the dangers of democracy .... " (emphasis added)).
321. Everson, Independent Agencies, supra note 55, at 203.
322. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[Vol. 99:628
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER OF THE EC
v. Defenders of Wldlife3 23 are the tangible legal expression of the normative
yearning for democratic accountability and control that I have de-
scribed. 324 The Supreme Court in Chevron held that American courts
should defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of the scope of its
delegated statutory authority if Congress has not precisely spoken to the
question in the enabling legislation. The Court reasoned that "[w]hile
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such policy choices .... ,,325 As Cynthia Farina has de-
scribed, the Court's implicit message is:
Deference is right not because it yields better answers, more effi-
cient answers, or even the answers Congress would have wanted,
but because it yields more legitimate answers. The Chevron mys-
tique flows from this promise that the ordinary act of statutory
interpretation can advance the larger process of reconciling
agencies with constitutional democracy. 326
For Professor Farina, the decision in Lujan is an even more dramatic
demonstration of the hope that the President will supply legitimacy to the
administrative state. Lujan involved the scope of the power of Congress
to confer standing by means of a so-called "citizen-suit" provision, author-
izing "any person" to bring action to enforce the provisions of a public
interest statute. The Court held that a "citizen-suit" provision was insuffi-
cient to confer standing to vindicate "procedural injuries" in the absence
of a concrete injury flowing from the procedural violation of the stat-
ute.327 Justice Scalia characterized plaintiffs' claim as merely part of "the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the
law" which Congress could not convert, by means of a citizen-suit provi-
sion, "into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts .... ,"328 Most
importantly, emphasizing a strict separation-of-powers rationale, Justice
Scalia asserted that excessive judicial involvement in supervising adminis-
trative procedures "transfer[s] from the President to the courts the Chief
323. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
324. See Cynthia I Farina, The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional
Revolution, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 179, 181-83 (1997).
325. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
326. Farina, supra note 324, at 183.
327. 504 U.S. 555, 571. The case arose out of newly-promulgated regulations under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). See id. at 558. Section 7(a) (2) of the ESA (codified at
16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (1994)) requires interagency consultation for any agency action
likely to jeopardize the existence of an endangered species. Prior regulations interpreted
this provision to require consultation if the action affected a species abroad (such as
funding a project in the developing world). However, the new regulations narrowed the
consultation requirement to actions within the United States or on the high seas. See 504
U.S. at 558. Plaintiffs sued to restore the broader interagency consultation, despite the fact
that they had no right to be consulted themselves. Plaintiffs based their right of action on
the "citizen-suit" provision in the ESA. See id. at 571-721.
328. Id. at 577.
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Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.' '3 29
The effect of these and other decisions330 is to reinforce the ultimate
responsibility of the President for policymaking in the administrative
sphere.331 Whether this makes sense in the American context in light of
the President's actual capacities of control and oversight is another mat-
ter that need not be addressed here.33 2 What is important for our pur-
poses is that the normative yearning for such ultimate responsibility ex-
ists, and that those Europeans who take inspiration from the perceived
example of the United States must not ignore it.333
329. Id. (quoting U.S. Const., art. II, § 3).
330. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (holding that
petitioner was not entitled to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to an agency order in
circumstances where the enabling statute provided a comprehensive review scheme and no
serious deprivation would arise from postponing review); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,
509 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding that, where a regulation simply limits an applicant's right to
receive a government benefit, an action challenging the legality of the regulation will not
be ripe until the agency has actually refused the application for the benefit in question).
331. Also to the same effect is the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520
(1994), which gives the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control over
the amount of paperwork generated by both executive and independent agencies. One
should also cite the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, which
added a new chapter 8 to Title 5 of the United States Code, 5 U.S.CA. § 801 et seq.,
establishing a new regime for Congressional review of agency regulations. For a critical
appraisal, see Daniel Cohen & Peter Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations,
49 Admin. L. Rev. 95 (1997).
332. See Farina, supra note 324, at 185 ("It seems to me that it is unrealistic to think
that the President can supervise the entire regulatory enterprise in a comprehensive and
meaningful way."); see also Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at
617-18 ("The [Lujan] decision, in pointing toward a more narrow judicial role in
supervising administrative procedures, assumes a certain degree of hierarchical authority
of the President over the administrative sphere which may not correspond to reality.").
333. It is perhaps another measure of the administrative character of the European
Community that its competences in economic and social regulation correspond roughly to
those regulatory domains over which the U.S. President has, in principle, the least claim to
direct political control. Nevertheless, even in those areas, the desire for administrative
accountability through Presidential supervision is still quite strong. One might also note
that those domains in which the President has the greatest claim to control-defense,
foreign affairs, law enforcement-correspond precisely to those that the Member States
have largely excluded from Community jurisdiction under the "pillar structure" of the
European Union: common foreign and security policy (the "second pillar") and justice
and home affairs (the "third pillar"). See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that, under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community gains competences
in many areas under the third pillar. However, this transfer of sovereignty was only made
possible by guaranteeing certain Member States the right to derogate, in effect restoring a
kind of hierarchical control. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
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VI. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND TREATw INTERPRETATION
A. A Presumption against Supranational Normative Autonomy
If one were to take the legitimacy principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court over the last decade and a half (notably in
Chevron) and apply them to the European case, the outcome would ar-
guably be precisely the opposite of what one finds in the American consti-
tutional context. Under the currently prevailing judicial doctrine in the
United States, the search for democratic legitimacy now tends to favor
the normative autonomy of agencies, at least relative to the courts. Such
autonomy is justified by the President's (sometimes admittedly theoreti-
cal) oversight over the administrative sphere, combined with the Presi-
dent's undoubted electoral accountability to the American people. From
the Supreme Court's perspective, this accountability renders the execu-
tive branch a more democratically legitimate interpreter of legislative am-
biguity than the courts.
There is, however, no equally accountable hierarchical superior in
the European Community, for all the reasons I have already put forward.
If, as one American commentator has argued, it is ultimately the responsi-
bility of the American judiciary, and notably of the Supreme Court, to
ensure "the continuing vitality of the principal-agent relationship be-
tween the people and government,"334 the same goes for the European
courts, both at the national and the Community level. The judicial en-
forcement of a kind of "direct" democratic discipline through broader
transparency and participation rights undoubtedly has a role to play in
ensuring that vitality.335 However, the ECJ and the national courts must
begin with the premise that the locus of democratic legitimacy in the
European Community remains with the Member States, and that the
courts must construct public law doctrines-especially those relating to
the interpretation of the extent of Community competences under the
EC Treaty-in light of this fact.
Where the "legislative" intent of the Treaty is ambiguous on a partic-
ular point, 8 6 the European courts should, in effect, apply a Chevron-type
interpretive presumption in favor of national institutions and against the
334. Pierce, supra note 12, at 1240.
335. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 70.
336. This argument presumes that the EC Treaty is best understood, not as a
constitution, but as a kind of enabling legislation. In interpreting the scope of the EC's
delegated legislative, executive, and adjudicative authority under the Treaty, European
courts should of course attempt to enforce the intent of the parties. But that intent will
often be ambiguous at best, given that the "legislation" results from intergovernmental
negotiation among fifteen different countries, as well as from a variety of ratification
procedures. In this sense, one of the preconditions that Professor Majone identifies for
delegation of normative power to supranational institutions-the "precise[ ] and
narrow[ ]" definition of regulatory tasks, see Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55,
at 28-becomes very difficult to achieve. For a concrete example, see the discussion of the
Community's power to legislate in the area of workers' "health and safety" under the old
Article 118a, discussed infra note 462 and accompanying text.
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Community qua supranational administrative agency, in order to restrict
the scope of the latter's normative autonomy relative to the more demo-
cratically legitimate Member States. There are two broad categories of
cases in which I can envision this presumption clearly applying. The first
comprises those cases where there is ambiguity in the relative meaning
and scope of potentially conflicting Community and national laws. Here,
the European courts-both national and supranational-should pre-
sumptively favor interpretations maximizing Member State control, so
long as they are reasonable in light of the broader goal of integration.
The second includes cases where two possible legislative bases exist for
Community legislation under the EC Treaty, one requiring unanimity in
the Council of Ministers and the other permitting qualified- or simple-
majority voting. Here, the ECJ should presumptively favor the legislative
basis requiring unanimity, unless there exists clear evidence of a contrary
intent on the part of the Member States at the adoption of the provisions
of the Treaty in question.
The interpretive presumption that I am advancing admittedly is
grounded in "a general skepticism when confronted with [supranation-
ally] produced laws."33 7 Such skepticism, however, should not be con-
fused with "hostility or even the functional equivalent of a presumption
against the validity of [a supranational] rule."338 Rather, it reflects the
realization that the national decisionmaker, "even if a bureaucrat, still
bears some political accountability for its choices; the [supranational]
lawmaker does not. What underlies the skeptical position is the belief
that the more accountable decisionmaker should receive the benefit of
the doubt."33 9
337. Stephan, supra note 47, at 729.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 732. Professor Stephan articulates this principle in order to deal with
potential conflicts between the GATT and domestic U.S. law. He argues:
What emerges from this and other trade law cases is a hierarchy; when statutory
ambiguity exists, international law trumps a court's independent guess as to what
domestic law requires but not the administrative agency's. Where the executive
accepts the international organ's position, the court will support the agency's
choice unless the plain language of the statute clearly requires otherwise. But
where the responsible agency disagrees with the international body, the court will
side with the domestic decisionmaker.
Id. (citing Footwear Distribs. and Retailers of Am. v. United States, 18 C.I.T. 391 (1994),
appeal dismissed, 43 F.3d 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In my view, the hierarchy that Professor
Stephan is articulating is simply an application to the GATT context of the well known
Chevron "two-step." Chevron requires judges first to determine whether Congress has
unambiguously spoken to the precise question at issue; then if not, to defer to any
reasonable agency interpretation. See Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The Chevron "two-step" implies a hierarchy of
normative legitimacy, with Congress at the top, followed by the administrative agency
(which draws its legitimacy from the President), after which come the courts. Professor
Stephan is effectively arguing for a similar hierarchy in the GATr context: first, Congress's
expressed position in the statute; second, the interpretation of the statute by the
administrative agency (if Congressional intent is ambiguous); third, the position of the
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B. Teleological Interpretation and the Constitutionalist "Preference for Europe"
Of course, the notion that national decisionmakers are presump-
tively entitled to the benefit of the doubt in disputes with Community
institutions would constitute something of a revolution in ECJ jurispru-
dence, running contrary to a long interpretive tradition built up over
nearly four decades. According to one judge of the European Court of
Justice, writing with a collaborator in 1994, there is a "preference for Eu-
rope" that the drafters of the Treaty built into "the genetic code transmit-
ted to the Court."340 This preference is central to the Court's constitu-
tionalist vision of the Community. The overarching obligation of the ECJ
is, in this view, to pursue the primary objective of the EC Treaty as set
forth in the Preamble: "an ever closer union among the peoples of Eu-
rope."8 41 The internal market is the cornerstone of that "ever closer
union," and together they constitute the very purpose-the "telos"-of
the EC. The method of Treaty interpretation geared to achieving this
telos-the "teleological method"-has thus dominated the reasoning of
the European Court of Justice since the early 1960s.3 4 2
1. Direct Effect and l'effet utile. - One could already see the teleolog-
ical method at work in perhaps the most celebrated judgment in the his-
tory of European "constitutionalism," Van Gend & Loos, handed down in
1963.343 At issue was whether a provision in Article 12 of the EEC Treaty
international organ (which, in effect, indirectly exercises delegated normative power of
Congress and the President); and fourth, the interpretation by the domestic courts.
But see Croley & Jackson, supra note 4, at 206-11, who question whether Chevron
provides useful analogies for the GATT/WTO context. Professors Croley and Jackson
regard democratic legitimacy as only the second of three justifications for Chevron
deference, along with agency expertise and efficiency or coordination, see id. at 206-07,
whereas I view it as the decisive underlying value of the doctrine. Moreover, they regard
"the GATT/WTO membership at large" as the legitimate political principal in the system,
rather than particular member states as representatives of their national communities. Id.
at 209. Therefore, "[t]he argument in Chevron thatjudges should defer to the interpretive
decisions made by those accountable to the citizenry's representatives simply has no
analogue in the GATr/WTO antidumping context." Id. However, by regarding "the
GATr/WTO membership at large" as the relevant political principal, Professors Croley
andJackson give preeminence to the needs of international cooperation and coordination
over those of democratic legitimacy, thus effectively ignoring the issue of the democratic
deficit when normative power is delegated outside the confines of the nation-state. For
further discussion, see supra notes 527-529 and accompanying text.
340. Mancini & Keeling, supra note 201, at 186.
341. See EC Treaty preamble.
342. See generally Fennelly, supra note 140. For a view from the early 1970s of a then-
judge on the ECJ, see Pescatore, supra note 146, at 86-90. The late Judge Fernand
Schockweiler discussed the teleological method as giving "preference to the interpretation
best fitted to promote the achievement pursued by the objectives pursued by the Treaty."
Fennelly, supra note 140, at 668. Fernand Schockveiler, La Cour de justice des
Communauths europ~ennes: dhpasse-t-elle les limites de ses attributions?, 18 Journal des
tribunaux, Droit europ~en 74 (Apr. 20, 1995).
343. Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
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prohibiting new customs duties344 had "direct effect"; that is, whether an
individual could enforce its obligations against the Member State in a
national enforcement proceeding. In order to determine the meaning of
the provision, the ECJ spoke of the need to consider not merely the word-
ing of the Treaty, but also its "spirit" and "general scheme. '3 45 In finding
that Article 12 was in fact directly effective, the Court-somewhat
vaguely-stressed the Preamble's reference to "peoples" and not merely
governments, along with the overall objective of the Treaty to establish a
Common Market, for which the Member States had transferred sover-
eignty to supranational institutions.3 46 Only then did the Court turn to
the "clear and unconditional" terms of Article 12's prohibition to find
that it did "not require any legislative intervention" on the part of the
Member States.3 47
The Court's reasoning in Van Gend & Loos manifested another ele-
ment of the ECJ's teleological approach: the so-called doctrine of l'effet
utile ("useful effect"). According to this doctrine, "once the purpose of a
provision is clearly identified, its detailed terms will be interpreted so 'as
to ensure that the provision retains its effectiveness. ' 48 Innocuous in
the abstract, the doctrine has in fact enabled the ECJ to arrogate to itself
an extraordinary degree of normative power, sometimes bending or ig-
noring literal meanings of Treaty provisions, other times "'fill[ing] in
gaps, quite unashamedly, without hesitation."' 3 49
344. See EC Treaty art. 25 (ex art. 12).
345. 1963 E.C.R. at 12.
346. See id.
347. Id. at 13.
348. Fennelly, supra note 140, at 674 (quoting case 9/70, Grad v. Finanzamt
Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, 837, para. 5).
349. Id. at 674 (quoting Lord Denning in James Buchanan & Co., Ltd. v. Babco
Forwarding and Shipping (U.K.) Ltd., [1977] 1 All E.R. 518, [1977] 2 C.M.L.t. 455). In
Van Gend & Loos, for example, the Court took a maximalist approach with regard to its
powers under the preliminary reference procedure of EEC Treaty Article 177, which
conferred jurisdiction on the Court to answer questions posed by national courts
concerning "the interpretation of [the] Treaty." EC Treaty art. 234(a) (ex art. 177(a)). In
that case, the Court held that this provision gave it the power not only to interpret the
Treaty but also to rule on the conformity of national law with Community law. The
problem with this conclusion-pointed out by both the Dutch and Belgian governments in
their arguments to the Court-was that Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty (now
Articles 226 and 227 of the EC Treaty) set forth a seemingly exclusive mechanism for this
sort of legal control, one which involved "traditional public-international-law-type
provisions offering a kind of declaratory relief for the Community or a Member State."
Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 98. Nevertheless, the Court found that "[a]
restriction of the guarantees against an infringement of [Community law] by [the]
Member States to the procedures under Articles 169 and 170 would remove all direct legal
protection of the individual rights of their nationals." The Court argued that "recourse to
the procedure under these Articles would be ineffective if it were to occur after the
implementation of a national decision taken contrary to the provisions of the Treaty." Van
Gend &Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 13. Hence, the Court found a need for a broad interpretation
of the its powers under Article 177.
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2. Supremacy - Standing alone, the combination of direct effect, tel-
eological interpretation, and its corollary, the doctrine of l'effet utile,
would be a potent formula for an expansive understanding of suprana-
tional adjudicative power. One final foundational element, however, re-
mained to be articulated: the doctrine of the supremacy of Community
law over national law, which was implicit in Van Gend & Loos but not
formally announced by the Court until its judgment in Costa v. ENEL in
1964.350 The original Treaty of Rome lacked-and the EC Treaty still
lacks-an explicit supremacy clause.351 In Costa, the Court nevertheless
found that the Treaty constituted "a permanent limitation of [the] sover-
eign rights" of the Member States,3 52 despite the fact that, in certain
Member States-like Italy, where the decision arose-the Treaty had
been ratified by simple statute. By looking broadly at "the terms and the
spirit of the Treaty,"3 53 the Court concluded that it was impermissible for
a Member State to give precedence to its own laws over those of the
Community, regardless of the constitutional status of the Treaty in do-
mestic law.35 4 Supremacy flowed from the need for uniformity.3 5 5
As a leading European jurist has put it, "[e]ffectiveness, supremacy,
and uniform judicial enforcement of Community law" are the key doctri-
nal achievements of the "constructionist stage" of ECJ case law.3 56 The
procedural and substantive consequences in national law were under-
standably profound. Procedurally, the ECJ's aggressive pursuit of its vi-
sion of the Community's telos led to an extensive involvement in the judi-
cial systems of the Member States. For example, the Court required
national courts to offer effective remedies in the enforcement of
Community law-even if this meant overriding domestic constitutional tra-
ditions.- 5 7 Substantively, the aggressive approach involved a broad inter-
pretation of the "four freedoms"-free movement of goods, persons, serv-
350. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
351. Instead, the Treaty has simply required the Member States to "ensure ... the
obligations arising out of the Treaty" and otherwise prohibits them from taking "any
measure which could jeopardize [its] objectives." EC Treaty art. 10 (ex art. 5).
352. Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594.
353. Id. at 593.
354. From a domestic Italian constitutional perspective, because the Treaty had been
adopted by legislation, see Law No. 1203 of October 14, 1957, the Italian Constitutional
Court had ruled that the Treaty had only the status of legislation, and thus was subordinate
to subsequent legislation. See George Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European
Community Law 193-94 (1993).
355. According to the Court: "The executive force of Community law cannot vary
from one State to another ... without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the
[EEC] Treaty set out in Article 5(2) .... " Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 594.
356. Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 96.
357. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R 1-2433 (holding that a U.K court must have the power to
strike down an act of Parliament if that act violated Community law, despite the prior lack
of such judicial power); Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.RI 629 (holding that Community law required that every Italian
court, not just the Constitutional Court, have the power to hold a domestic statute invalid
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ices, and capital-often bringing Community law into direct conflict with
national laws that might have an indirect impact on these freedoms.3 5 8
3. Community Competence and Internal Institutional Balance. - Perhaps
the most profound effects of the teleological method, however, have
been felt in the ECJ'sjurisdictional and institutional decisions relating to
the Community itself. These include, notably, cases exploring the
Community's "implied powers" relative to the Member States, as well as
those dealing with the balance of power among the Community's own
legislative institutions, as reflected in decisions considering the appropri-
ate "legal basis" for Community legislation under the Treaty.35 9 These
cases share a common concern: defining in legal terms the new bound-
ary between the Community's authority and the Member State's residual
sovereign prerogatives.
a. Implied Powers. - In the Court's 1971 judgment in the ERTA
case, 360 the ECJ outlined the basic principles of the Community's implied
powers. The issue was whether the authority conferred on the
Community under EEC Treaty Article 75,361 which covers the implemen-
tation of a common transport policy within the Community, extended to
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements with third
countries-in this case the European Road Transport Agreement, or
ERTA. The then-six Member States claimed the right to negotiate indi-
vidually, even though the Community had adopted common rules in this
area.
In ERTA, the Council argued that, because the Community pos-
sessed only delegated powers, the "authority to enter into agreements
with third countries cannot be assumed in the absence of an express pro-
vision in the Treaty."3 62 The Commission argued, by contrast, that in
those circumstances where the Community had in fact adopted internal
rules on the subject-as was the case here-the Member States lost their
right to negotiate individually because separate agreements might jeop-
ardize the common policy adopted under then-Article 75. The Commis-
sion further argued that the narrow interpretation of this provision
wrongly excluded it from the process of negotiation of the ERTA, as was
its right under EEC Treaty Article 228,363 which conferred on the Coin-
if it violated Community law, eliminating the Constitutional Court's monopoly of such
authority under Italian law).
358. For example, in the area of free movement of goods, the ECJ held that a potential
and indirect hindrance to interstate trade was sufficient to strike down a Member State
requirement. See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852, 2
C.M.L.R 436, 453-54 (1974); see also supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
359. We also saw evidence of this in Van Gend & Loos with regard to the Court's broad
reading of its "interpretive"jurisdiction under EEC Treaty Article 177. See supra note 349.
360. See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, [1971] C.M.L.R. 335
[hereinafter ERTA].
361. Now EC Treaty art. 71.
362. ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 273.
363. Now EC Treaty art. 300.
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mission the exclusive power to negotiate on behalf of the Community.3 64
The ECJ sided squarely with the Commission on the question of implied
powers, finding not only that the Treaty implicitly granted the Commu-
nity powers in this domain but that, in view of the need for "the unity of
the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law,"
those powers were in fact exclusive.3 65
With the ERTA decision and its progeny, the European Court of
Justice "added another rung in its constitutional ladder."366 It has since
become a basic principle of European "constitutionalism" that,
whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the
Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of
attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority to
enter into the international commitments necessary for the at-
tainment of that objective even in the absence of an express pro-
vision in that connexion. 367
Most importantly, in its implied powers decisions, the Court demon-
strated that it was willing "to sidestep the presumptive rule of interpreta-
tion typical in international law, that treaties must be interpreted in a
manner that minimizes encroachment on state sovereignty. The Court
favored a teleological, purposive rule drawn from the book of constitu-
tional interpretation."3 68
b. Legal Basis. - Decisions like ERTA reflect a more general atti-
tude-the "preference for Europe"-that has become even more appar-
ent as the Court has confronted with increasing regularity challenges to
the appropriate legal basis for Community legislation under the Treaty.
The legal basis for Community legislation determines the balance of
power between the Community and the Member States in three ways. 369
First, the existence of a legal basis in the Treaty determines whether the
power to act has been delegated to the Community or has been retained
by the Member States.3 70 Second, the procedural requirements associ-
ated with a particular legal basis determine both the degree of political
control that any one Member State may assert over the legislative process
through the Council, as well as the degree of Commission autonomy in
formulating legislative proposals. 371 Third, the legal basis determines the
364. See EC Treaty art. 300(1) (ex art. 228(1)).
365. ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. at 276. On the merits, however, the Court held for the
Council, finding that the bulk of the negotiations had occurred before the common rules
had been adopted. Thus, in those unique circumstances, the Council did not violate
Articles 75 and 228. See id. at 281-82.
366. Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2416.
367. Opinion 1/76, 1977 E.C.R. 741, 755, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 279, 295.
368. Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2416.
369. The following discussion draws on Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 123.
370. In this sense, ERTA was also a "legal basis" case.
371. That is, by determining the voting scheme in the Council-unanimity, qualified
majority or simple majority-as well as the extent of Parliamentary involvement-
consultation, cooperation, or co-decision. See id. 123-24.
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nature of the resulting legislative instrument-either a regulation or di-
rective-the first being by definition directly applicable in the Member
States and the second requiring, in theory, national implementing
legislation.3 72
In legal disputes involving legal basis, the ECJ has historically favored
Treaty interpretations that maximize the prerogatives of those institu-
tions deemed most representative of the Community's interest as a whole:
the Court itself, the Commission, and the Parliament.373 Take, for exam-
ple, the issue ofjusticiability, or whether the Treaty commits the question
of the appropriate legal basis to the Council's ultimate discretion or
makes it subject to judicial review by the ECJ. The Treaty itself seems to
indicate that the question was committed to the Council's discretion.
The Council had long argued that it had the right, pursuant to its author-
ity under Article 149(1) of the EEC Treaty to amend proposals from the
Commission by a unanimous vote, to determine for itself the appropriate
legal basis, regardless of what the Commission had proposed, and free
from legal control by the Court.374 The Court rejected this argument, 375
holding that the choice of legal basis is to be determined by "objective
factors which are amenable to judicial review."376 In effect, the Court
"remove [d] the choice of the correct legal basis from the sphere of polit-
ical discretion,"377 reserving for itself the role of final arbiter of both the
scope of the Community's legislative competence relative to the Member
States and the institutional balance within the Community.
4. The Court's Problematic Pursuit of Democratic Values. - As one Euro-
pean judge sympathetic to the Court's approach has noted, however, the
Court's "search for 'objective factors'," although designed "to make judi-
cial review more credible," nevertheless is often "open-ended and value-
laden."378 Ironically, the principal value which the Court often claims to
be pursuing is democracy, or what the Court has described as "a funda-
mental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the ex-
ercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assem-
bly."3 79 Where more than one provision of the Treaty might arguably
372. See EC Treaty art. 249 (ex art. 189).
373. See generally Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 123-28.
374. See Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.1L
2871, 2881, 2906-07, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639, 647, 671. EEC Treaty Article 149(1)
provided: "Where, in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal of the
Commission, unanimity shall be required for an act constituting an amendment to that
proposal." The TEU transferred this provision to Article 189a(1) (now Article 250).
375. Opinion 1/78, 1979 E.C.R at 2907-08.
376. Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 126 (quoting Case 45/86, Commission v
Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, 1520, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 131, 153 (1987)).
377. Id. at 125.
378. Id. at 126.
379. Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2867, 1-2900, [1993] 3
C.M.L.R. 359, 348-85 (1991) [hereinafter Titanium Dioxide Waste] (tracking language first
used in case 138/79, SA Roquette Fr~res v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360; and Case 139/
79, Maizena GmbH v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3393, 3424).
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serve as the legal basis for a piece of Community legislation, the Court
has expressed its clear preference for the provision requiring the most
extensive involvement of the European Parliament-pursuant to either
the co-decision or cooperation provisions in Articles 251 and 252 (ex Arti-
cles 189b and 189c).
The Court's approach in this area, however, has often been highly
problematic, both as a matter of the Member States' "legislative" intent
under the Treaty as well as, more importantly, with respect to the pursuit
of democratic legitimacy strictly speaking. The decision in which the
Court first applied the "fundamental democratic principle" to the ques-
tion of legal basis is instructive. The case arose out of a dispute between
the Commission and the Council over the passage of a directive on tita-
nium dioxide waste.380 The Commission based its proposal on EEC
Treaty Article 100a381 (added to the Treaty by the Single European Act of
1986) which governed the adoption of harmonization directives designed
to achieve the internal market. Under the SEA, Article 100a of the EEC
Treaty authorized passage of internal market directives by a qualified ma-
jority in the Council, followed by the "cooperation" procedure in the Par-
liament.3 8 2 The Council argued, however, that given its subject matter
the directive should have been based on EEC Treaty Article 130s (also
introduced into the Treaty by the SEA), which governed the adoption of
environmental directives.383 EEC Treaty Article 130s authorized passage
only after a unanimous vote in the Council, and then merely "in consulta-
tion" with the Parliament 384
Clearly, the Single European Act created some ambiguity with regard
to the appropriate legal basis for environmental legislation. On the one
hand, EEC Treaty Article 100a(3) expressly contemplated the adoption
of environmental protection directives in order to achieve the internal
market.L3 85 Yet, the presence of a more specific provision for the adop-
tion of environmental legislation in EEC Treaty Article 130s provides at
least prima facie evidence of the Member States' intent to exercise
greater control over the content of such legislation, via unanimity in the
Council. Once the Court concluded that EEC Treaty Article 130s was an
appropriate legal basis,386 according to venerable canons of legislative in-
terpretation prevailing in code-based countries, the more specific provi-
380. See Titanium Dioxide Waste, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2900.
381. Now EC Treaty art. 95.
382. "Cooperation" refers to the procedure now codified at Article 252 (ex art. 189c),
which in effect provides the Parliament with a suspensive veto that can be overridden only
by a unanimous vote in the Council. In the TEU, the Member States again amended
Article 95 (ex art. 100a) to require Parliamentary co-decision under Article 251 (ex art.
189b), which gives the Parliament a true veto over proposed legislation.
383. EC Treaty Article 175 (ex art. 130s).
384. See EEC Treaty art. 130s. EC Treaty art. 175 (ex art. 130s) now requires co-
decision under Article 251.
385. EC Treaty art. 95(5).
386. See Titanium Dioxide Waste, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2899-2901.
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sion should have trumped the more general. The Court, however, used
its "fundamental democratic principle" as an aid in tipping the balance in
favor of the opposite conclusion, resolving the ambiguity against the
Council, contrary to the arguable intent of the Member States. 8 7
Despite the Court's professed pursuit of democratic values, the rea-
soning in Titanium Dioxide Waste is deeply questionable on democratic
legitimacy grounds for at least two reasons. First, it is unclear which insti-
tution-the Parliament or the Commission-actually benefitted most
from the Court's ruling. By favoring the cooperation procedure, the
Court not only increased the involvement of the Parliament but also ex-
panded the freedom of action of the Commission from Member State
control, because the cooperation procedure only requires qualified-ma-
387. The Court ultimately based its judgment on the so-called "center of gravity" test,
finding that the Titanium Dioxide Waste Directive was centered primarily on harmonizing
national rules on production in an industrial sector so as to eliminate competitive
distortions, rendering Article 100a the appropriate legal basis. Id. at 1-2901, para. 23. The
Court further claimed that, because EEC Treaty Article 130r(2) provided that
"[e]nvironmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community's
other policies," this implied that "a Community measure does not necessarily call for the
application of Article 130s simply becuase it pursues environmental objectives." Id., para.
22. However, further evidence of the intent of the Member States to maintain the
maximum degree of control over environmental legislation is found in EEC Treaty Article
130r, which introduced the subsidiarity principle into the Treaty specifically in the
environmental domain (the principle would be added to the Treaty generally as Article 3b
by the TEU in 1992). See EC Treaty art. 5. As will be argued in greater detail below, see
infra notes 459-466 and accompanying text, subsidiarity should be regarded as an
interpretive principle favoring constructions of the Treaty that maximize Member State
control. Given the specific insertion of the subsidiarity principle in the environmental
domain in EEC Treaty Article 130r, the appropriate choice of legal basis in this case should
have been one that required unanimity in the Council-i.e., EEC Treaty Article 130s.
In a more recent decision, Case C-155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.RL 1-939,
[1993] 68(7) C.M.L.R. 359 [hereinafter Waste Directive], the Court took a stricter line,
specifically with regard to a 1991 amendment to a 1975 directive on waste disposal, holding
that the appropriate legal basis was EEC Treaty Article 130s and not Article 100a, as the
Commission had proposed. On the directive's "center of gravity," the Court reasoned that
the waste directive amendment was aimed primarily at "protecting the environment" and
had "only ancillary effects on the conditions of competition and trade." Id. at 1-968-69.
The Court distinguished its earlier decision on the titanium waste directive by virtue of its
purported restriction to "a given industrial sector with the aim of eliminating distortions of
competition in that sector," so that it constituted a harmonization/internal market
directive under EEC Treaty Article 100a. Id. at 1-969. This is at best a distinction without a
difference. The fact that the waste directive amendment applied to all waste rather than to
a specific type does not alter the fact that different producers in different Member States
might be subject to different regulatory regimes with effects on the conditions of
competition and trade. Indeed, the original waste directive had been adopted in 1975 as a
harmonization/internal market directive under EEC Treaty Articles 100 and 235, in the
era when the Court was expansively interpreting the Community's competence under
those provisions. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text. Perhaps the only
explanation for the Court's changed attitude in 1993, when it handed down its decision on
the waste directive amendment, is that it reflects increased caution on the part of the Court
following the surprising popular opposition to the ratification of the TEU in 1992. On the
Court's changed attitude after 1992, see infra notes 398-405 and accompanying text.
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jority voting in the Council.a88 Indeed, given what some see as the Parlia-
ment's effective exclusion from the real process of decisionmaking in any
case-regardless of the type of legislative procedure used 389-one could
fairly hypothesize that the principal effect of the Court's decision was to
solidify the position of the Community's permanent bureaucracy vis-A-vis
the Council and the Member States.
There is a second, even more fundamental democratic legitimacy
criticism, which relates to the ECJ's problematic invocation of the notion
of the democratic rights of the European "peoples" taken together. As
Part IV of this article argued in great detail, no European demos yet exists
as a cultural reality, and as long as this is the case, the European
Parliament cannot claim the democratic legitimacy that national parlia-
ments presently possess as representatives of their respective national
communities. To make such a claim on behalf of the European "peo-
ples" aggregated as a whole, and to use this claim to presume a greater
degree of democratic legitimacy in the Parliament than in the Council, is
effectively to argue that some form of European demos already exists.
Although the development of a European demos is not out of the ques-
tion-indeed, evidence now exists that the cultural foundations for such
a demos are being laid-its emergence will require a major transforma-
tion: As Joseph Weiler rightly put it, "[i] ndividuals must think of them-
selves in this way before such a demos could have full legitimate demo-
cratic authority." °90 Because national identity still predominates over
European identity,39' the Court's reference to a "fundamental demo-
cratic principle" simply shows that it mistakenly equates formal parlia-
mentary democratization at the Community level with true democratic
legitimacy.
The likely consequence of its legal basis decisions is the consolida-
tion of the formal autonomy of the Community's normative power from
the democratically legitimate political structures of the Member States.
The constitutionalist "preference for Europe"-along with the teleologi-
cal method of Treaty interpretation that the Court has used to translate
that preference into legal terms-has amounted in practice to a strong
presumption in favor of the prerogatives of the Community. At least until
1992, when the legal and political debates over the ratification of the
TEU brought the question of the democratic deficit squarely to the fore,
it was apparently of little consequence to the Court that the Community's
388. On the relationship between qualified-majority voting and Commission
autonomy, see supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
389. See Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 233-34. On a related point, Professor
Majone states that most of the decisions are made by the Commission before an issue
reaches even the Council. See Majone, Regulatory State, supra note 55, at 92. He further
notes that the advent of qualified-majority voting undermines the power of the Member
States to bring political considerations to bear in the legislative process. See id.
390. Weiler, Demos, supra note 28, at 254.
391. See generally Deflem & Pampel, supra note 61; Shore, supra note 61; Wood,
supra note 61.
1999]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
popular legitimacy was at best questionable when compared to that of the
Member States.
5. Signs of Restraint After 1992. - The democratic deficit became an
unavoidable issue following the expansion of the Community's autono-
mous legislative powers in the SEA of 1986 and then in the TEU of 1992.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the expressed intent of the Member States
to reassert some measure of political control over the Community's norm
production,3 92 certain judges on the Court began to query publicly
whether the time had come for a more restrained stance vis-,I-vis the polit-
ical process. Some observers saw signs of "public penance" in the state-
ments of members of the Court in the early 1980s as intended "to reas-
sure concerned onlookers that the Court was very well aware of the need
for prudence."393 However, at least before the political crises that accom-
panied the ratification of the TEU in 1992, the tenor of many judges'
public statements reflected more pride than penance in what the Court
had been able to accomplish to date, guiding the Community through
the long night of Eurosclerosis until the moment when the political pro-
cess was finally able to regain "the strength to make policy decisions and
pass necessary legislation."3 94
Indeed, between 1986 and 1992, a strong sense of "Euro-optimism"
prevailed, and the public statements of members of the Court arguably
reflected this outlook. The Single European Act had removed the most
serious obstacle to supranational legislation by instituting qualified-major-
ity voting in the Council in most important matters, notably the achieve-
ment of the internal market, and had also increased Parliamentary in-
volvement through the introduction of the cooperation procedure. The
Community was now actively pursuing the goal of achieving the internal
market by 1992, delegating extensive normative powers to the
Commission to achieve this task.3 95 In these circumstances, some mea-
sure ofjudicial self-restraint seemed to be appropriate because the polit-
ical process now appeared ready to pursue vigorously the telos of the
Community as the Court understood it. As Judge Mancini declared in a
speech at Harvard in late 1989, "[w] hen democracy advances and politics
asserts its claims, judges are bound to take a pace back."396 Although
Judge Mancini acknowledged that some would call this "a retreat from
the daring of old," he preferred to describe it simply as "a little rest, all
the more pleasant for being so richly deserved."3 97
392. See Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 110-11.
393. Burley & Mattli, supra note 100, at 71 (referring to articles by Judge Ulrich
Everling in the early 1980s).
394. Lenaerts, Interaction, supra note 102, at 95.
395. See supra notes 159-162, 283-284 and accompanying text.
396. Mancini, supra note 102, at 613. Judge Mancini went on to say. "The Court still
has ample room to mould [sic] the destiny of the Community both by writing new rules
and by cutting a number of Gordian knots." Id. at 614.
397. Id. at 614.
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The post-1992 environment lacked much of the optimism of the
1986-1992 period. The depth of popular opposition to the Maastricht
Treaty (the TEU) caught many ardent supporters of European integra-
tion by surprise 98 The self-assurance of Judge Mancini in 1989399 now
seemed decidedly out of place, belied not only by the ratification crises of
1992, but also by the intent of the drafters of the TEU to place clear limits
on the jurisdiction of the ECJ through the pillar structure of the newly-
established European Union.400 Although Judge Mancini could confi-
dently declare in 1989 that "[a] ccepting a measure of self-restraint...
does not mean embarking on a course of strict constructionism,"401 sev-
eral post-1992 decisions seemed to indicate that the Court was prepared
to pursue precisely such a course. In 1993 and 1994, the Court handed
down major decisions reflecting unexpectedly restrictive interpretations
of Community competence in two key areas: the free movement of
goods402 and the Community's implied powers in external affairs. 403
398. See The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, supra note 29, at 3-4; see also
David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century 212-16
(1993).
399. See Mancini, supra note 102, at 613 (contemplating that, although the Court was
"likely to extend the area of problems which it feels should be solved by the political
institutions .... in other areas it [would] undoubtedly go on feeling that it can, or rather
must, exercise guidance").
400. See TEU art. 46 (ex art. L); supra text accompanying note 178. According to
Weiler and Trachtman: "It is clear that the principal raison d'itre of the pillar structure,
with the meticulous and explicit attempt to exclude the Court, was the wish of the Member
States to operate outside the European constitutional structure." Weiler & Trachtman,
supra note 23, at 371.
401. Mancini, supra note 102, at 613.
402. See Joined Cases 267 and 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097
(partially overturning Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, which held that a showing of potential
and indirect hindrance to interstate trade was sufficient to strike down a Member State
requirement under Article 30). According to KEck, the Dassonville rule does not apply to
so-called "selling arrangements" (i.e., marketing standards) as long as those standards
'apply to all affected traders operating within the national territory." Id. at 1-6131. This
decision has provoked considerable commentary, often strongly negative. See, e.g.,
Laurence W. Gormley, Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable Judgment in Keck &
Mithouard, 5 Eur. Bus. L. Rev.. 63 (1994). According to Weiler and Trachtman: "[I]f one
finds a certain emotional edge in the articles dealing with decisions of the European Court
in cases such as Keck and others like it, this is understandable. These decisions are painful
since they seem like a betrayal [of the constitutionalist vision] from within the Vatican itself
[i.e., the ECJ]." Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23, at 371-72.
403. See Opinion 1/94, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, 1-5281-5344 (re the 'WTO Agreement)
(holding the Community and the Member States had concurrent competence to ratify the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)). The Commission had argued for the
Community's exclusive competence, first, based on the purported inclusion of trade in
services and intellectual property rights within the scope of the Community's common
commercial policy under Article 113, and, alternatively, because of their inclusion within
the Community's exclusive implied powers under the ERTA doctrine. See id. at 1-5282-83.
The Court rejected both arguments, motivated apparently by the concern that recognition
of exclusive Community competence would circumvent the Community's internal
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One suspects that the difficulties associated with the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty, which revealed a decided lack of popular consensus
over the direction of European integration in several Member States, had
much to do with blunting the Court's enthusiasm for its earlier activ-
ism.40 4 These decisions certainly indicate a willingness on the part of the
Court to take a more respectful line toward Member State
prerogatives.40
5
C. The Persistence of the "Preference for Europe" in the Emerging Case Law on
Subsidiarity
The free movement of goods and implied powers decisions noted
above40 6 undoubtedly signal a change in course. It would, however, be
wrong to conclude that they reflect a fundamental abandonment of the
Court's broad interpretation of the Community's legislative powers, as
though the Council and Parliament were a "normal" or "constitutional"
legislature drawing their legitimacy directly from a definable European
"people." The persistence of the constitutionalist "preference for
Europe" manifests itself most clearly in the degree of deference the Court
is prepared to show the Community "legislature" on questions involving
the application of the principle of subsidiarity.40 7 Deference in this con-
text is especially problematic because the Member States' aim in inserting
the principle into the Treaty alongside enumerated powers and propor-
tionality was clearly to constrain the exercise of the Community's newly-
expanded legislative authority after 1992.408
harmonization procedures and would be unnecessarily disruptive of the existing division of
competences between the Member States and Community. See Piet Van Nuffel, Case Law
WTO-Agreement, 1 Colum. J. Eur. L. 338, 348, 351 (1995).
404. The Court's apparent change in course after 1992 might bear out the positive
political theory of judicial behavior developed by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast in the
American context. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1131 (1995). They find that, although
routine electoral vicissitudes generally do not affect the content of judicial doctrine as
announced by the Supreme Court, doctrine has been highly responsive to major electoral
shocks (e.g., post-1932). See id. at 1152-56, 1168-73. In the European case, perhaps 1992
was precisely such a shock, which the ECJ could simply not ignore.
405. In addition to Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.RL 1-6097, and Opinion 1/94, 1994
E.C.R. 1-5281, see Waste Directive 1993 E.C.1L 1-939, 1-964-70, [1993] 68(7) C.M.L.R. 359.
For a similar view, see Todd J. Friedbacher, Motive Unmasked: The European Court of
Justice, the Free Movement of Goods, and the Search for Legitimacy, 2 Eur. L.J. 226 (1996)
(claiming that the Court was motivated in these case by a sense of waning faith in its
institutional legitimacy).
406. See supra notes 402-403.
407. See Working Time Directive 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755, 1-5793, (1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 671;
Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2405, 1-2441, [1997] 3
C.M.L.R. 1379 [hereinafter Deposit-Guarantee Schemes]. On the principle of subsidiarity in
Article 5 (ex Article 3b) of the EC Treaty, see supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
408. George Bermann notes: "As if to emphasize the connection between subsidiarity
and the expansion of the Community's powers, the drafters of the TEU put language into
virtually every new treaty chapter underscoring their intention that the Member States
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1. Preliminary Considerations: Comparing the Deference Owed a Constitu-
tional Legislature and an Administrative Agency. - A constitutional legisla-
ture, as that term is used in this Article, exercises legislative power dele-
gated directly from the people, and is further subject to direct and
periodic popular control by way of the vote.40 9 Given the popular source
of its legislative powers and legitimacy, courts are generally reluctant to
oblige a constitutional legislature to articulate in detail its reasons for
adopting a particular law. Rather, courts defer to the policy choices of a
constitutional legislature as long as there is some identifiable rational ba-
sis for the legislature's decision.410 Broad deference is justified because it
is ultimately the responsibility of the voters to approve or disapprove of
the advisedness of legislative action. Except in the rare instance when the
legislature oversteps the bounds of its constitutional authority or violates
the constitutional rights of an individual, it is not for ajudge to intervene.
The direct democratic check that exists in the constitutional legisla-
tive context does not exist in the administrative context, which under-
mines-though hardly eliminates-the case for deference to agency pol-
icy choices. Judges should not substitute their policy preferences for
those of an administrative agency if that agency is lawfully operating
within the bounds of its delegated authority.41 ' As the French put it, the
role of the administrative judge is to consider questions of la lgaliti (le-
gality), not those of l'opportunitf (that is, the political expediency of mak-
ing a particular decision or adopting a particular rule).412 Yet, the en-
forcement of legality in the administrative context often leads courts to
invade the realm of agency policymaling to a degree not appropriate
continue to exercise primary responsibility in these new Community spheres." Bermann,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 346; see also Marquardt, Subsidiarity, supra
note 172, at 625-27.
409. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)
("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an
end.... [T]his Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for
enacting a statute."). As the ECJ puts it: "[I]t would be pointless to require [that the
legislature provide] a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical choices made
by it." Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5816.
411. The Supreme Court in Chevron stressed this point quite clearly "When a
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really
centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).
412. Despite the broad deference that the ECJ shows, this is precisely the terminology
that it uses to describe its role: "[I]t is not the function of the Court to review the
expediency of measures adopted by the legislature. The review [of Community legislation]
must be limited to the legality of the disputed measure." Working Time Directive, 1996
E.C.R. at 1-5802. However, while the Court's legality/expediency terminology reflects the
influence of French administrative law, its "constitutionalist" stance is belied by its
persistent invocation of the term "legislature."
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when dealing with a legislature-for example, through more stringent
applications of the principles of proportionality and cost-benefit analysis.
This tendency toward more searching judicial review in the administra-
tive context is justified, from a democratic legitimacy standpoint, by the
often problematic nature of hierarchical political control over delegated
normative power by elected representatives. 413 Unchecked administra-
tive discretion, beyond political or even legal control, violates the demo-
cratic principle by conferring autonomous normative power on unac-
countable technocrats.
In the administrative context, therefore, a reviewing court promotes
democratic legitimacy when it forces the agency, as an aspect of legality,
to give sufficient reasons for its actions in order to demonstrate that the
agency has engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking."414 A court evaluating
the legality of administrative action must not simply accept conclusory
statements from the agency justifying its actions. Rather, the reviewing
court must satisfy itself that the agency "examine [d] the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation" for its normative output.4 15 If
the agency cannot make such a showing, the court should annul the chal-
lenged measure and remand the question to the agency for reconsidera-
tion. Americans describe this more demanding level of scrutiny of ad-
ministrative action as "hard look" review.416
2. Deference to Conclusory Findings of the Community "Legislature" on
Questions of Subsidiarity. - There have been two post-1992 cases that have
raised serious issues of subsidiarity.4 17 In each, the Court rejected de-
mands by the complaining Member States that the Court engage in a
kind of "hard look" review of the evidence purportedly demonstrating
why Community action was preferable to rulemaking at the national or
sub-national level. In the first case, the Court simply inferred, in the ab-
sence of any evidence, that the requirements of subsidiarity were satisfied
solely by virtue of the Council's decision to legislate. 418 In the second,
413. See Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States, supra note 73, at 618 (speaking
of the greater burden on the courts to supervise the fairness and legitimacy of
administrative decisionmaking in the absence of adequate political controls).
414. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (describing "hard look" review). In
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the
Supreme Court "essentially endorsed 'hard look' review." Peter L. Strauss, Considering
Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 Duke L.J. 538, 539 [hereinafter Strauss,
"Hard Look" Review].
415. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
416. See, e.g., Strauss, "Hard Look" Review, supra note 414; see also Strauss, From
Expertise to Politics, supra note 63, at 756-57 (explaining, inter alia, how "hard look"
review developed as an interpretation of the APA).
417. See Working Time Directive, E.C.R. 1-5755, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 671; Deposit-
Guarantee Schemes, 1997 E.C.R 1-2405, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1379.
418. See infra note 426 and accompanying text.
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the Court accepted conclusory statements contained in legislative recitals
as a sufficient basis to justify action at the Community level. 41 9
The first decision arose out of a challenge by the United Kingdom to
the so-called 'Working Time Directive,"420 which, inter alia, requires the
Member States to enact legislation limiting the work week to an average
maximum of 48 hours and mandating four weeks of paid vacation per
worker each year.42 ' The measure was adopted in 1993 by a qualified
majority pursuant to then-Article 118a (added to the Treaty by the SEA in
1986), which authorized harmonization directives establishing "minimum
requirements" regarding the "working environment," as well as "the
health and safety of workers."422 The then-Conservative British govern-
ment opposed the measure in the Council and ultimately abstained from
its adoption.423
In its application to the Court, Britain argued that the directive,
aside from being unsupported by any scientific evidence linking the new
work rules with its purported "health and safety" objectives, failed to dis-
close why those objectives would better be achieved by action at the Com-
munity level rather than at the national level. 424 In its decision, the Court
made no explicit ruling that the Council was under any obligation to ex-
plain how the directive satisfied the subsidiarity requirements of then-
Article 3b.425 The Court focused instead on the language of Article l18a,
which in the Court's reading recognized "harmonization" as an end in
itself-rather than a means to the end of "health and safety"-in seeming
contradiction of the subsidiarity principle. In response to the United
419. See infra notes 428-431 and accompanying text.
420. Council Directive 93/104 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of
working time, 1993 OJ. (L 307) 18 [hereinafter Working Time Directive].
421. More specifically, the Working Time Directive obligates the Member States to
take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest
period of 11 consecutive hours per 24 hour period (Article 3); to a rest break where the
working day is longer than six hours, the details of such break to be determined by the two
sides of industry or by national legislation (Article 4); to a minimum uninterrupted rest
period of 24 hours in each seven-day period, plus the 11 hours daily rest referred to in
Article 3 (Article 5, first sentence); such period in principle to include Sunday (Article 5,
second sentence); and, finally, to four weeks paid annual leave (Article 7). See id.
422. For the text of Article 118a of the EC Treaty, as amended by the TEU, prior to
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see 1992 O.J. (C 224) 45. Article 2 (22) of
the Treaty of Amsterdam replaced Articles 117-120 of the EC Treaty, as amended by the
TEU; see EC Treaty arts. 136-143, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 OJ.
(C 340) 239-43. The new Treaty provisions incorporate the Protocol and Agreement on
Social Policy attached to the TEU, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 126-29, from which the United
Kingdom had opted out.
423. The United Kingdom argued that the true purpose of the Directive was to create
jobs and reduce unemployment and for that reason constituted a misuse of powers under
Article 173. See Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755, 1-5763, para. 26, [1996] 3
C.M.L.Rt 671 (Opinion of Advocate-General Philippe L6ger) (citing sections 3.12 and 3.13
of the United Kingdom application).
424. See id. at 1-5782-83, para. 122.
425. EC Treaty art. 5.
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Kingdom's subsidiarity argument, the Court resorted to a tautology:
"Once the Council has found that it is necessary to improve the existing
level of protection as regards the health and safety of workers and to har-
monise the conditions in this area .... achievement of that objective
through the imposition of minimum requirements necessarily presupposes
Community-wide action .... -426
In the second case, the Court's treatment of a similar challenge by
Germany to the adoption of a directive requiring the establishment of
"deposit guarantee systems" in credit institutions was only slightly more
rigorous.427 The Court relied exclusively on conclusory statements con-
tained in the directive's recitals to find, somewhat sweepingly, that "the
Parliament and the Council did explain why they considered that their
action was in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity."428 The Court
looked particularly to the second recital in the preamble to the Directive
that "consideration should be given to the situation that might arise if
deposits in a credit institution that has branches in other Member States
became unavailable" and that it was "indispensable to ensure a harmo-
nized minimum level of deposit protection wherever the deposits are lo-
cated in the Community."429 The Court also noted that, as the fifth reci-
tal indicated, the action taken by the Member States in response to an
earlier Commission recommendation "had not achieved the desired re-
sult."430 According to this reasoning, George Bermann and others have
noted, "it is sufficient for the institutions merely to reach and to state a
conclusion on the subsidiarity question; they do not apparently have to
recite detailed evidence to support that conclusion-much less convince
the Court that the conclusion is correct."43 1
426. Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5809, para. 47 (emphasis added).
427. Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1997 E.C.1L 1-2405, 1-2411 [1997] 3 G.M.L.R. 1379,
1383-84.
428. Id. at 1-2453, para. 28. One explanation for the perfunctory nature of the
Court's treatment or the subsidiarity issue in Deposit-Guarantee Schemes is that it reflects the
way in which counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany presented the subsidiarity
argument to the Court. German counsel argued subsidiarity as part of the requirement to
provide reasons under then-Article 190 (now Article 253), rather than as a substantive
claim to annul the directive. (I am grateful to Stephan Wernicke for this insight.) From
an American standpoint, however, it is difficult to see how the presentation of the
subsidiarity argument as part of a claim under Article 190 should relieve the Court from a
full treatment of Germany's position, particularly as it relates to the procedural obligations
on the part of the Community "legislature" to evaluate the subsidiarity aspects of the
proposed directive. On the procedural dimension of subsidiarity viewed from an
American perspective, see Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 391.
In effect, I am arguing for a kind of "hard look" doctrine on questions of subsidiarity. On
the American "hard look" doctrine, see supra notes 414-416 and accompanying text.
429. Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-2452, par. 26.
430. Id. at 1-2452, para. 27.
431. 1998 Supplement to Cases and Materials on European Community Law
(Including European Union Materials) 23 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 1998). Indeed,
the Court has stated quite clearly that the authority to adopt a harmonization directive
"cannot be limited exclusively to circumstances where the justification for such action is
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The Court's refusal to engage in more searching judicial review on
questions of subsidiarity effectively imputes a rational basis to the
Community's interpretation of the scope of its legislative power in the
absence of any supporting evidence. This highly deferential approach
would perhaps be justified if the Council and the Parliament possessed
the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional legislature, subject to direct
popular control, which of course they do not. Indeed, several Member
States, among them France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, found
the Court's position sufficiently objectionable that they demanded the
insertion of a judicially enforceable "Subsidiarity Protocol" in the new
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.432 This Protocol provides, in pertinent
part, that "[f] or any proposed Community legislation, the reasons on which
it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying that its compliance with the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality."43 3 It further states that
"the reasons for concluding that a Community objective can be better
achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative or, wherever
possible, quantitative indicators."43 4 By placing this evidentiary burden on
scientifically demonstrated." Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5806, para. 39. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court made an implicit distinction between the Council as a
"legislative" body and the Commission as an "administrative" body. The Court had ruled
in an earlier case that all subordinate legislation adopted by Commission action must be
"founded on scientific and technical assessments which must themselves be based on the
results of the latest international research." See supra notes 302-304 and accompanying
text (discussing Case 12/91, Angelopharm GmbH v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1993
E.C.R. 1-171). Indeed, the Court went so far as to say that technical and scientific
consultation on the part of the Commission was required by "the nature of things and
apart from any provision laid down to that effect." Angelopharm, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-211.
However, in the case of the Working Time Directive, apart from the requirement of eleven
hours rest per work day (where some research existed), the Council offered no scientific
evidence to support the health and safety claims for the directive's other work rules (rest
breaks during the work day, a day of rest on Sunday, a limitation of the average work week
to 48 hours, and four weeks paid vacation). See Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at I-
5804, para. 32. In fact, the Council did not even bother to consult the Advisory Committee
on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work in the drafting of the directive. See id.
at 1-5806, para. 39. The Court of Justice held, however, that such consultation was
mandatory only for the Commission, and that the Council's "failure to consult [the Advisory
Committee] cannot be relied on to cast doubt on the link between the measures laid down
by the directive and the protection of health and safety of workers." Id. at 1-5807.
432. Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 105 [hereinafter Subsidiarity Protocol].
433. Id. at para. 4.
434. Id. (emphasis added). Paragraph 5 also specifies that both aspects of the
subsidiarity principle must be met: (1) that "the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by Member States' action in the framework of their national
constitutional system," and (2) that those objectives "can therefore be better achieved by
action of the part of the Community." Id. The Protocol further codified the subsidiarity
'guidelines' issued at the 1992 Edinburgh Summit by the European Council (the heads of
state or government of the various Member States), requiring all Community institutions
to determine: (1) whether the problem to be addressed "has transnational aspects which
cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States"; (2) whether the
Community's failure to act "would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the
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the Community's "legislature," the Member States signaled to the Court
that it should no longer defer so sweepingly to legislative policy choices
that are at least questionable on subsidiarity and proportionality grounds.
Rather, the Member States have now instructed the Court to evaluate the
Council's and the Parliament's reasoning on these critical questions in
the same manner and to the same extent as one might expect of a na-
tional court exercising a kind of "hard look" review over administrative
decisionmaking.435
As George Bermann has argued in terms consistent with the adminis-
trative perspective advanced here, subsidiarity is both a procedural and a
substantive constraint on Community lawmaking.436 In fact, according to
Professor Bermann, the principle is perhaps best understood in proce-
dural terms, obligating the ECJ "to verify whether the institutions them-
selves examined the possibility of alternative remedies at or below the
Member State level."43 7 On the one hand, the Court should avoid "en-
meshing itself in profoundly political judgments that it is ill-equipped to
make and ultimately not responsible for making."438 On the other hand,
the Court must force the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament
"to structure their discussion and focus their debate" specifically on ques-
tions of subsidiarity, which in turn "should promote a realistic assessment
... of the costs and benefits of Community action and inaction alike. '43 9
3. The Rejection of Subsidiarity as an Interpretive Principle. - Emphasiz-
ing the procedural aspects of the subsidiarity principle does not mean
that its substantive dimension should be ignored. Indeed, part of the
explanation for the Court's cursory treatment of subsidiarity as a proce-
dural norm is to be found in its highly mechanistic understanding of the
substantive relationship between subsidiarity and proportionality, the
other major constraint on Community lawmaking in Article 5 (ex Article
3b) of the EC Treaty.440 In the Working Time Directive case, for example,
the United Kingdom had argued quite reasonably that "a measure will be
need to correct distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade or
strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise significantly damage
Member States' interests"; and (3) whether the proposed measure "would produce clear
benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member
States." Edinburgh European Council, Dec. 11-12, 1992, Bull. EC 12-1992, No. 12, vol. 25
(summarizing results of the Edinburgh Summit). For a critique of the guidelines, see
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, 368-71.
435. On the American "hard look" doctrine, see supra notes 414-416 and
accompanying text.
436. See Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 391.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Article 5 (ex art. 3b) of the EC Treaty provides, with regard to proportionality,
that "[a] ny action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty."
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proportionate only if it is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity"441
and that the nature of the Community's legislative authority under then-
Article 118a "should be interpreted in the light of the principle of sub-
sidiarity."442 The Court squarely rejected this effort to merge the two
concepts, holding that subsidiarity is only relevant on the functional ques-
tion of "the need for Community action" rather than on the manner of its
exercise.443 The Court further stated that "[t]here is nothing in the
wording of Article l8a to indicate that [its provisions] should, in the
absence of other indications, be interpreted restrictively."44 4 The exist-
ence of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty apparently did not consti-
tute one of those "other indications."
Admittedly, the Court's approach was consistent with the opinion of
the Advocate-General as well as with a large body of scholarly commen-
tary, which view the question of subsidiarity as strictly one of competence
that is distinct from the appropriate extent of otherwise lawfully exercised
Community power.4 45 This interpretation also finds some support in the
actual language of Article 5 (ex Article 3b), which identifies the central
question as whether "the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suf-
ficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community."44 6 As one commentator has noted, "the underlying logic of
[Article 5's language] reduces the claim of rightful governance to a tech-
nocratic question of functional efficiency."447 Subsidiarity, in this nar-
row, technocratic reading of Article 5, "'determines whether Community
action is to be set in motion,'" whereas the proportionality principle "'de-
fines its scope."448
One might question whether this doctrinal interpretation of the rela-
tionship between subsidiarity and proportionality can survive the Sub-
sidiarity Protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Section 3 of the
Protocol indicates that "[t] he principle of subsidiarity provides a guide as
441. Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R 1-5755, 1-5810, para. 54, [1996] 3 G.M.L.R.
671, 718, par. 54.
442. Id. at 1-5808, par. 46, [1996] 3 G.M.L.R at 717 par. 46.
443. Id. at 1-5811, par. 55, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 718, par. 55 (emphasis added).
444. Id. at 1-5800, para. 15, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 710, par. 15.
445. Id. at 1-5783, par. 126, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 699, par. 126 (Opinion of
Advocate-General Lger) (citing K Lenaerts & P van Ypersele: "Le principe de subsidiarit6
et son contexte: 6tude de l'article 3 B du Trait6 GE," (1994) 1-2 Cahiers de Droit
Europ~en 3 (par 100); G Strozzi: "Le principe de subsidiarit6 dans la perspective de
l'int6gration europ6enne: une 6nigme et beaucoup d'attentes," (1994) 30(3) Revue
Trimestrielle de Droit Europ6en 373)).
446. EG Treaty art. 5.
447. Marquardt, Subsidiarity, supra note 172, at 618.
448. Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5783, par. 126, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R at 699,
par. 126 (Opinion of Advocate-General LUger) (quoting K Lenaerts and P van Ypersele:
"Le principe de subsidiarit et son contexte: &tude de 'article 3 B du Trait6 CE," (1994)
1-2 Cahiers de Droit Europ6en 3 (par 100)).
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to how [the Community's] powers are to be exercised... ."449 This lan-
guage would seem to indicate that subsidiarity does in fact relate to the
manner in which the Community exercises its powers. It further seems to
confirm the position of George Bermann that the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality "bear a much more awkward relationship to
each other than is commonly supposed."450 Indeed the English text of
Article 5 provides direct support for the proposition that subsidiarity con-
tains a proportionality component: "[T]he Community shall take action
... only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States"451-"insofar as" here imply-
ing "only to the extent that."452
Conversely, as George Bermann notes, proportionality also contains
a subsidiarity component. Proportionality requires that the Community
opt for the least burdensome of the various alternatives available for
achieving the intended legislative objective. Although a Community mea-
sure may be reasonably related to its stated purpose and advantageous
from a cost-benefit standpoint-both elements of proportionality-the
measure "may nevertheless not have been necessary, in the sense that ac-
tion taken at the Member State level, or perhaps non-regulation alto-
gether, would have been quite effective in achieving the Community's
goals."455
Hence, the British position in the Working Time Directive case-that "a
measure will be proportionate only if it is consistent with the principle of
subsidiarity"454 -is justified both by a reasonable understanding of the
proportionality principle and a fair reading of the subsidiarity language
in the Treaty itself. In its challenge to the Working Time Directive, the
United Kingdom in effect argued for an interpretive presumption against
a broad reading of the Community's autonomous legislative authority not
unlike the one advanced earlier in this Article. 455 In the case of then-
Article 118a, the United Kingdom asserted that the Community's author-
ity to adopt directives regarding the "working environment," as well as
"the health and safety of workers," should be limited to regulating the
449. Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 432, section 3 (emphasis added).
450. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 336.
451. EG Treaty art. 5 (emphasis added).
452. Other language versions of the Treaty are to the same effect. See, e.g., the
German version of Article 5, which provides: "wird die Gemeinschaft nach dem
Subsidiaritktsprinzip nur titig, sofem und soweit die Ziele der in Betracht gezogenen
MaBnahmen auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten nicht ausreichend erreicht werden k6nnen
und daher wegen ihres Umfangs oder ihrer Wirkungen besser auf Gemeinschaftsebene
erreicht werden k6nnen." The German "soweit" is the exact translation of English "in so
far," with "so" meaning "so" and "weit" meaning "far." Official language versions of the
Treaties generally have a very high linguistic equivalence, for the reason that the Treaty
must be equally authentic in all eleven official languages.
453. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48, at 388.
454. Working Time Directive, 1996 E.G. 1-5755, 1-5810, para. 54, [1996] 3 G.M.L.RL
671, 718, para. 54.
455. See supra notes 336-339 and accompanying text.
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"physical conditions and risks at the workplace."4 56 It should not be read
as extending to other non-physical factors like working time broadly con-
ceived unless there existed "a genuine and objective link to the 'health
and safety' of workers."457 Moreover, the United Kingdom asserted,
then-Article 118a's reference to "minimum requirements" should be read
literally, empowering the Community "to adopt harmonisation measures
only at a level acceptable to all Member States and constituting a mini-
mum benchmark."45 8
In support of this position, the government of the United Kingdom
might have looked to an American administrative law analogue-the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in the so-called Benzene
case.4 59 The plurality opinion in Benzene provides a useful guide for pro-
ceeding with terms like "safety" and "health" in a regulatory statute, re-
quiring that the relevant decisionmakers find that a condition is "unsafe"
or "unhealthy" before they can legislate.460 The plurality opinion of the
Supreme Court stressed that allowing the administrative sphere to make
rules without such a finding would amount to "such a 'sweeping delega-
tion of legislative power' that it might be unconstitutional" under the
American nondelegation doctrine. 461 Similarly restricting the scope of
the Community's normative autonomy relative to the Member States is
especially necessary with regard to provisions like the old Article 118a, of
which the key terms ("health" and "safety") were at best ambiguous,
largely due to the fact that they resulted from a legislative compromise
456. Working Time Directive 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5799, para. 13, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 710,
para. 13.
457. Id. at 1-5799-5800, paras. 13-15, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 710-11, paras. 13-15.
458. Id. at 1-5800, para. 16, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 711, para. 16.
459. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) [hereinafter Benzene]. This action involved the power of the U.S. Secretary of
Labor to promulgate "occupational safety and health standards" under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 95-596, 84 Stat. 1590, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651
et seq. (1994). Section 3(8) of the Act defined such standards as those "reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8). Section 6(b) (5), on the other hand, obligated the
Secretary to issue standards "to the extent feasible." 29 U.S.C.§ 655(b) (5). The
reasonableness language of the definitional provision implied a cost-benefit analysis, and
the feasibility language of the substantive provision could imply, but did not necessarily,
the most protective standard regardless of cost or technology. Although the grant of
rulemaking authority under section 6(b) (5) was seemingly open-ended-not unlike the
ECJ's interpretation of Article 118a-the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court held that
the Act required the Secretary "to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is
unsafe-in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by
a change in practices"-before promulgating a new standard. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642
(emphasis added).
460. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642.
461. Id. at 646 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
539 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). The plurality's holding
may be read as a response to Justice Rehnquist's urging that the statute be struck down on
nondelegation grounds. See 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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among the Member States themselves. 462 Using subsidiarity as an inter-
pretive principle permits the delegation of legislative authority to the su-
pranational level, but also reasonably restricts the scope of that authority
in the interest of more democratically legitimate regulation at the Mem-
ber State level.
Consistent with the constitutionalist perspective, subsidiarity has too
often been viewed simply as a principle of an emergent European "feder-
alism,"463 thus conferring a degree of sovereign legitimacy on the
Community that it does not independently possess, apart from delega-
tions by the Member States. Properly understood, the subsidiarity princi-
ple in the European Community must, at a minimum, serve the same
interpretive function as the nondelegation doctrine in the United States,
favoring Treaty interpretations that minimize the Community's norma-
tive autonomy. Viewed in a nondelegation sense, subsidiarity becomes a
means of ensuring "that important choices of social policy are made by
• . . the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
will."464 In the Community legal system, the Member States severally are
the "branch" most responsive to the popular will. The Court's expansive
interpretation of provisions like the old Article 118a should be strongly
disfavored unless there is clear evidence of a "legislative" intent on the
part of the Member States to confer such authority on the Community as
their agent.465 Indeed, the Court's decision in the Working Time Directive
case, as well as the published opinion of the Advocate-General in that
case, leave serious questions as to whether any such evidence exists. 4 66
462. See Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5765, para. 34, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at
683, para. 34 (Opinion of Advocate-General _ger) (noting that interpreting Article 118a is
a delicate matter because of the different views that collaborated to create this compromise
version).
463. See, e.g., Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 48.
464. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
465. Cf. Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 28 (stating that a "precise[]
and narrow[ ]" definition of the assigned regulatory tasks is a necessary precondition to
the delegation of normative power to Community institutions).
466. Neither the Court nor Advocate-General L~ger could produce persuasive
evidence of a legislative intent supporting a broad reading of Article 118a, which forced
them to turn instead to highly debatable textual interpretations of the Community's
authority. The Court stressed the words "especially in the working environment" in Article
118a, which it saw as "militat[ing] in favour of a broad interpretation of the powers which
Article 118a confers upon the Council for the protection of the health and safety of
workers." Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5800, para. 15. Lacking solid evidence of
the Member States' intent, the Court then asserted that a broad reading of the words
"safety" and "health" "derives support in particular from the preamble to the Constitution
of the World Health Organisation to which all the Member States belong. Health is there
defined as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being that does not consist
only in the absence of illness or infirmity." Id.
Advocate-General Lger's argument was somewhat more elaborate but also devoid of
solid evidence of an intent that Article 118a should be interpreted broadly. See id. at I-
5767-70, paras. 39-50 (Opinion of Advocate-General Lger). Aside from the WHO
evidence on the meaning of "health" also cited by the Court, which is of questionable
[Vol. 99:628
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER OF TlE EC
D. Choice of Legal Basis and Subsidiarity as a Nondelegation Doctrine
The scope of any one Treaty provision necessarily bears on the more
fundamental question of the choice of legal basis and, by extension, of
the required voting procedure in the Council-unanimity versus quali-
fied-majority. On its face, the Working Time Directive case involved a dis-
pute over whether a qualified-majority basis (Article 118a) or a unanimity
basis (either Article 100 or Article 235467) was appropriate in the circum-
stances. 468 Here, too, subsidiarity should be used as an interpretive prin-
ciple presumptively favoring the Member States. That is, where there is
ambiguity as to what the appropriate legal basis should be for a particular
piece of legislation like the Working Time Directive, the Court should
opt for the basis which mandates unanimity in the Council as a means of
protecting the prerogatives of the individual Member States.469
The Working Time Directive case, however, also points to the tensions
that will inevitably flow from the Community's increasingly prevalent vari-
able geometry. At the heart of variable geometry in Community law is the
right of certain Member States not to participate in particular categories
of legislation, which this Article views as a means of asserting national
control over legislative domains otherwise claimed by the Community.470
These rights may give rise to potentially difficult problems of line-drawing
between those general legal bases applicable to all Member States-like
the old Article 118a-and those from which a particular Member State
has secured a right not to participate. 47 1
The conflict over the Working Time Directive suggests how sub-
sidiarity can also serve a useful interpretive function in this context as
well. Underlying the case was arguably the tension between the Commu-
relevance at best, Advocate-General L~ger cited a Danish statute to support his reading of
the term "working environment." Id. at 1-5767, para. 42 (citing The Danish Working
Environment Act, Law 681 of 23 December 1975, which entered into force on July 1, 1977
(printed by the Danish Labour Inspection Service, Copenhagen, 1981)). The Advocate-
General argued that this statute was relevant because the original proposal for the Working
Time Directive had come from Denmark.
467. Now EC Treaty arts. 94 and 308.
468. We need not dwell on the United Kingdom's legal basis argument, as it was
grounded in the already extensively described narrow reading of Article 118a, which thus
left only Article 100 or 235 (now art. 94 or 308) as the possible legal bases. Article 100
provided general authority to adopt harmonization directives for the establishment of the
common market. Article 100a (added to the EC Treaty by the SEA in 1986) changed the
voting mechanism for directives in completion of the internal market to qualified majority,
but by its terms (see Article 100a(2)), it did not apply to legislation "relating to the rights
and interests of employed persons." Article 235 was the Community's "necessary and
proper" clause, and also required unanimity. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Article 235.
469. See, e.g., my critique of the ECJ's decision in Titanium Dioxide Waste, 1991 E.C.R.
1-2867, 1-2900, [1993] 3 C.M.L.1R 359, supra notes 378-390 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 380-387 and accompanying text.
471. See the discussion of variable geometry and the likelihood of intensified disputes
over the relative competences of the Community and the Member States, supra Part III.D.
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nity's general legislative authority under the old Article ll8a to regulate
"health and safety of workers," and its more specific authority-from which
the United Kingdom had expressly opted out-under the so-called Protocol
and Agreement on Social Policy attached to the Treaty on European
Union in 1992.472 Under the terms of the Protocol, any legislation
adopted under the Protocol and Agreement would not be binding on the
United Kingdom.473 The Protocol and Agreement authorized the re-
maining Member States, excluding the United Kingdom, to adopt direc-
tives for, inter alia, "the promotion of employment, improved living and
working conditions, [and] proper social protection."474 Confusingly, Ar-
ticle 2 of the Agreement nearly tracks the language of the old Article
118a, speaking of social legislation for "the improvement in particular of
the working environment to protect workers' health and safety." 475
There was little or no guidance as to what distinguished a "health and
safety" measure based on the old Article 118a from one based on Article
2 of the Agreement, save perhaps that the latter were also adopted for
"the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions,
[and] proper social protection."476
In its challenge to the Working Time Directive, the United Kingdom
asserted that the Council had misused the Community's authority under
then-Article 118a to pursue other social policy goals, notablyjob creation
and reduced unemployment.477 The Court responded to this argument
by again relying on conclusory assertions in the directive's recitals, 478 in
much the same way as it responded to Germany's subsidiarity claim in the
Deposit-Guarantee Schemes case. 479 The Court did not dispute that the
Working Time Directive "may affect employment,"480 but argued that it
"is o broad in its scope and coverage as to be capable of classification as a
social policy measure, for the adoption of which other legal bases ex-
472. 1992 OJ. (C 224) 126-29. For an overview of the evolution of Community social
policy, with particular reference to the United Kingdom's refusal to take part in the
expansion of Community competences in this field in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see
David O'Keeffe, The Uneasy Progress of European Social Policy, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 241
(1996); see also Ferdinand von Prondzynski & Ada Kewley, Social Law in the European
Union: The Search for a Philosophy, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 265 (1996) (discussing social
policy issues in light of the U.K. opt-out from the Social Policy Protocol of the Treaty on
European Union).
473. Protocol on Social Policy, sec. 2, paras. 1 and 3, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 126.
474. Agreement on Social Policy art. 1, 1992 OJ. (C 224) 127.
475. Id., art. 2.
476. Id., art. 1.
477. See Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755, 1-5763, para. 26 (Opinion of
Advocate-General Uger) (citing sections 3.12 and 3.13 of the United Kingdom's
application to the Court). One might also speculate that one aim of the directive was to
impose greater labor costs on firms operating in the United Kingdom, reducing that
country's competitive advantage over other Member States with more costly systems of
legally mandated workers' benefits, such as France and Germany.
478. See id. at 1-5803-04, para. 29.
479. See supra notes 427-431 and accompanying text.
480. Working Time Directive, 1996 E.C.RL at 1-5804, para. 30.
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ist."48 1 Although the Court further conceded that "the directive consti-
tutes a practical contribution towards creating the social dimension of the
internal market,"4 2 the Court asserted that "it does not follow from the
fact that the directive falls within the scope of Community social policy
that it cannot properly be based on Article l18a, so long as it contributes
to encouraging improvements as regards the health and safety of
workers."48 3
Here, precisely, is the weakest element of the Court's reasoning. As
the United Kingdom persuasively demonstrated-and as the Court effec-
tively conceded-there was no scientific evidence that the directive's provi-
sions would actually contribute to workers' health and safety.48 4 Given this
absence, as well as the ambiguity with regard to the appropriate legal
basis for the legislation, the Court should have, in the interest of sub-
sidiarity, favored an interpretation of the Treaty that best preserved the
rights of the opted-out Member State.48 5
The impact on the remaining Member States would have been mini-
mal, unless, of course, the purpose of the measure was to make social
costs more uniform across the Community, removing the competitive ad-
vantage of low-cost Member States. This is a perfectly legitimate objec-
tive, but if it were the true purpose, the old Article 118a would clearly
have been an inappropriate legal basis. Had the Court rejected Article
118a as the appropriate legal basis, it would have merely forced the re-
maining Member States to proceed under either a unanimity basis or
under the authority granted in the Protocol and Agreement on Social
Policy attached to the TEU. In the latter circumstance, both the United
Kingdom and the remaining Member States would have benefited from
precisely the flexibility that advocates of variable geometry have hoped to
introduce into Community law.48 6
481. Id. at 1-5803, para. 26.
482. Id., para. 27 (citing the sixth recital in the preamble of the Working Time
Directive).
483. Id.
484. The Court implied as much when it stated that the authority to adopt a
harmonization directive "cannot be limited exclusively to circumstances where the
justification for such action is scientifically demonstrated." Id. at 1-5806, para. 39 (citation
omitted).
485. At a minimum, one might have expected the Court, in its interpretation of the
scope of the old Article 118a, at least to take cognizance of the potential overlap with
Article 2 of the Agreement. Even if subsequently negotiated, the Protocol and Agreement
would seem to indicate an understanding by the Member States that the scope of the old
Article 118a was insufficientiy broad to encompass health and safety rules adopted
primarily for social policy purposes-in contradiction to what the majority of Member
States were claiming for the old Article 118a at the time of the adoption of the Working
Time Directive. Otherwise, the more expansive language of Article 2 of the Agreement-
again, from which the United Kingdom had expressly opted out-would have been
unnecessary. Certainly, this constitutes more concrete evidence of Member State intent
than the evidence cited by the Court and the Advocate-General. See supra note 466.
486. See supra notes 180-194 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, while the benefit in terms of Community legislation was
arguably small, the cost of sanctioning this use of the old Article 118a in
this way was, in terms of democratic legitimacy, quite high. The Court's
disposition of the Working Time Directive case was not simply contrary to
the spirit of subsidiarity; rather, the decision actually circumvented the
democratic process at the national level. It was ultimately the right of the
British people to judge the decision of its national government to opt out
of Community social legislation-which they in part did by giving Labour
a majority in the 1997 general election.4 87 It was not for the Commission
and the remaining Member States, exploiting a debatable understanding
of the extent of Community competences under then-Article 118a, to im-
pose their will on the British government and people. By sanctioning this
claim of open-ended normative power at the supranational level, the
Court undermined still further the democratic legitimacy of Community
institutions.
VII. THE ISSUE OF Komiir ,Vz-KOMP=NzE-.z TOWARD A EUROPEAN
CoNmIcTs TRmuNAL
Had the British electorate kept the Conservatives in office after 1997,
the Government would have had little or no recourse, either politically or
legally, to challenge the Court's Working Time Directive decision. Although
a negotiated political solution with the remaining Member States was not,
formally speaking, out of the question, it was almost certainly a practical
impossibility.488 Moreover, the possibility of a further legal challenge
under Community law was non-existent. The ECJ had long held that it,
487. Indeed, the Labour Party's election manifesto committed a Labour government
to adopt the Social Protocol and Agreement (the "Social Chapter") as part of a more
general plan to offer a "fresh start in Europe." Labour Manifesto, Times (London), Apr. 4,
1997, at IV. The Conservatives tried to make this commitment a major campaign issue but
still lost. Ian Lang, President of the Board of Trade under the Conservative government of
John Major, asserted that the Labour Manifesto was "the biggest IOU to the unions in
British electoral history. Promise after promise conforms exactly to the unions' agenda:
statutory union recognition, a national minimum wage and the European Social Chapter."
Labour's Manifesto is the "Biggest I.O.U. in British Electoral History," Universal News
Servs., Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S. File. Furthermore, at a
press conference at Conservative Party headquarters on the eve of the General Election,
John Major asked the voters specifically not to vote for Labour "[b] ecause if Labour follow
policies like those in Europe and sign up to the Social Chapter and minimum wage, the
extra costs on business mean we would get Europe's unemployment too." You'll be worse
off under Labour, M2 Presswire, Apr. 30, 1997, available in NEXIS, News Library, Non-U.S.
File. The Labour government of Tony Blair confirmed soon after the election that the
United Kingdom would end its opt-out at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1997, and
the provisions of the Agreement have since been incorporated into the Treaty of
Amsterdam, inserting new Articles 117-120 into the EC Treaty (arts. 136-143).
488. Repeal of the Directive itself would have required, under the old Article 118a(2),
a qualified majority in the Council and Parliamentary "cooperation" under Article 189c
(now Article 252), whereas negotiating a Treaty revision of the scope of Artidcle 118a would
have required unanimous consent of the Member States. Both were unlikely prospects
given that the British Conservatives were isolated in their opposition to the measure.
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and it alone, had exclusive competence to rule on the validity of a
Community act.489 This authority necessarily includes the exclusive com-
petence to rule on the extent of Community competences, or, as it is
called in German, Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The Court had thus established
itself as the supreme legal arbiter of the scope of the Community's au-
thority relative to the Member States, from which there was no legal
appeal.490
The Working Time Directive decision is evidence of how democratically
problematic the ECJ's claim of Kompetenz-Kompetenz has become since the
advent of qualified-majority voting in the Council in 1986. By expanding
the relative autonomy of Community institutions from Member State con-
trol, qualified-majority voting creates a classic principal-agent problem,
albeit one with an important supranational twist, owing directly to the
lack of a democratically-legitimate hierarchical superior within the
Community legal system. 49 1 A Member State's ministerial representatives
in the Council could now find themselves in disagreement with their "co-
principals," the ministers representing the other Member States, who
might agree with the Commission's legislative proposal and adopt it in
the form of a directive. It is not simply a situation analogous to a member
of a national legislature finding him or herself in the minority on a piece
of legislation. No individual legislator can make a claim to sovereignty
under international law as can a nation-state. 492 Nor can individual legis-
lators representing particular subnational constituencies claim the same
measure of democratic legitimacy that the Member State executives de-
rive from representing a national community in the Council.
The only recourse for the dissenting Member State or States is to
challenge the action before the ECJ. Yet, because the ECJ has consist-
ently favored a broad interpretation of the Community's legislative com-
petences, any one Member State or group of Member States that found
itself on the short end of a qualified-majority vote would take little com-
fort in the fact that legal action before the Court was available. Because
of its teleological "preference for Europe," the Court has demonstrated
itself to be an unreliable defender of the interests of particular Member
States against the Community as a whole. This is especially true onjuris-
489. See, e.g., Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lfibeck-Ost, 1987
E.C.R. 4199; Case 66/80, SpA Int'l Chem. Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato, 1981 E.C.R. 1191.
490. In this regard, the ECJ benefits from whatJoseph Weiler has called "that deep-
seated legitimacy that derives from the mythic neutrality and religious-like authority with
which we invest our supreme courts." Weiler, Transformation, supra note 31, at 2428. In a
press release following the Court's announced decision, the then-President of the Board of
Trade in Britain, Ian Lang, said: "The European Court of Justice has now given its
judgment, and we will obey the law." United Kingdom Government Press Release, P/96/
915, 6 Dec. 1996, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, EC NEWS File.
491. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
492. This is true culturally no matter how tenuous that claim is increasingly becoming
as an empirical matter.
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dictional questions: The Court has never struck down a piece of
Community legislation "for pure and simple lack of competence."
4 93
Individual Member States could tolerate this state of affairs prior to
1986, when unanimous voting gave each a veto over the Community's
legislative output. With the advent of qualified-majority voting, however,
"the seeds-indeed the buds-of crisis became visible." 494 In 1990, Jo-
seph Weiler, writing with Jean Paul Jacqu6, foresaw "a ticking constitu-
tional time bomb which one day might threaten the evolution and stabil-
ity of the Community."495 Professors Jacqu6 and Weiler continued:
Sooner or later, "supreme" courts in the Member States would
realise that the "socio-legal contract" announced by the Court in
its major constitutionalising decisions, namely that "the Com-
munity constitutes a new legal order.., for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields" (emphasis added) has been shattered, that although they
(the "supreme" courts) have accepted the principles of the new
legal order-supremacy and direct effect-the fields [do] not
seem any more to be limited, and that, in the absence of Com-
munity legislative or legal checks it will fall on them to draw the
jurisdictional lines of the Community and its Member States. 49 6
This prediction proved prescient. In 1994, in what is known as the
Maastricht Decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court explicitly as-
serted its independent authority, as a matter of German constitutional
law, to rule on the outer scope of Community competences, effectively
rejecting the ECJ's claim of exclusive Kompetenz-Kompetenz.4 97 On its face,
the German Maastricht Decision appears to be "an egregious violation of
the Treaty"4 98 and "incompatible with the needs of contemporary Eu-
rope. '499 However, in perhaps the most penetrating examination of the
legal-theoretical underpinnings of the decision, Neil MacCormick has
shown that these sorts of "criticisms are altogether too hasty."500 Profes-
sor MacCormick argues that the relationship between the highest tribu-
nals in the Member States and the ECJ must be understood as "pluralistic
493. Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23, at 388.
494. Id.; see also J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35
J. Common Mkt. Stud. 97, 124 (1997) [hereinafter Weiler, Reformation]; J.H.H. Weiler &
Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-Through the Looking
Glass, 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411, 445 (1996); Weiler et al., supra note 128, at 36; Jean Paul
Jacqu& & Joseph H.H. Weiler, On the Road to European Union-A New Judicial
Architecture: An Agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference, 27 Common Mkt. L. Rev.
185, 201 (1990).
495. JacquE & Weiler, supra note 494, at 200.
496. Id. at 200-01 (emphasis and parentheticals in original).
497. See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 89 (BVergG 1994)
(Germ.) [hereinafter Maastricht Decision].
498. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 494, at 445.
499. MacCormick, Sovereignty Now, supra note 51, at 265.
500. Id.
[Vol. 99:628
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTER OF THE EC
rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical."501 He ar-
gues that "it must be for the highest constitutional tribunal of each Mem-
ber State to interpret its constitutional and other norms, and hence to
interpret the interaction of the validity of EC law with higher level norms
of validity in the given state system." 502
Following Professor MacCormick's lead, Joseph Weiler has used the
metaphor of a "conversation" between "two constitutionalisms" to de-
scribe the interaction between national courts and the ECJ.503 Rather
than there being a hierarchical judicial structure with the ECJ at the top,
Professor Weiler sees "a constitutional interpretive community" com-
posed of the "supreme" courts in the various Member States and the
ECJ.50 4 As a means of institutionalizing that conversation, Professor Wei-
ler and his many collaborators have suggested the creation of a "Constitu-
tional Council" for the Community, modeled in part on its French name-
sake.505 The President of the ECJ would serve as the presiding judge over
the new tribunal, and the remaining judges would be drawn from sitting
members of the constitutional courts or their equivalent in the Member
States. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council would be limited to
questions of competences, including subsidiarity. By composing this
Constitutional Council of judges from national tribunals, Professor
Weiler would hope to "underscore that the question of competences is
fundamentally one of national constitutional norms,"50 6 thus addressing
some of the cultural tensions associated with supranational delegation
that have been described earlier.50 7
Professor Weiler's proposal moves in the correct direction but, from
the administrative perspective advanced here, is flawed both practically
and theoretically. As a practical matter, the proposal excessively restricts
both the timing of review and the standing of the parties entitled to bring
a claim before the new tribunal. According to Professor Weiler, only
Community institutions (including the European Parliament acting on a
majority of its members) or the Member States (presumably their execu-
tives) should have the right to submit an action, and only in the interim
between the law's adoption and its coming into force. 508 If the purpose
of the proposal is to institutionalize a "conversation" over the relative
boundaries of Community and Member State competences, this sort of
"abstract norm control" in the French tradition is an extremely narrow
way of facilitating it. National courts and especially individual litigants
501. Id.
502. Id. at 264.
503. Weiler, Reformation, supra note 494, at 125.
504. Id. at 127.
505. Weiler & Trachtman, supra note 23, at 391-92; see Weiler, Reformation, supra
note 494, at 127; Weiler & Haltern, supra note 494, 447-48; Weiler et al., supra note 128, at
38; see also Jacqu6 & Weiler, supra note 494, at 204.
506. Weiler, Reformation, supra note 494, at 127.
507. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
508. Compare Fr. Const. art. 61.
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should be allowed to participate in the conversation as well, by raising
questions of competences in the context of actual litigation, assuming
that the litigant has suffered some injury-in-fact reasonably traceable to
the Community legislation at issue.509 Expanding standing in this way
will bring decisionmaking closer to the individual while also perhaps im-
proving the quality of review, by giving the new tribunal a concrete set of
facts upon which to rule. More importantly, it will put the national courts
in a position to use precisely the same sort of "courteously didactic
method" with the ECJ on questions of competences that the ECJ has long
used with national courts in the pursuit of European integration.5 10
On a theoretical level, Professor Weiler's proposal also exhibits insuf-
ficient sensitivity to the legitimate prerogatives of the Member States as
loci of democratic legitimacy within the Community. Professor Weiler
acknowledges that " [t] here has been no constitutional convention in Eu-
rope"; nevertheless, he wants to establish an institution that will avoid
"compromising the constitutional integrity of the Community as did the
German Maastrcht decision."51 If one believes, as I do, that the Commu-
nity is better understood as administrative in character, and that the
greatest threat to its integrity is the lack of democratically-legitimate polit-
ical control over its norm production, the Constitutional Council as pro-
posed would do little to address this central problem.
There are attractive elements to the proposal: staffing of the new
tribunal with sitting national judges, and shifting the telos of the new
body to scrutinizing with greater care the boundary between national and
Community competence, as the ECJ has shown little willingness to do.
Unfortunately, other aspects of the proposal risk exacerbating the prob-
lem of legitimate political control by, for example, precluding any Mem-
ber State from exercising a veto within the new body and by underscoring
that all disputes are "subject to a [supranational] solution by a [suprana-
tional] institution."5 12 Perhaps its most significant drawback is that the
new tribunal constitutes an exclusively legal solution to a problem that is
both legal and political. "[N] ot all legal problems can be solved legally,"
Neil MacCormick warns, and "[r] esolving such problems, or more wisely
still, avoiding their occurrence in the first place, is a matter for circum-
spection and for political as much as legal judgment."513 Thus, the chal-
lenge facing Europe is to develop an institution that attempts to resolve
conflicts between Community and Member State competences as far as
509. The application of some form of injury-in-fact doctrine will ensure that the
individual litigant is seeking to redress something more than simply a generalized
grievance against the adoption of Community legislation.
510. Mancini, supra note 102, at 606.
511. Weiler, Reformation, supra note 494, at 126-27. The character of the
Community as a constitutional entity is apparently emerging, in Professor Weiler's view,
from "a common-law type" process, "one which draws on and integrates the national
constitutional orders .... " Id.
512. Id. at 127.
513. MacCormick, Sovereignty Now, supra note 51, at 265.
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possible legally, but nevertheless builds in political rights that fully account
for the greater democratic legitimacy of the Member States.
Principles of administrative law again may prove useful here. From
an administrative perspective, the ECJ's claim of unchecked Kompetenz-
Kompetenz should be rejected because it amounts to allowing the adjudica-
tive branch of an administrative agency to act as the final and exclusive
judge of the scope of the agency's own jurisdiction. In defense of this
state of affairs, one might counter that the Community simply follows the
French administrative tradition, with a separate system ofjustice organi-
cally attached to the administrative sphere but also historically independ-
ent from it,514 a claim that the ECJ can certainly substantiate vis-a-vis the
Community's "political" branches. Even in the French tradition, how-
ever, the administrative courts are not the ultimate judge of the scope of
administrative competence, at least relative to the judicial courts. In cases
of conflict between the two orders ofjurisdiction, a Tribunal des Conflits is
convened, comprised ofjudges from both the supreme administrative and
judicial courts (the Conseil d'ttat and the Cour de Cassation), to rule on
the conflict. 515
The time has come, as Joseph Weiler has correctly recognized, to
establish a similarly distinct body at the European level-what I call a
"European Conflicts Tribunal"-to rule on the question of the relative
competences of the Community and the Member States, not merely of
their courts but more importantly of their respective "legislatures" as well.
My proposed tribunal would be comprised, like Professor Weiler's "Con-
stitutional Council," of sitting judges from national supreme courts or
their equivalent, and be presided over by the president of the ECJ. Deci-
sionmaking in the new tribunal, however, would not be limited to "ab-
stract norm control" upon reference by a Member State or Community
institution;516 rather, I would also allow national courts and individual
litigants to interpose conflicts of jurisdiction as well, as long as individual
514. See generally Jacques Chevallier, L'Elaboration historique du principe de
sparation de lajuridiction administrative et de l'administration active (1970).
515. See generally L. Neville Brown &John S. Bell, French Administrative Law 152-56
(5th ed. 1998). Conflicts between judicial and administrative jurisdiction have a deep
significance in the political and legal history of France, extending back to the Old Regime.
See, e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Part Two,
Chapter Four (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1955) ("How administrative justice and the immunity
of public servants were institutions of the old regime."). Much of the tension owed to the
fact that, until the definitive establishment of the Third Republic in the 1870s, the Conseil
d'Etat possessed ultimate authority to rule on the scope of administrative jurisdiction
relative to the ordinary judicial courts-in effect, Kompetenz-Kompetenz. A cornerstone of
the new Republican legal order established in the 1870s was the transfer of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz to a distinct body, the Tribunal des conflits. See c. Adm. 539 (20th ed. Dalloz
1989) Law of May 24, 1872, art. 25.
516. Community institutions and the Member States would have standing to
challenge the Community act, but only after first bringing an Article 230 (ex art. 173)
action in the European Court ofJustice. Member States could also interpose a conflict in
an Article 226 (ex art. 169) enforcement proceeding brought by the Commission.
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standing requirements are satisfied and the available national and EC
legal remedies are exhausted first. This exhaustion requirement would
have two parts: first, that the national court make a preliminary refer-
ence to the ECJ under Article 234 (ex Article 177) on the question of the
scope of Community law; and second, that all appeals then be exhausted
at the national level, including full appeal to the highest court in the
relevant judicial hierarchy on the question of the conflict between Mem-
ber State and Community competence. If the supreme appellate court at
the Member State level finds that the Community has overstepped its au-
thority, the matter should then be referred to the European Conflicts
Tribunal.
Should a decision of the European Conflicts Tribunal be the end of
the matter? The new tribunal would still constitute a supranational body,
in that no single Member State would have a veto over its decisionmak-
ing. Following Neil MacCormick's admonition that "not all legal
problems can be solved legally,"5 17 the Community should explore
whether to give the Member States a further "political" right of appeal
from a decision of the Conflicts Tribunal. If the dissenting Member State
or States are dissatisfied with the ruling of the Conflicts Tribunal, one
option could be to refer the matter to the European Council for consid-
eration at its regular semi-annual summit. This body, composed of the
heads of state or government and the foreign ministers of each Member
State, along with the President of the European Commission and the
Commissioner for External Affairs, is charged with defining the "general
political guidelines" of the entire European Union.518 It therefore consti-
tutes the most appropriate political forum within which to debate the
question of conflict over the relative competences of the Community and
the Member States. If the concerned Member State cannot negotiate a
satisfactory political solution within the European Council, the Member
State should then be allowed to opt out of the legislation.
This Conflicts Tribunal procedure attempts to strike a balance be-
tween the need for uniformity and stability in Community law and the
more democratically-legitimate prerogatives of the Member States. A sta-
bilizing element of the proposed conflicts procedure is that it will first
require a dissenting Member State to state in legal terms its objection to
Community competence, thus favoring the development of legal princi-
ples-including subsidiarity-to define the relative boundary between
national and Community authority. This essentially judicial process, in
turn, should benefit the quality of political and technical deliberation
within Community institutions as well, by forcing the relevant players to
take cognizance of colorable jurisdictional objections at an earlier
517. MacCormick, Sovereignty Now, supra note 51, at 265 (suggesting giving due
regard to political considerations in interpreting the relative competences of the ECJ and
the national courts).
518. TEU art. 4 (ex art. D).
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stage.519 It largely allows the regular process of Community legislation
and judicial review to proceed in the first instance, and further makes a
Member State's ultimate right to opt out subject to a number of signifi-
cant procedural conditions precedent. In this sense, it is not unlike the
closer cooperation procedures of the new Treaty of Amsterdam and is
simply another manifestation of the emerging variable geometry in
Community law.520
The most important dimensions of the proposal, however, are the
political rights of appeal and opt-out, in that those rights attempt to ad-
dress the "normative yearning" for legitimate democratic control over ad-
ministrative decisionmaking that I believe lies at the center of the demo-
cratic deficit, both nationally and supranationally. 521 The elected
governments of the Member States, as the more legitimate decision mak-
ers, should have ultimate political responsibility-subject to significant
legal conditions precedent-to determine the relative scope of national
and supranational competences insofar as they affect the content of regu-
latory norms applicable within national borders. Should the government
of a Member State decide to opt out after pursuing the conflicts process
to its judicial and political conclusion, it will then be for the national
electorate, in the exercise of its democratic rights, to judge whether the
government's decision was in the country's best interests.
Undoubtedly, the existence of an opt-out right raises legitimate con-
cerns regarding the incentives given to potentially uncooperative Mem-
ber States. Governments of Member States facing the greatest increased
costs from the adoption of a new piece of Community legislation-the
hypothetical "up-stream" polluter, for example-will also have the
greater incentive to opt out, making it even more difficult to reach con-
sensus on public-regarding legislation at the Community level. Perhaps
more dangerously, a particular Member State government may choose to
opt out solely to cement political deals with powerful constituencies at
home, regardless of a potentially positive impact on the overall domestic
economy.
In my view, however, these objections are not decisive. The choice to
opt out would carry significant political costs, and the prospect of incur-
ring these costs may in fact tend toward public-regarding legislation at
the Community level rather than against it, while also augmenting the
legislation's democratic legitimacy. A decision by a Member State govern-
519. I hypothesize an effect similar to that which Alec Stone has described with regard
to the French Constitutional Council. See Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in
France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective 122-29 (1992) (arguing
that the prospect of constitutional review by the Council has "juridicized" the policymaking
process in France, more specifically through the process of autolimitation ("the
government's exercise of legislative self-restraint from anticipation of a referral to, and an
eventual negative decision of, the Constitutional Council") and corrective revision ("where
lawmakers are forced to rewrite legislation after a negative decision")).
520. See supra notes 180-194 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 311-316 and accompanying text.
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ment to opt out, after a very public invocation of the Conflicts Tribunal
and reference to the European Council, should be sufficiently controver-
sial as to garner the attention of the domestic press, both specialized and
general. The ensuing public debate should in fact reduce the institu-
tional "slack" that might allow a Member State government to conceal its
decision from the broader public.522 In turn, the very publicness of a
Member State government's decision to opt out will counter the other-
wise weak incentives for citizens to inform themselves about the details of
government policy.523 All in all, the incentives structure created by the
conflicts process proposed here-including the opt-out right-should
force Member State governments to pay greater attention to the electoral
consequences of their positions with regard to the particular European
legislation at issue.
CONCLUSION
Is the European Community so unique as a supranational body that
it is difficult to draw general lessons from its experience? Certainly the
Community is distinguished from other international organizations in its
range of delegated normative powers, both legislative and adjudicative, as
well as its relative independence from unilateral Member State control.
No other international organization can claim similar authority, or at
least not to the same extent. I would argue, however, that this indisputa-
bly broad range of autonomous normative powers does not distinguish
the Community in its legal character from other less ambitious experi-
ments with supranational delegation, such as the dispute settlement
panels of the WTO. All such organizations share a similar telos-"to
overcome the significant coordination or collective-action problems that
[the] membership otherwise faces." 524 They use similar means in pursuit
of that telos-delegation of normative power to a non-national body of
experts-thus displacing the elaboration and/or control of a range of
regulatory questions into the realm of international technocratic net-
works. They are, in other words, essentially of an administrative
character.
One might argue that the European case remains unique in the
manner in which its delegated normative powers have been rationalized
in constitutionalist terms, as leading toward "an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe." Of course, the same sort of constitutionalistjusti-
fication is unavailable in other contexts (e.g., GATT/WTO, NAFTA),
522. The notion of "slack" is taken from Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interests, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6J. Law,
Econ. & Organ. 167 (1990) (Special Issue). Levine and Forrence use agency and
information theory to demonstrate the limits on political accountability of representatives
and regulators due to the costs of information and monitoring (e.g., between voters and
legislators, legislators and agencies, etc.). Levine and Forrence call this "slack." Id. at 174.
523. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
524. Croley &Jackson, supra note 4, at 209.
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where no pretense is made that the entity is anything other than an inter-
national organization of independent sovereigns. I would submit, how-
ever, that all such bodies share not merely a similar administrative charac-
ter but also a propensity to deny that character through a kind of tacit
constitutionalist logic. The challenge facing all supranational bodies is
the same: how to balance the legitimate prerogatives of the organiza-
tion's "sovereign" Member States against the broader interest of the
membership as a whole "in realizing the gains of international coordina-
tion."5 25 In seeking this balance, however, there is a built-in prefer-
ence-not unlike the EGJ's "preference for Europe"-to view realizing
the gains of international coordination as decisively outweighing all other
values, like democratic legitimacy.526 In the constitutionalist logic of su-
pranational delegation, the abstract "membership at large" takes on the
role of the legitimate political principal in the system, and it is to this
abstraction that supranational agents are supposed to owe their loyalty.527
Legitimation is thus divorced from the representative institutions of each
member and transferred to the supranational level-the membership at
large. Once legitimacy is removed from the confines of the nation-state
in this way-a process common to all instances of supranational delega-
tion-it follows that any presumption in favor of particular members in
disputes with the organization as a whole, even ifjustified on democratic
legitimacy grounds, is "constitutionally" inappropriate. 528
525. Id. at 212.
526. Joerges and Neyer have gone so far to argue that "the legitimacy of governance
within the constitutional [nation-]states is flawed in so far as it remains inevitably one-sided
and parochial or selfish.... The legitimacy of supranational institutions can be designed
as a cure to these deficiencies-as a correction of 'nation-state failures' as it were." Joerges
& Neyer, supra note 55, at 292.
527. See, e.g., Croley &Jackson, supra note 4, at 209.
528. According to Croley andJackson, such deference "simply has no analogue in the
[supranational] context." Id. (criticizing the use of Chevron deference in the GATr/WTO
antidumping context). Joerges and Neyer attempt to justify supranationalism in
democratic terms by arguing that the inevitable extraterritorial effects of national policies
constitute, from the perspective of neighboring countries, something akin to "taxation
without representation'-that is, a public burden that its citizens must endure while
remaining powerless to alter it through electoral means. SeeJoerges & Neyer, supra note
55, at 292-93. Joerges and Neyer assert that "the very idea of democratic constitutionalism
requires that constitutional states apply th[e] principle [prohibiting 'taxation without
representation'] against themselves." Id. at 293. The notion of democratic
constitutionalism advanced by Joerges and Neyer thus requires "that the interests and
concerns of non-nationals should be considered even within the national polity. In this
sense, supranationalism does convey political rights and not just economic freedoms to
Community citizens. Supranationalism is therefore to be understood as a fundamentally
democratic concept." Id. (emphasis in original). This argument is normatively appealing
but sociologically and historically problematic. It begs the question of the social, cultural
and historical conditions that'must exist before such political rights of non-nationals will
be broadly and popularly interpreted as democratically legitimate. Conceptually, there
may be a certain democratic dimension to arguments in favor of supranational
governance, as Joerges and Neyer assert, but it is difficult to see how one can describe
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By regarding the membership at large as the relevant political princi-
pal in the system, however, the tacit constitutionalist logic of suprana-
tional delegation effectively ignores the issue of the democratic deficit-
that is, the absence of a democratically-legitimate political principal capa-
ble of expressing or symbolizing the sovereignty of a self-governing peo-
ple. This democratic symbolism is essential to lending public confidence
to a political organization's normative functions. Regardless of the scale
or constitutionalist pretense of an international regulatory organization,
without this cultural foundation of democratic legitimacy, all we are left
with, from the standpoint of popular perception, is a technocratic body-
a supranational administrative agency-with an attenuated relationship
to the perceived ultimate source of the agency's normative powers: the
participating states severally as representatives of their "sovereign" peo-
ples. The temptation to ignore this attenuated relationship, perhaps to
read it out of the problem by arguing that the very idea of national sover-
eignty has become an anachronism, 529 in my view simply lays the ground-
work for serious, on-going democratic-legitimacy problems in suprana-
tional bodies.
As long as political identity clings to the nation-state-that is, as long
as it lags behind the shift in the locus of normative power to the suprana-
tional level that has accompanied economic globalization-there will be
democratic-legitimacy problems in supranational bodies.530 This is an
empirical, sociological reality that cannot be theorized away.531 As one
observer has warned, "focusing global issues on trade organizations does
little to remedy the chronic 'democratic deficit' of international institu-
tions."15 2 Rather, "the arrangements for global governance of economic
interaction must command popular confidence,"5 33 and yet, given the
obstacles to democratically-legitimate political control at the suprana-
tional level, these arrangements are often found wanting in this critically
important respect.
supranationalism as "fundamentally" democratic in the absence of the necessary socio-
historical underpinnings.
529. See, e.g., supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
530. However, MatfiLy, supra note 70, at 110, argues: "If [supranational decision-
makers] to an increasing extent defy classification as representing a given state, the
implications of this for the state as the source of legitimacy are that it is no longer the sole
source of such legitimacy." Matlfry sees this as the forerunner of "new political identifies."
Id. This characterization may be true, but for now there is a clear gap between the locus of
normative power and the requisite common political identity needed to legitimate its
exercise. See generally Deflem & Pampel, supra note 61; Shore, supra note 61; Wood,
supra note 61.
531. The temptation to do precisely that, however, is strong, as if legitimacy tied to
the nation-state were simply a question of "the choice and the basic definition of
categories." Jachtenfuchs, supra note 14, at 129. "Sovereignty" is not simply an intellectual
or conceptual category, but a cultural reality that gives meaning to social and political
action.
532. Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1055-56.
533. Id.
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There is, therefore, one clear and general lesson to draw from the
European experience. Efficiency, measured in terms of realizing the
gains from international coordination, cannot be divorced from other,
less-quantifiable values like democratic legitimacy, without the threat of
political backlash. 53 4 Despite the federalist ideal that the Community's
supranational institutions possess a kind of independent constitutional
legitimacy, the pressures from below for some semblance of national
political control have remained strong. Even as they have expanded the
scope of qualified-majority voting in the Council, advocates of intensified
European integration have had to accept a variety of substantive and pro-
cedural rules that are less than optimal when viewed from the standpoint
of efficient international coordination-or, for that matter, of European
"constitutionalism"-which, in some sense, amounts to the same thing.
These include subsidiarity-not merely in Article 5 (ex art. 3b) of the
Treaty but also the evidentiary requirements of the Subsidiarity Protocol
attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam-the pillar structure, comitology,
and variable geometry, along with the retention of unanimous voting in
the Council in important domains. 535 My proposed European Conflicts
Tribunal would simply add to this list.
Although these rules might be difficult to comprehend on efficiency
or constitutionalist grounds, they are entirely understandable when
viewed from an administrative perspective. They are evidence of the
profound cultural desire for democratically-legitimate political control
over technocratic decisionmaking in the era of administrative govern-
ance, both national and supranational. Although a significant range of
normative power has now been displaced to the European level,
Community institutions have not become self-legitimating. Rather, their
legitimacy continues to be channeled through the constitutional struc-
tures of the Member States, like any other administrative body. This is
not to say that Community norms are inherently illegitimate, but only
534. On the concept of backlash, see generally Roe, supra note 80. With specific
relevance to the discussion of supranationalism rooted in free trade agreements, Roe
writes: "Few economically-oriented analysts doubt the efficiency of free trade in most
settings. But if free trade whips up a successful political backlash-the backlash thus far
has failed to influence policy deeply-then efficiency analysis becomes harder." Id. at 238
n.40.
535. It should also be noted that in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, in order to
make the transfer of sovereignty acceptable, several countries introduced provisions into
their constitution designed to increase domestic parliamentary monitoring of the
Community's legislative output. See, e.g., Fr. Const. new art. 88-4 (requiring the French
Government to report proposed Community measures to the French Parliament if those
measures would have fallen within the domestic legislative domain); Grundgesetz art. 23
(requiring notice to the German Bundestag of Community legislation and an opportunity
for the Bundestag to take a position); see also Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the role
of national parliaments in the European Union, preamble, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 113 (seeking
"to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the
European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on matters which may
be of particular interest to them.").
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that they are not worthy of the same degree of respect and deference
owed to the output of a constitutional legislature on the national level.
Supranationalism is a phenomenon in search of a "mediating princi-
ple or principles"536 that will adequately account, on the one hand, for
the legitimate needs of international coordination and, on the other, for
the cultural persistence of the "sovereign" nation-state as "the primary
political unit."5 37 In my view, given the essentially administrative charac-
ter of supranational bodies, administrative law is a good place to start
looking for those principles, as the European example amply demon-
strates. National specialists in administrative law must now join the
broader scholarly debate over the proper means of legitimizing and con-
trolling supranational normative power, notjust in the Community but in
other international organizations as well. Supranational delegation is
never simply a question of choosing the best or most efficient institu-
tional design538; rather, it inevitably raises concerns of democratic legiti-
macy that are central to the study of administrative law.
536. Croley & Jackson, supra note 4, at 212.
537. Picciotto, Networks, supra note 18, at 1055.
538. See Christian Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the
Role of Law in the Process of European Integration, 2 Eur. L.J. 105, 107 (1996). For a view
that emphasizes efficient institutional design as the principal means to legitimation, see
Majone, "Democratic Deficit," supra note 55, at 25.
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